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

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THE

WAY OF SALVATION;

A SERMON,

DELIVERED AT MORRISTOWN, NEW-JERSEY,

February 8, 1829,

BY ALBERT BARNES.

Seventh Edition.

TOGETHER WITH

MR. BARNES' DEFENCE OF THE SERMON,

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AND HIS

"DEFENCE"

BEFORE THE

SECOND PRESBYTERY OF PHILADELPHIA,

IN REPLY TO THE

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

THE

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FEBRUARY 8, 1829.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO

THE FIRST EDITION.

The following Discourse was prepared as a part of the weekly pastoral duties of the Author, and delivered in the midst of a very extensive Revival of Religion. Many were rejoicing in hope of the glory of God; and multitudes were inquiring what they should do to be saved. It occurred that it might be of use to bring together, in a single discourse, the leading doctrines of the Bible respecting God's way of saving men. It was felt that the time of great religious excitement was a period peculiarly favorable for fixing in the minds of multitudes a permanent impression of the system of revealed truth. Such an exhibition, according to the views with which the author is accustomed to interpret the Scriptures, was attempted in this discourse. Under the inexpressible pressure on the spirit of a minister of God at such seasons, it was penned and delivered. It is now printed at the suggestion, and chiefly at the expense of a few friends, simply with the hope of giving a more fixed impression of the views then expressed.

The original plan of the discourse, of necessity, precluded extensive discussion. A few references, with a few notes on the most important topics presented, are now added. The Sermon makes no pretensions to any new or original views. It is supposed to be nothing more than

is indicated by its title—an outline of the way of salvation by the Gospel. Such, it is *hoped*, it will be found to be.

One thing has been established, in the author's view, by the delivery of this discourse, as well as by a very frequent and full, but temperate, exhibition of the leading doctrines presented in it—*that injury, is* NOT *done in a revival by a full exhibition of God's plan of saving men according to his sovereign will and pleasure.* No doctrine during the revival in this place has been more fully presented, than that God is a SOVEREIGN in the dispensation of his favors;—that the sinner has on him no claim;—that he is wholly dependent for mercy;—and that if God interpose not, he *must die.*—At the same time, the truth has been as uniformly presented, that the obligation of the sinner is not measured by the favors he hopes to obtain. The duty of an immediate and unqualified surrender into his hands—of a direct and eternal renunciation of all acts of rebellion—of an instantaneous submission to all the terms and requirements of the Gospel, and of an entire committing of all the interests of the soul to the hands of the God long hated, and of the Redeemer long set at nought and contemned, has been urged with all the ability that has been vouchsafed. By the divine blessing on this united presentation of the doctrines of grace, and of man's obligation, so far as the author of this discourse has had opportunity of knowing, most happy results have followed. The convicted sinner has felt the necessity of casting himself on the mercy of God, to be saved or lost at his will. Doing this, peace has followed; the burden of sin has been removed, and the blessings of redemption have distilled upon the spirit like the dews of the morning.

Morristown, Dec. 26, 1829.

THE

WAY OF SALVATION.

"*But after that the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour; that being justified by his grace, we should be made heirs according to the hope of eternal life.*"—Titus, iii. 4, 5, 6, 7.

All men have some scheme of salvation. Except the very few cases where individuals are thrown into a state of despair, there are none who do not expect to be happy beyond the grave. The proof of this is found in the composure with which most men look at eternity; and in their indifference when warned of a coming judgment. It requires the utmost strength of human hardihood, when a criminal looks without trembling of limbs on the gibbet where he is soon to be executed; and we infer, that there is no hardihood so great, no courage so strong, as to look upon eternal sorrow with a belief that it will be *ours*, and be unmoved. When we see, therefore, so many unconcerned about their eternal state; so many professing to believe that they are exposed to endless suffering,

and still unanxious about it; the fair conclusion is, that not one syllable of the book that teaches this is truly believed. It is not, cannot be, human nature, to believe this, and still sit in indifference. Every man, therefore, has some secret scheme by which he expects to be saved. Yet it is perfectly clear that there can be but one scheme of salvation that is true. If the Christian plan is *true*, then all others are *false*. If others are true, then there was no need of the sacrifice on the cross, and the scheme is an imposition. The admission then—an admission which probably all the sinners that I address would readily make—the admission that the Christian religion is true, is a condemnation of all other systems, and shuts out all who are not interested in the plan of the gospel, from all hope of heaven.

The text contains the substance of the whole Christian scheme. It expresses, I believe, every point that is peculiar to Christianity. It may be regarded as one of those condensing paragraphs, or summaries of the scheme, expressing all that is original in the plan in few words, in which the sacred writers seem to delight. It brings together distant doctrines—scattered rays of light, to be surveyed in the near neighborhood of each other, and to set off each other by the reflected light thrown from one point of view to another.

It is not often that a subject so extensive as the whole Christian plan of saving men, is introduced into the pulpit, with a view of giving its great points in a single discourse. I endeavor, from week to week, to explain particular parts of it, and to press its prominent doctrines and duties on your attention. It has occur-

red, that in the state of things now existing in this congregation, there is demanded a full, single view of God's way of saving men. Such a view, according to the interpretation which we give to the Bible, I wish this morning to present. If a demand somewhat more than usual should be made on your attention, it will be remembered, I trust, that it is difficult to give even an outline of the Christian religion in a single discourse; and perhaps it will be deemed hazardous to have attempted it. Let me further premise, that I shall be indebted very much to your own knowledge of the sacred Scriptures for the proofs of the particular points which I shall consider. I foresee that it will demand no ordinary degree of attention on the part of my hearers to obtain, and do justice to the views which I shall present—perhaps no ordinary candor to necessary obscurity of statement, and barrenness of illustration. *For the views themselves*, if fairly understood, I ask no indulgence. They are the views, if I mistake not, of God; and I am bound only to present them with fairness, and you to receive them into good and honest hearts.

What, then, is God's plan of saving men? What are the great leading points on which that plan is based, and to bring out which, is the design of the Bible? These are the questions which it is my wish, in few words, to answer. It will be seen at once, that the text ascribes all the honor to GOD, and none to men. It will be the design in this discourse, honestly, in this respect, to follow the representation of the text. Sinners and saints, people and preacher, may expect from this plan an unqualified condemnation, and a

pressing claim to lay aside all their own honor, and to ascribe all glory to GOD.

I remark then, in the first place, that GOD'S plan of saving men is based on the fact that the race is destitute of holiness. So says the text. Not by works of righteousness which *we* have done. If it were not so, there would have been no necessity for the scheme. Men would have possessed full capability of saving themselves. If men, before or since the promulgation of this plan of mercy, had any of the elements of holiness, or any traits of character, which could, by culture, be wrought into a texture of righteousness, then the design of interposition in this manner would have been a work unnecessary, and would not have been done at all. The design of interposing to save mankind, supposed that in themselves they were lost and must be ruined, if left to their own guidance.

In the explanation of this position, it is important to be understood. It is not asserted by the friends of the Christian religion that all men are as bad as they can be; or that one man is as bad as another; or that there is no morality—no parental or filial affection—no kindness or compassion in the world—no love of truth, and no honest dealing among men. The friends of religion are not blind to the existence of these qualities in a high degree; nor are they slow to value them, or to render them appropriate honors. They suppose that the Bible presents the fact, that all these things may exist, and diffuse a charm over society, and cement the body politic, and still there be an utter destitution of right feeling toward GOD. They suppose that natural amiableness is no proof

that a man is not selfish; that because a child loves its parent, it is no evidence that the child has any regard to GOD; and that it is possible that a man may be very kind to the poor, and very just in his dealings, and still have a heart full of pride and selfishness, and envy, and be an entire neglector of GOD in the feelings of his soul, and in regard to prayer, and to every act that expresses homage to the Deity. Christianity does not charge on men crimes of which they are not guilty. It does not say, as I suppose, that the sinner is held to be personally answerable for the transgressions of Adam, or of any other man;* or that GOD has given a law which man

* It is not denied that this language varies from the statements which are often made on the subject, and from the opinion which has been entertained by many men. And it is admitted that it does not accord with that used on the same subject in the Confession of Faith, and in other standards of doctrine. The main difference is, that it is difficult to affix any clear and definite meaning to the expression, "we sinned *in* him, and fell *with* him." It is manifest, so far as it is capable of interpretation, that it is intended to convey the idea, not that the sin of Adam is *imputed* to us, or set over to our account; but that there was a *personal identity* constituted between Adam and his posterity, so that it was really *our act*, and *ours only*, after all that is chargeable on us. This was the idea of Edwards. The notion of *imputing* sin, is an invention of modern times: it is not, it is believed, the doctrine of the Confession of Faith. The author of this discourse intended in the Sermon only to state what he conceived to be the doctrine of the Bible. Christianity affirms the fact, that in connection with the sin of Adam, or as a result, all moral agents in this world will sin—and sinning, will die. Rom. v. 12–19. It does not affirm, however, any thing about the *mode* in which this would be done. There are many ways conceivable in which that sin might secure the result, as there are many ways in which all similar *facts* may be explained. The drunkard commonly secures as a result, the fact that his family will be beggared, illiterate, perhaps profane or intemperate. Both facts are evidently to be explained on the *same prin-*

has no power to obey. Such a charge, and such a requirement, would be most clearly unjust. The law requiring love to GOD, supreme and unqualified, and love to man, is supposed to be equitable; fully within the reach of every mortal, if there was first a willing mind. Every man is supposed to be under obligation perfectly, and for ever, to obey that law; be he in heaven, earth, or hell,—be he a king on the throne, or a beggar in the streets,—be he a bondman or a freeman.

What, then, is *the fact* on which the plan of mercy is based? It is simply, that all men have failed to yield obedience to the requirements of this reasonable law—that there is not an individual that has given evidence that he has not been its violator. The violation of this pure law is held to be the first act of the child when he becomes a moral agent; the continued act of his life, unless he is renewed; and the last act on his dying pillow. His whole career is set down as one act of rebellion, because he neglects GOD, is selfish, is proud, is cherishing enmity against his Maker, is opposed to the acts of his government, and is unfriendly to all the efforts made to produce better feelings. In innumerable instances this want of holiness, this destitution of love to GOD and man, goes forth in acts of falsehood, impurity, blasphemy, theft,

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ciple as a part of moral government. The Bible does not, it is believed, affirm that there is any principle of moral government in the one case that is not in the other. Neither the facts, nor any proper inferences from the facts, affirm that I am, in either case, *personally responsible* for what another man did before I had an existence.

murder, unkind feelings, and implacable individual and national war. In support of this presentation of the character of men, the sacred Scriptures assert the naked fact, claiming to be the testimony of GOD.* Christianity has moreover recorded the history of the world, under inspired guidance, for more than two-thirds of its continuance, and presents no exception to the melancholy account of men. Profane writers, with no reference to any theological debate, and nine-tenths of them with no expectation that their testimony would ever be adduced to settle questions in divinity, have presented the same fact. Not one solitary historian, though coming from the midst of the people whose deeds are recorded, and designing to give the most favorable representation of their character, has exhibited a nation bearing any marks of holiness.† The world, the wide world, is presented as apostate; and he must be worse than blind that would attempt to set up a defence of the conduct of men.

Christianity appeals to individuals. All who have been converted by its power, have given their decided testimony, to the darkest representations of the human heart, in the sacred record. Men, before, of all characters, the moral and the vicious, have concurred in the representation that they were by nature the children of wrath, and that their hearts were enmity against GOD.

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* Rom. i. 21–32; iii. 10–19; v. 12; viii. 6, 7. Gen. viii. 21. Ps. xiv. 1–3. Eph. ii. 1–3. 1 John v. 19. John iii. 1–6.

† The same is true of all testimony now. Dr. Ward affirms, after a residence of twenty-five years in India, that he had never known there *one moral man.*

On this broad fact—wide as the world, and prolonged as its history—the Christian scheme is based. Here is an apostate province of God's empire. Rebellion invaded it, not as it did the ranks of heaven. There it cut off a fixed number; all mature in wisdom and knowledge. It would not spread; it could not be extended to successive tribes. Here, it poisoned a fountain. It was amidst God's works, at first but a little spring, pouring into a rill, but soon swelling to creeks, to rivers, to lakes, to oceans. An incalculable number would descend from that first pair of apostates; and with prophetic certainty it could be foretold that not one of all their descendants could escape the contagion to the end of time, however long the apostate world might be suffered to roll amongst the orbs that preserved allegiance. To all ages it would be the same —rising, sinning, apostate, dying man. On each island, on each mountain, in each valley, in each cavern, wild or civilized, it would be the same. Crime would be heaped on crime;—whole nations would bleed;—whole soils be wet with gore;—whole tribes would wail;—and generation would tread on generation—and then themselves expire—and all die as enemies of the God that made them.

II. What could be done? What *was* done to arrest the evil?—I remark, secondly, that a plan of salvation was devised on the ground of this, sufficient for all; a healing balm fitted to extend far as the spreading moral pestilence and death. This plan consisted in the selection and gift of the Son of God to die for the race, that a way of salvation might be opened for all. The Being thus selected was the co-equal of the Father

—existing in intimate union with him, in perfect honor and happiness, without derivation and without change, from all eternity. He was God.* This person of the Godhead became intimately and indissolubly united to human nature, in the person of Jesus the Son of Mary of Nazareth.† This union was such as to constitute the acts of the Divinity, and those of the humanity those of a person; in the same way as the acts of the mind, or the sufferings of our body, are the acts and sufferings of a person—of *ourselves*. Thus united, this being possessing the divine and human nature in one person, became the mediator between God and man. In our nature the Son of God preached the good tidings of peace; exerted his power in healing the sick, and raising the dead; gave comfort to the desponding; supported the weak; traversed the valleys and ascended the mountains of Judea; founded a church and appointed its officers; predicted his own death, his resurrection, the destruction of the temple and holy city, and the certain universal spread of the gospel. In human nature the Son of God expired on the cross. The divine nature suffered not, but it gave dignity and value to the sufferings of the man of Nazareth.

He died in the place of sinners.‡ He did not endure indeed the *penalty of the law*—for his sufferings

* John i. 1-3. Rom. ix. 5. Heb. i. 8, 9. 1 John v. 20. John xx. 28; v. 21-23. Matt. xi. 27. Rev. ii. 23. Heb. i. 3. Rev. xxii. 13. Acts vii. 59, 60.

† John i. 14. Luke i. 35. Rom. ix. 5. 1 John i. 1.

‡ John i. 29. Eph. v. 2. 1 John ii. 2; iv. 10. Isa. liii. 4. Rom. iii. 24, 25. 2 Cor. v. 14. 1 Peter ii. 24.

were not eternal, nor did he endure remorse of conscience; but he endured so much suffering, bore so much agony, that the Father was pleased to accept of it in the place of the eternal torments of all that should by him be saved.* "The atonement, of itself, secured the salvation of no one."† It made it consistent for God to offer pardon to rebels. It so evinced the hatred of God against sin—so vindicated his justice—so asserted the honor of his law, that all his perfections would shine forth illustriously, if sinners through this work should be saved. The atonement secured the salvation of no one, except that God had promised his Son that he should see of the travail of his soul,‡ and except on the condition of repentance and faith.§

In our nature the Son of God arose; gave proofs of his identity; and ascended to heaven to make intercession; to give repentance and remission of sins; and

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* The *penalty of the law* is what God will inflict on its unredeemed violators—neither more nor less. The *result*, therefore, is the best interpretation of what was meant by the threatening, "Thou shalt die." Gen. ii. 17. Eze. xviii. 4. 20. The *fact* turns out to be, that in that threatened death were included temporal pains and dying, remorse of conscience, and direct eternal infliction of suffering in hell. Christ's sufferings were severe—more severe than those of any mortal before or since: but they bore, so far as we can see, only a very distant resemblance to the pains of hell—the proper penalty of the law. Nor is it possible to conceive that the sufferings of a few hours, however severe, could equal pains, though far less intense, eternally prolonged. Still less, that the sufferings of human nature in a single instance—for the Divine nature could not suffer—should be equal to the eternal pain of many millions. It greatly confirms this view, when it is remembered, that no where in the whole Bible is there the semblance of a distinct affirmation that he endured the penalty of the law.

† Dr. Owen. ‡ Isa. liii. 11.

§ Mark xvi. 15, 16. Luke xiii. 3. Acts xvii. 30, 31.

to conduct the affairs of the universe, with reference to the welfare of the church. He still lives to teach his people, to defend them in danger, to preserve his church from ruin.

This atonement was for all men. It was an offering made for the race. It had not respect so much to *individuals*, as to the *law* and *perfections of God.* It was an opening of the way for pardon—a making forgiveness consistent—a preserving of truth—a magnifying of the law; and had no particular reference to any class of men. We judge that he died for all. He tasted death for every man. He is the propitiation for the sins of the world. He came, that whosoever would believe on him should not perish, but have eternal life.*

The full benefit of this atonement is offered to all men. In perfect sincerity God makes the offer. He

* 2 Cor. v. 14, 15. 1 John ii. 2. Heb. ii. 9. John iii. 16, 17; vi. 51. The intention was here, as in other parts of this Discourse, to give the views of the Bible, without reference to any theological controversy. The great principle on which the author supposes the truths of religion are to be preached, and on which he endeavors to act, is, that the Bible is to be interpreted by all the honest helps within the reach of the preacher; and then proclaimed *as it is*—let it lead where it will, *within* or *without* the circumference of any arrangement of doctrines. He is supposed to be responsible not at all for its infringing on any theological system; nor is he to be cramped by any frame-work of faith that has been reared around the Bible. This doctrine was preached because, in the author's view, the fair interpretation of the New Testament demanded it. He is happy in the belief, however, that in doing so he does not *in the least* depart from the standards of his own church. The doctrine *of limited atonement*—of the exclusive confinement of the work of Christ to any particular class of men in its original applicability, it is believed, is not to be found in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith.

has commissioned his servants to go and preach the gospel—that is, the good news that salvation is provided for them—to every creature.* He that does not this; that goes to offer the gospel to a part only; to elect persons only; or that supposes that God offers the Gospel only to a certain portion of mankind, violates his commission, practically charges God with insincerity, makes himself "wise above what is written," and brings great reproach on the holy cause of redemption. The offer of salvation is not made by *man*, but by *God*. It is *his* commission; and it is his solemn charge, that the sincere offer of heaven should be made to every creature. That all creatures have not heard it; that every heathen man, every Indian, African, and Islander, have not heard it, has been owing to the unfaithfulness of ministers—to the avarice of the church—to the want of proper zeal among Christians, and not to the command of God, or any want of fulness in the atonement.

I assume the free and full offer of the Gospel to all men, to be one of those cardinal points of the system by which I *gauge* all my other views of truth. It is, in my view, a corner-stone of the whole edifice; that which makes it so glorious to God, and so full of good-will to men. I hold no doctrines—and by the grace of God never can hold any—which will be in *my* views inconsistent with the free and full offer of the Gospel to all men; or which will bind my hands, or palsy my tongue, or freeze my heart, when I stand before sinners to tell them of a dying Saviour.

* Mark xvi. 15, 16.

I stand as the messenger of God, with the assurance, that all that *will* may be saved; that the atonement was full and free; and that if any perish, it will be because they choose to die, and not because they are straitened in God. I have no fellow-feeling for any other Gospel; I have no right hand of fellowship to extend to any scheme that does not say that GOD sincerely offers all the bliss of heaven to every guilty wandering child of Adam,—be he a Caffrarian, a Hindoo, a man of China, or a Laplander;—a beggar or a king, a rich man, a learned man, a moral man, or an abandoned wretch of Christian climes.

The scheme of salvation, I regard, as offered to the *world*, as free as the light of heaven, or the rains that burst on the mountains, or the full swelling of broad rivers and streams, or the heavings of the deep. And though millions do not receive it—though in regard to them, the benefits of the plan are lost, and to them, in a certain sense, the plan may be said to be in vain, yet I see in this the hand of the same God that pours the rays of noon-day on barren sands, and genial showers on desert rocks, and gives life, bubbling springs, and flowers, where no man is, to *our* eyes, yet not to *his*, *in vain*. So is the offer of eternal life, to every man here, to every man every where, sincere and full—an offer that, though it may produce no emotions in the sinner's bosom *here*, would send a thrill of joy through all the panting bosoms of the suffering damned.

III. In the representation of this scheme, I proceed to remark, in the *third* place, that while God thus sincerely offers the gospel to men, all mankind,

while left to themselves, as sincerely and cordially reject it. It is not to any want of physical strength, that this rejection is owing; for men have power enough in themselves to *hate* both God and their fellow-men; and it requires *less* physical power to *love* God than to *hate* him; less power to love a kind and tender parent, than in the face of conscience, and motive, and law, to hate such a parent. And so with regard to a kind, a patient and holy God. It is found that it is far easier to be reconciled to him, and love him, than to remain at war and oppose him.

It is supposed that it is an evident reflection on the Deity, of a most serious nature, to say that he has required, under the penalty of eternal vengeance, that of man, which he has in no sense power to do.*

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* This is a matter of common sense. If God requires more of men than *in any sense* they are able to perform, then in the practical judgment of all men, according to the reason he has given them, he is unjust. That there is something which makes certain the *result* that a sinner will not, of himself, believe, is the doctrine of the New Testament. John v. 40; vi. 44. If this be such as in all cases to put it beyond *his power* to do it, then it frees him from obligation;—if not, he may be urged still to do it. The distinction, then, between natural and moral inability referred to here, is not one of mere speculation. It enters into all preaching; and this single distinction will give a complexion to all a man's theology, and to all his efforts to save men. It will determine the character of the message he brings, and the degree of expectancy, and of course of prayer, with which he looks for the conversion of sinners. The Bible ascribes the sinner's inability *to the will*. John v. 40. The effect of conversion is on the will. Psalm cx. 3. So the Confession of Faith, while it steadily holds to these *facts* in regard to the sinner, modestly, yet closely, follows the New Testament in ascribing the whole of the difficulty to the obstinacy of the will. "Man by his fall hath wholly lost all ability OF WILL; so as a natural man being altogether *averse* from that which is good, is not able, &c."—Chap. ix. iii.

The rejection of the gospel, then, is to be traced to some cause, where man will be to blame, not God.

It is impossible for the pure gospel to have any fellowship with a scheme, which in any sense charges God with wrong. The fact that the gospel is rejected, is then to be traced to the obstinacy of men; to a decided, deliberate purpose *not* to be saved in this way. All men are supposed, by nature, to be insensible of the need of salvation by another. They are held to be so much opposed to God, that they *will* not submit to him. They are charged with being so much in love with sin, that neither commands nor threatenings,—neither love nor vengeance,—neither the offer of heaven, nor the prospect of hell, will induce them to forsake it. They are so proud, that they will not stoop to receive even eternal joy as a gift. They have so high a conception of their own merit, that neither argument nor entreaty, nor the mild voice of persuasion, will induce them to come to the arms of a bleeding Saviour.

Their hearts are so hard, their minds are so blind, that the Saviour might have prolonged his groans to the end of time, and the rocks—the hard rocks of Jerusalem, might have burst, and the firm granite of the everlasting hills been dashed to powder, but still the sinner's heart would have been unmoved by all his groans; and the race would have been giddy in pleasure, and immersed in business, and grasping honor unmoved. And, had the darkness of that unnatural night when he died, been prolonged to the present time; and had it been still whispered in every breeze, and heard in every echo, that the Son of God

was *yet* suffering for men, and crying in the bitterness of a dying soul, "My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me?" still not one solitary human heart would, of itself, care that there was no sorrow like to this sorrow. From this scene the world turns in cool contempt. The plan is rejected. Man will not come to Christ that he may have life. The proof of this we need not adduce. It is found in the Saviour's personal ministry—in the fact that a nation conspired to put him to death,—in the wide, universal rejection of the gospel since,—in the humiliating unconcern with which men listen, when

> "In strains as sweet
> As angels use, the gospel whispers peace,"

in the open opposition, the profane jibe, the bitter sneer, with which the multitude turn from the sufferings of Jesus.

You, who are impenitent sinners in this house, are most favorable representations, in this respect, of your fellow-rebels against heaven, in other parts of the world. May I ask what has been your treatment of the plan of salvation? From year to year, it has been pressed on your attention. Argument, entreaty, and persuasion, have been exhausted in vain. Never has the smoothness of your self-complacency been ruffled by any remorse that you have trampled on the blood of the Son of God; never has the highness of your look been brought down by the remembrance that you have practically joined in the cry, "Crucify him, Crucify him;" never have you breathed one solitary emotion of gratitude to heaven, that Judah's

rocks heard his groans, and that her mountains echoed his sighs; never have you sought his aid, or felt your need of his salvation, or desired an interest in his blood. With one consent, you have turned your backs on the gospel. So have all the race—so would you, and they, to the end of time. There is such a cool indifference to it in the sinner's bosom,—or such decided contempt,—or such fixed opposition, that if it were left to itself, not a man would be saved. As the cold and putrid carcasses of the dead do not of themselves seek life; as the turf would not move, nor the tomb-stones shake, nor the pale, mouldering people open their eyes, *of themselves*, if I were to go and preach to yonder graves; even so it is, when I preach to sinners. Of themselves, they are all sightless, and motionless, and fixed. They cordially reject the gospel. So it is with all the race. So it has ever been, and ever will be. Men are so wicked, that they will not be saved by a holy Redeemer, and a holy scheme. We are prepared, then, to remark, in the

IVth place—That those who are saved, will be saved because God does it by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. If the last point which I suggested be true, that all are disposed to reject the scheme, then it would seem to follow, that if any are saved, it will be by the special agency of God. To accomplish this, it is supposed he has sent down his Holy Spirit into the world. In the discharge of his great official work, he arrests the attention of heedless sinners. He does it by applying the preached gospel,—by leading the thoughts in a proper manner in the dispensations of his Providence,—by blessing the example and conver-

sation of parents, brothers, and friends, or by a secret, silent influence, known only to the individual, drawing the thoughts along to eternity, producing distaste to the ways and wages of sin, and a panting and breathing of the soul for enjoyments suited to its nature. The effect of this operation of the Spirit is not to produce inactivity or slumber. It is not compulsion. No man is compelled, against his will, to be saved.* The work of salvation, and the work of damnation, are the two most deliberate and solemn acts *of choosing*, that mortal man ever performs.

The Spirit of God acts on the will. He goes *before* the convicted sinner to remove obstacles; he pours light into the mind; he impresses truth; he urges to duty. He calls up the sinner's own activity; and the guilty man, sensible now of his danger, commences the most mighty and persevering struggle in which he ever engages, that to secure the salvation of his soul; and under the guidance of this spirit, he goes willingly and cheerfully, where he would not of himself go, to pardon and peace. There is here supposed to be no violation of freedom. In all this the sinner chooses freely. The Spirit compels no one: he shuts out no one. If the particular influence is not given at all—as no man can maintain that it is, and as the world is full of facts to show—it is thought, that no man is injured when salvation is freely and sincerely offered to him; and when he as freely and sincerely rejects it. No being in heaven or earth, but

* Psalm cx. 3. Luke xv. 17, 18.

himself, shuts him out of the blessings of redemption. The same heaven is offered,—the same Saviour died,—the same promises are made to him, and he has all the requisite power to comply. If he chooses to go to hell, after all this, no injustice will be done him: nor will he suffer beyond his deserts, if all other beings choose of themselves to be saved, or *if God chooses to save them*, and takes the glory to himself.

It is an essential part of the scheme which I am stating, that *God*, not *man*, begins the work. In the language of the Episcopal and Methodist articles of religion, the grace of Christ "*prevents*"—that is, goes *before* the sinner in his efforts to be saved. God begins the work, disposes the sinner to act, and pray, and repent, and gives him pardon. God does not himself repent, but he gives grace to man to do it for himself. That this is the true statement is clear. Man himself, as we have seen, *will* not come to Christ, that he might have life. One man has no power to produce this change in another. The devil surely will not do a work so unlike himself, and so injurious to his kingdom. It remains then, that it is the work of God. In the distributions of these favors, he acts by a rule that he has not made known to us. There can be no doubt that it is wise, but he has not given us the reason of it. The *fact* he has stated, and the world, the nations past and present, the distant tribes of men, and this place, are full of proofs that God changes, by his power, the hearts of many; and that there are many whose hearts are not changed—who choose not to be saved, and whom God has not yet chosen to renew and pardon. No man has a right to

conclude that *he* is shut out from salvation, except *by the fact.* If he loves sin, and will not repent and believe the gospel, he has no evidence that he will be saved; and if he persist in this course, he will be among the reprobate and be damned, by his own choice. If *he* should repent and believe, he would be saved, and be among the elect, and give the glory to God.*

This doctrine, that God by his spirit *prevents*, or goes before a sinner in his efforts, or commences and carries forward the work of his own power, I deem of cardinal value in the work of religion. If it be true, then it is of the utmost importance that it should be *seen* and *felt* to be true, and that the Holy Ghost should have the glory. I have no sympathy with any scheme that divides the honor with man. I have so deep a sense of the utter and total wickedness of the human heart,—of its entire opposition by nature to all that is good, and of the corruption of all its best efforts, even when aided, that I involuntarily shrink from every scheme that seems to mingle in merit the pure

* The following passages of the Bible are referred to as fully sustaining the views presented in this part of the Discourse. They are adduced here as irrefragable and everlasting proof that the sacred writers *meant* to teach, that God, in saving men, has a purpose; that he has mercy on whom he will have mercy; and that it is because he has chosen them that they are saved. If these passages do not prove it, it is difficult to see how they *could* have taught it. It is certainly not presented with greater clearness, or with stronger affirmations, in any Calvinistic Confession of Faith on the face of the globe. Certain it is, that when Calvinists wish to express their loftiest views of this doctrine, they are quite willing to confine themselves to the *very language* of the Bible, without any attempt to explain it away:—John xvii. 2. Eph. i. 3–11. Rom. viii. 29, 30; ix. 15–24. 2 Thess. ii. 13. John vi. 37, 39. 2 Tim. i. 9.

work of the Holy Ghost, with the crude and abortive energies of my own bosom. I seek to ascribe, in this work, simple and undivided praises to God; to feel and proclaim to my expiring breath, that God "is first, is midst, is last, is supremest, best," in all the work of saving men; and that poor human nature, in all cases except in the person of Jesus, is to be regarded as undeserving, polluted, and meriting only death eternal.

What God *does*, he *intends* to do. There is no chance—no hap-hazard. What it is right for him to do, it is right for him to purpose to do. What he does in my salvation or yours, he always meant to do. In him is no change, no *shadow* of turning. He has no new plan. We should have no security of the salvation of an individual if he changed—no security that an act of justice would ever be done to any of the living or the dead. The welfare of the universe demands that he should have one unchanging plan, running from the beginning to the end of years; and if there is a God immutably just and holy, there must be. In that purpose, and not in *our* poor abortive plans, lies your welfare and mine.

It is no part of this scheme, as you will see, that God made men on purpose to damn them. No man, from the beginning of the world, to my knowledge, has ever professed to maintain that opinion. It is certainly not the sentiment of the Bible, and no man has any right to charge it on any system of religion; and I do not deem it too serious to say, is guilty of gross slander if he does it. God made men to glorify himself in their holiness and felicity; and has

made provision for their salvation, and if they do not choose to be saved—if they choose to hate him, and rebel, and go to perdition, and HE does not choose to save them against their will, they cannot blame *him* for their self-chosen condemnation. It is an act of justice which we claim, that it should be remembered, that neither here, nor in any Christian church on the face of the earth is it held, that God made men on purpose to damn them.* If, then, God renews the heart by his Holy Spirit, if he begins and carries forward the work in all that shall be saved, and holds

* When it is affirmed here, that no denomination of Christians has maintained that God made men on purpose to damn them, it is meant that that was not the *design* or *end* for which they were created; or, that they are not condemned without any respect to their character. That many *will be lost* is believed. That God created them with an *understanding* of that fact; and understanding it, and *knowing* it, chose to create them rather than *not* to create them, cannot be denied, unless the foreknowledge of GOD be called in question. But this is a very different thing from maintaining that God had no other end in their creation but to damn them. Garbled extracts from Calvinistic writers, and quotations, *singularly made*, from the Presbyterian Confession of Faith, are sometimes resorted to, in proof of what is here denied;—but it may be safely affirmed, that not a single assertion can be found in any Calvinistic standard of doctrine, in which it is designed to be affirmed, that the intention for which God made men, was to inflict on them eternal misery, or to punish them *at all* without respect *to character*.—Affirmations that such an opinion is held, should be slowly made; and the friends of Calvinism insist on it as a matter, not *of courtesy*, but *of right*, that the very place where the obnoxious opinion is held, should be pointed out.—The Bible affirms, that God has determined to punish men for their sin and unbelief. Mark xvi. 16. John iii. 36. Rom. ii. 5-9. The Confession of Faith has, in this, wisely and meekly followed the Bible, and says, that "The rest of mankind God was pleased to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath FOR THEIR SIN, to the praise of his glorious justice." Chap. 3. 7. Assuredly this does not look like dooming man to hell without any respect to character.

the power of doing this over all men, and does *not* thus incline all to come to him, and it be asked, as well it may be, why he does not renew and save all —we have only to say, that all do not *choose* to be saved, and *will* not come to him. If it be asked why the great sovereign of worlds does not *constrain* them to come, and bring all to heaven, I answer, my powers of reason here fail,—my understanding faints, and is weary; and I ask also, why he did not keep by his power men and devils from falling, and save the universe from sin and sorrow altogether?—Secret things belong to God, and I can only say as God's only Son said long since, "Even so, Father, so it seemeth good in thy sight." The Christian scheme, then, claims that God, by his spirit, renews all that will be saved. I remark,

V. That this is done by a change in the affections and life of man. This change has been usually called regeneration, or the new birth, or conversion. It is that revolution of character, when a man ceases to be a sinner total and unqualified, and begins to be a man of holiness. It implies a change in his views and feelings towards God and the Saviour,—towards the truths and duties of religion,—towards Christians, and a revolution in his objects and pursuits. It is not merely a love of happiness in a new form, it is a love of God and divine things, because they are good and amiable in themselves. It is instantaneous — not always indeed known at the time or precise moment, but to be tested by the new views and feelings, and especially by a holy life. New objects are loved;

new views are acted on; a new world opens to the view; and the man before selfish, becomes now benevolent; he that was vicious, becomes virtuous; he that hated religion is now its friend; he that looked with cool contempt on all that could be said or done to win him, now enters heart and soul into the same work, and *wonders* that all does not see as he sees; he that sought only to live and enjoy himself here, now rises to higher objects, begins to feel that he is in the infancy of his being, and casts an eye of desire to the green fields in the skies, where he may for ever sweep the lyre in the praise of the Son of God, and unite with angels and archangels in lauding him that sitteth on the throne for ever and ever. Never was a more appropriate name given by inspired or uninspired lips, than to call such a man a new creature. He *begins* now to live. He has just awaked to the great purposes of his being, and treads with a light heart, and soft step, the earth where he shall soon sleep, and fixes the eye on the heavens that are soon to become his home. All this is done through the merits of the Son of God, in virtue alone of his death, and in connection with two acts made indispensable by the authority of God. These high feelings, these exalted hopes, are conferred on no one who repents not of his sins, and believes not on the Son of God. The former act implies deep sorrow that God has been offended; a deep sense of the intrinsic evil of sin, as well as of its consequences; and a solemn purpose to renounce all that opposes God. The latter implies a sense of the lost condition by nature; a conviction of helpless-

ness, and unworthiness, and a simple reliance on the merits of the Lord Jesus Christ, a willingness to be in the hands of a holy God, and an humble trust in the promises of aid. It is a solemn, deliberate rejection of self, and a giving up the soul to God, and a cordial hatred of sin in every form, and an embracing of the only Lord God, as the portion and Saviour of the soul. In connection with this act of believing, the sinner is pardoned and justified. A sweet sense of pardon, a peace that passeth all understanding, flows into the wounded spirit. The storms subside,—the sky becomes clear and serene. A new beauty,—the beauty of a new spring, where every flower and fountain, every rock and hill, every sun and star, have "found a tongue" to tell the praises of the all-present God of redemption,—spreads over the works of creation and providence. And the soul redeemed and disenthralled, goes forth, for the first time, to enjoy truly the works of creation, or the business of life, or the society of *new-found friends*. There is a charm around the duties of religion, unfelt in all other employments; and all tell of the height and depth, and length and breadth, of the love of Christ that passeth knowledge.

The evidence of this great change is to be sought in the life. By their fruits they shall be known. They shall grow in grace. They shall be progressively sanctified. They, and they only, have evidence of this change who die unto sin, and live unto righteousness, who put on the Lord Jesus Christ,—are clothed with humility, crucify the flesh with the affec-

tions and lusts,—who do justice, love mercy, walk humbly, and persevere unto the end.*

VI. The only other remark which I shall make in explaining our views of this scheme, is that this salvation is complete; and that God will watch over each renewed spirit till the day of judgment, and bring it infallibly to his kingdom. We should deem it strange, if God should be at all the expense of this plan,—if he should awaken and renew a soul,—if he should sprinkle on that soul the blood of Jesus, and freely pardon all its sins, and adopt it into his family, and make it a joint heir with Christ to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled,—if angels should rejoice over it, and after all in vain, and it should fall away and die for ever. Such a once-pardoned sinner would, we should think, claim a rank in hell by himself.† Such a work would belie all God's other works. When has he begun a thing, and abandoned it? Why should this

* Matt. v. 16; vii. 16–22. James ii. 14–18. John xiv. 21. 1 John ii. 3; iii. 11, 18, 19. Heb. vi. 9–12. Gal. vi. 4. 1 Peter ii. 13–25. 2 Peter i. 5–8. Rom. xii. Phil. iv. 8. For some invaluable remarks on the position that a holy life is the only conclusive evidence of piety, see Edwards' "Twelfth Sign of Gracious Affections."

† He could not inherit the doom of the common damned—for his sins have been once forgiven: perhaps two-thirds or nine-tenths of the transgressions of his whole life had been freely and fully pardoned. Or are these sins, once forgiven, again to be *re-charged* against him, and a moral agent to be punished for ever for crimes which the Creator had by a solemn act, at his justification, remitted? Or if these sins are not *re-charged* upon him, then here is a being, two-thirds of whose crimes, perhaps, receive neither punishment, nor permanent forgiveness. Is this judging him *according to his works*?—On either supposition, the man who had been once forgiven, and then condemned, would be unlike all other moral agents in the universe, and might assert a singular pre-eminence in hell.

be begun, and then forsaken? It is then in accordance, we suppose, with a scheme complete in all its parts, that the all-seeing and all-powerful Saviour said, My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand:* and in accordance with the same system, he will say in the day of judgment to all hypocrites and apostates, with all their pretences to experience and joy, I NEVER *knew you, depart from me.*†

It is with peculiar interest that we are permitted to proclaim that *all* that will believe, ALL, not a part, shall infallibly be saved; that God is able to keep that which you have committed to him against that day; that HE will *never* leave you, nor forsake you; that if you will come to him, he will *in no wise* cast you out; that he will keep you by his mighty power through faith unto salvation; and that though you fall, you shall not be utterly cast down. *To all*, I say, if you believe the gospel, *heaven is yours.* When you be-

* John x. 27, 28. This single passage settles all controversy about the doctrine of falling from grace. Admitting that it had ever been the intention of Christ to teach the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, it could not have been done in more explicit language. No Confession of Faith on the globe teaches it in a more emphatic manner; and if this does not mean to assert the doctrine, it is impossible so to torture words as to *make* them mean it. There is, probably, no Calvinist who would not be willing to express his views on this subject always in the identical language of the Saviour. Other passages, scarcely less explicit, may be seen in the following places:—Phil. i. 6. John v. 24; vi. 37; x. 9. Rom. viii. 29, 30. Mark xvi. 16. Job xvii. 9. Psalm xxxvii. 24.

† Matt. vii. 23.

lieve, you lay hold with no feeble grasp, on eternal life; and in every season of temptation and conflict, you shall find the Saviour, like the shadow of a great rock in a weary land, a covert from the tempest, a hiding-place from the storm, a strong tower into which the righteous may run and be safe. A heaven of boundless felicity shall be yours; and neither the marshalled hosts of hell, nor the devices of men, nor the ten thousand foes in your own bosom, and around you, shall be able to pluck you from him who holds you in the hollow of the hand, and guards you as the apple of the eye. The angels await your approach. They shall come forth with the glorious Son of God in the day of judgment, to welcome you to your, and their, eternal home.* With them, you shall ascend, amidst songs and loud hallelujahs, rolling sweet music o'er the skies, to your, and their, Father and God, to dwell where shall be no more sin, nor pain, nor death.

There, in the blessed bosom of the living God, the everlasting Father of his redeemed people, there, shall terminate the efforts to redeem man. There, shall be gathered a countless host from every nation and tongue, to join in one song of universal praise, to "extol *him* first, *him* midst, and *him* without end." There shall be humbled all human pride; and God only shall attract all eyes, and fill all hearts with the glories displayed in devising and executing the scheme, resulting in the ceaseless felicity of lost, ruined man.

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* Matt. xxv. 31. Luke xvi. 22; xv. 10.

I still ask your indulgence, while I deduce from this fruitful subject some important practical remarks.

1st. Permit me to ask of you, my hearers, are you prepared to commit the interests of your immortal souls to this plan of salvation? If I mistake not, the scheme which I have presented, is that of the Bible. If it is, it is the only way in which men can be saved. No scheme of morality, no religious device, if it has not the elements of this scheme in it, can be true or safe.* The plan that humbles man, and exalts God; that presents the great Sovereign of worlds as originating and carrying forward the scheme, is that which is presented in the sacred Scriptures. Unless I have read the Bible, and facts to no purpose, this which I have presented contains the outlines of the scheme of truth. This is the system of the Bible. This is the doctrine which, in all ages, has excited the opposition of the human heart. Herein is the offence of the cross. Here is the scheme that abases all human pride, and gives honor, where honor is due, to God only,—I may add, that this is Calvinism,—the scheme so often misrepresented,—so little understood,—so much hated by impenitent sinners—a scheme that has excited, probably, more opposition than any other system of doctrines since the foundation of the world. This scheme, if I understand it, contains nothing more than an enlargement of the principles which I have stated in this discourse.† It neither asserts, that God made

* Acts iv. 12. Rom. ii. 12.

† It is not meant by this, that this is all that has been *represented* to be Calvinism by its foes, nor precisely all the points which have been

men to damn them,—nor that infants will be damned,* nor that sinners will be lost, do what they can,—nor that God is unwilling to save them,—nor that a poor penitent may not be saved; but it claims that God is full of mercy, making ample provision for all that *will* come, and inviting all freely;—that all men are full

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held by some of its friends, but that it contains all the *great features* of the system that have usually been attacked as objectionable. It contains the *essence* of the system as distinguished from other systems.

* It is to be admitted, with regret, that it has been held, by a few, that infants *may be* lost. This must be conceded in regard to Dr. Gill, Dr. Twisse, and a few others. For two years past, this has been the subject of a spirited and able discussion in the "Spirit of the Pilgrims," and the "Christian Examiner." In that discussion, it has been fully proved, that it has *never* been the *common* sentiment of Calvinists; and that the sentiment is *not* held by Calvinists of the present day. Indeed, the opinion never had any essential connexion with Calvinism. It grew out of the doctrine of imputation of Adam's sin, or our *acting in him*—a sentiment as fully held, in principle, by Arminians, as it ever was by their opponents. It is now asserted, that in no Presbyterian Church in this country is it maintained to be a fact, that infants are actually damned. An assertion that such an opinion *is* held—that it *is* maintained that "there are infants in hell not a span long," unless the case where it has been done, are specifically and distinctly referred to, in the language of the law, is slander. We insist, then, as a matter *of right*, that when such statements are made, the time, circumstances, and preacher, when, where, and by whom, such a doctrine was preached, be distinctly referred to, that the charge may fix responsibility, and be in some accessible form. If not done, from whatever quarter the charge may come, the author deserves an appellation which the writer of this discourse is very unwilling to apply to any person whatever. The Confession of Faith says, on this subject, that "Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved," &c. This has by some been supposed to imply that others might be lost. The inference, however, cannot be sustained. The authors of the Confession, *like the sacred writers*, were in the habit of calling all those who were saved, "the elect." They spoke of infants saved, as a *part* of the elect—a part of the race *chosen* to salvation. They affirm not, that *any* are lost; nor can it be proved that they meant to imply it.

of evil, and of themselves *will* not come;—that those that are saved, are saved by the grace of God, in which he bestows his favors according to infinite wisdom, and his sovereign pleasure;—that he has no new views about it, but has always intended to do what he actually does;—and that he renews *no heart* in vain, but will keep all that are renewed, unto salvation. I appeal to your consciences, dying sinners, if this is not the scheme of the Bible? I ask not whether this is such a plan as a proud, impenitent sinner would love, or such as your unsanctified feelings would approve, but I ask, is it not the evident scheme of the word of God? Is it not the plan on which, in fact, God governs the world?—Who in this house can gainsay, or resist it; or prove, or *believe*, that it is not?—*Not one.* I ask then, again, fellow-sinners, are you prepared to commit your eternal interests to this plan? Are you willing to be saved in this way? Are you willing to abase yourselves at the feet of the Sovereign of worlds, and to give all the honor to God? Do you feel safe in this plan? Do you feel that you are lost sinners—that you deserve eternal death—that you lie at the Sovereign mercy of God—that you have no claim; and feeling this, are you willing to drop into the hands of Jesus, and to be saved by his merit alone? Do you feel, that if you are saved, it will not be by might or power of yours, but by the spirit of the Lord? And do you love this scheme? Do you seek that God should be honored in it; and do you pray and earnestly desire that it should spread wide as the world? Do you pant that all may taste the grace of God—that every inhabitant of the lost world should join with you in

the song of redeeming mercy? If these are your feelings, then you are Christians. I hesitate not to hold out to you, all the consolation that a minister of Jesus can afford, and to assure you, that you are treading the narrow path that leads to life. In that strait way, moving as God directs you, you shall find indeed, here and there a thorn, or a deep ravine, or a fen, or morass; but all along the path flowers shall shed their fragrance, the ear shall listen to sweet harmony, green fields shall spread out before you, and the hope of heaven shall cheer you. To such I say, go on. Press forward. The prize, even the eternal crown is near. Look not back; but depending on the grace of God, fix the eye on heaven, and fight manfully the fight of faith, and lay hold on eternal life.

Of impenitent sinners, whether anxious or not, I say,

2dly, Are you prepared to reject this scheme? To your *consciences*, not to your *feelings*, for you will not love it,—to your consciences, I put it, whether this is not the scheme of the Bible? If it is, and what rebellious man here can deny it, if it is the plan of God, then you reject it at your peril. Then all your present plans, your morals, your formal prayers, your self-righteousness, your vain reliance on the unpromised mercy of God, are schemes that are abominable in the sight of your Maker; and they and you, unless you forsake them, shall be driven away like chaff before the tempest. There is but one path that leads to life. It is a path where God is honored, and the sinner humbled. In that path the sinner does not, will not tread. Again I ask, are you prepared, fellow-mortal,

to reject this scheme? I do not ask, whether you will deny it in words, for not a man dare, or can do this. But will you reject it *in fact*? Man of the world, you that love riches and honors more than God, will you still love your riches; and in seeking your own honors, refuse to honor God? Guilty sinner, you whose profaneness, and sensuality, and envy, and pride, have rendered your heart black as hell, and miserable almost as the damned, are you prepared to reject this plan, and still love your sins? Trembling sinner, bent under the weight of your guilt, and almost on the verge of life—you that seek salvation and have not found it, are you prepared to reject this scheme, and trust to your own merits? If you do, you do it, I repeat it, at your peril. It is your duty *now* to embrace it. Here is all your hope. If this scheme is rejected, if you *will* not submit to God's plan of saving men,—if you do it not *now* from the heart, you tread a broad, and crowded path down to the chambers of death. In that path you now go. You may be charmed with sweet sounds, and revel with the wicked, and be unwilling to turn and live; you may walk amidst flowers, and wealth, and honor, but beyond you is a dreadful hell; and as a minister of the Son of God, I proclaim, that you will soon hear the groans of the damned, and see the right arm of the God of vengeance lifted on high to cut you down in eternal death. To this scheme set before you now, trembling mortal fly. Fly before it is too late. Fly before the day of vengeance comes, and you perish—perish for ever.

3rd. From this subject, we see what excludes men from heaven. It is not a want of fulness, and free-

ness, in the plan of mercy. It is not that God is unwilling to save the sinner. It is simply because *you will not be saved.* You choose your own pride, your own vanity, your own lust, your own course in life, —the path that leads to hell. Need I repeat the assurance so often made here, and in the sacred Scriptures, that if you are lost, it will not be because God, or the Saviour, or the Angels, or Ministers, or Christians are to blame? It will be simply because you choose death rather than life. No other being will bear the guilt but yourselves. Forever and forever, you will welter in eternal wo, bearing your guilt unpitied and alone. No other being will bear the blame. No solitary mortal or immortal can be charged with the guilt of our destruction. Nor will it be a trifling *crime* to be damned. It is not a thing which you are at liberty to choose. You have *no right* to go down to hell and become the eternal enemy of God. You are under solemn *obligations* to be saved. Think what is implied in being lost. It implies the rejection of God's plan of saving the soul—the grieving of the spirit of God—trampling on the blood of Jesus—unbelief of what the God of truth has declared—contempt of his threatenings—the love of self, of sin, of destruction. Sinner, have you *a right* to travel in this wretched path? Have you a right thus to trifle with a holy God? Have you a right to reject all the means of mercy, and deliberately sin forever, against the God that made you? I appeal to your conscience. Let me also remind you, if you go from *this* place to wo, you will inherit no common damnation. Here this amazing plan of

God's mercy, has been presented again and again. Here you have been entreated in every possible way to be saved. Here God's spirit has striven. Many of you have been before awakened, and lived through revivals of religion. With great power he has, within the past three months, awed you. Others have pressed into the kingdom; and you have felt and known, that you must *repent or die.* You are now passing through the most solemn and interesting scenes that the earth witnesses, and listening to the most affecting appeals that he makes, unmoved. Who will be to blame, if you are lost,—if others are taken, and you are left? Will God? Will Christians? Will ministers? Will parents? Will friends? or will you yourselves? Let conscience answer. Go home this day, impenitent sinner, if God spares a rebel like you to get home—go home and reflect, that if you pass through this revival unmoved; if you resist all the appeals that are made to you, from day to day, and week to week, the probability is, that you will be damned, and the certainty is, that *you* only will be to blame if you are. I do not say that you will *certainly* be lost, I say that a most fearful probability "thunders perdition on your guilty path." What *should* move you hereafter, if you are not now moved? What more can be done for you than has been done? You have been warned, entreated, impressed. You *know* your duty, and your doom, if you do it not. You are in the hands of a Sovereign God. There I leave you. I have no other power than to spread out the scheme of mercy—to entreat you by the love of Jesus, and the mercy of God, and

the value of your soul, to embrace the offer of life; and if you *will perish*, I must sit down and weep as I see you glide to the lake of death. Yet I cannot see you take that dread plunge—see you die, die for ever, without once more assuring you that the offer of the gospel is freely made to you. While you linger this side the fatal verge, that shall close life, and hope, and happiness, I would once more lift up my voice and say, See, sinner, see a God of love. He comes to you. He fills the heaven, the skies, the earth. Hear his voice as it breaks on the stillness of this house. Listen to the accents of the ever-living God—"As I live I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that he turn and live: turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die?" In the hands of that present God, that benignant Father, whose mercy breathes from every page of this book, I leave you. To him I commend you, with the deep feeling in my own bosom, that you are in his hands; that you are solemnly bound to repent *to-day*, and believe the gospel, and that if you perish, you only will be to blame. I feel, and know, that for not repenting, you have no excuse, and that God will forever hold you guilty.

I also feel and know, that God is under no obligation to save you. That if you die, he will be guiltless. That if you are saved, it will be by his sovereign mercy—in such a way, that he only will have the praise; and that the great secret, whether you will live or die, is lodged in his bosom, and that no mortal can compel or control him. That he holds over you the sceptre of life, or the sword of death;

and that if you die, all creation will bow and say Amen, and Amen.

We also feel, and know, that God *can* save you—that he hears prayer. We will bear you then, before the throne of grace, and say—Sovereign of worlds, Arbiter of life and death, spare this people, and save these dying sinners. "Oh most holy, blessed, and merciful Saviour, deliver them not into the bitter pains of eternal death!" AMEN.

ANSWER

TO

THE PROTEST

AGAINST THE LEAVE

GRANTED BY THE PRESBYTERY OF PHILADELPHIA

TO THE

First Presbyterian Church,

TO PROSECUTE A CALL FOR

MR. BARNES TO BECOME THEIR PASTOR.

ANSWER

TO

THE PROTEST, &c.

"THE Protest" charges the author of the Sermon entitled "The Way of Salvation," with having "broached errors opposed to the doctrinal standards of the Presbyterian Church, and in their tendency exceedingly dangerous;" with "maintaining sentiments in direct opposition to the doctrinal standards of the church; and with making "certain general declarations which induce" the Protestants to "believe that he does not properly regard his obligation to adhere to the doctrinal standards of the Presbyterian Church." The errors and delinquencies alleged are contained in five specifications, and on the ground of them the Protestants object to his being received as a member of the Presbytery, and installed over the congregation which had called him.

These charges have become matters of record. They are preserved on the books of the Presbytery, and are published to the world, to form the opinions of ministers, and members of the Presbyterian Church, untried, and uncondemned by any tribunal having competent jurisdiction, and in good standing in the Presbytery, on the records of which he is accused. The charges have been made by a minority respectable in numbers, in character, and in age. The ac-

cused is unknown; is on the commencement of his ministry; has had no opportunity for defence, and has not felt before this time that the proper occasion had come to volunteer a full explanation of his views, or to enter into a vindication of his sentiments. He deems it now a duty which he owes to his private feelings; to his ministerial character; and to the Presbytery who have received him as a member of their body, and with whose members, by the constitution of the church, he now stands on a footing of entire parity, most respectfully to present the following explanation of his views in reply to the "Protest." He is desirous that those who may peruse this Protest, may know that the author of the Sermon has not in his own view—except in a single expression, in which he believes he coincides with almost the entire mass of ministers in the Presbyterian Church,—deviated from her standards, and he wishes that it may be known also that the majority of the Presbytery have not received to their fellowship, one who has "contemptuously" rejected those standards, or one who has been a stranger to the nature of his ordination vows.

The first charge against the Sermon is, that it denies the "fundamental docrine of original sin," in not admitting the "federal and representative character of Adam." The statement which has been considered objectionable on this subject is found in pages 6 and 7 of the Sermon. "Christianity does not charge on men crimes of which they are not guilty. It does not say, as I suppose, that the sinner is held to be personally answerable for the transgression of Adam, or

of any other man." And in the note, "It is not denied that this language varies from the statements which are often made on the subject, and from the opinion which has been entertained by many men; and it is admitted that it does not accord with that used on the same subject in the Confession of Faith, and in other standards of doctrine. The main difference is, that it is difficult to affix any clear and definite meaning to the expression, 'We sinned *in* him, and fell *with* him.' It is manifest, so far as it is capable of interpretation, that it is intended to convey the idea, not that the sin of Adam is *imputed* to us, or set over to our account; but that there was a personal identity constituted between Adam and his posterity, so that it was really *our act*, and *ours only*, after all, that was chargeable to us. This was the idea of Edwards. The notion of *imputing* sin is an invention of modern times." "Christianity affirms the fact, that in connection with the sin of Adam, or as a result, all moral agents in this world will sin—and sinning, will die. Rom. v. 12—19. It does not affirm, however, any thing about the *mode* in which this would be done. There are many ways conceivable in which that sin might secure the result, as there are many ways in which similar *facts* may be explained. The drunkard commonly secures, as a result, the fact that his family will be beggared, illiterate, profane and intemperate. Both facts are evidently to be explained on the *same principle* as a part of moral government. The Bible does not, it is believed, affirm that there is any principle of moral government in the one case, that is not in the other.

Neither the facts, nor any proper inferences from the facts, affirm that I am, in either case, *personally responsible* for what another man did before I had an existence."

On this quotation the Protest has based the charge of "denying the doctrine of original sin," and of "broaching opinions opposed to the doctrinal standards of the Presbyterian Church." It will be observed that the Sermon denies that we are *personally* responsible for Adam's sin; that his sin, being his, is imputed to us; and that there is any difference between the results of Adam's act, as a part of God's moral government, and any other acts in which descendants are affected by the conduct of their ancestors; and that the notion of *imputing* sin, or of setting to one man's account the sin of another, *as being the act of that other man*, is contrary to the original structure of Calvinism.

The Confession of Faith affirms, that "*we sinned* in him, and *fell with him*." It appeared to the author of the Sermon, that the fair meaning of this expression was, that there was an *identity* constituted between Adam and his posterity; that the act of the fall was *our act*; that we are held answerable for *our own conduct only*, and not that the *act of Adam* was set over to our account. Hence it is not said that *Adam* sinned, and that his act, *being his*, was set over to our account; which the author understood to be the modern notion of imputation; but that *we sinned*, and *we fell in him*, implying such a constituted existence as to render us capable of acting and rendering us answerable, not for *his act*, but for *our own*, performed in him. In other words, it was thought that Cal-

vinism originally contained the idea, that Adam's act was ours *before* imputed to us; that it was imputed to us *as ours* and not *made ours* by imputation.

The reasons why this was supposed to be an original feature of Calvinism were the following:

1. It is the plain language of the Confession of Faith, and of the Catechisms of the Church. They do not affirmt hat Adam's act became ours *by imputation*, but was ours *prèviously* to that imputation, and constituted the *just ground* of such imputation. "All mankind SINNED *in him*, and FELL *with him*, in that first transgression." Larger Catechism—22. To *sin*, to *fall*, imply *action*, *doing*. When it is said that WE *sin*, and WE *fall;* that all mankind *sin and fall*, it is as remote as possible from saying that *one man* sinned and fell, and that *his* act *being his*, was charged on other men, and set to their account. And the language of the Confession on this subject is uniform. We may safely challenge a man to bring a statement that varies in the least from this on this subject. It was supposed that the authors of this Confession understood the structure of the system which they were stating, and that the Confession on this subject was considered authoritative.

2. This is the uniform statement of the early writers on Calvinism. Thus Calvin explicitly declares that the guilt of our original sin is not the sin of another man, set over to our account; but affirms it to be the *proper sin* of every individual. "And this liableness to punishment," says he, "arises not from the *delinquency of another*, neque est alieni delicti—for when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us

obnoxious to the divine judgment, it is not to be understood as if we, *though innocent*, were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin. Wherefore Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of another, the more carefully to indicate its transmission to us by propagation, yet at the same time he also asserts it *properly to belong to each individual*, proprium unicuique. Institutes, b. 11. ch. 1. 38. "And therefore," he continues, "infants themselves, as they bring their condemnation into the world with them, are rendered obnoxious to punishment *by their own sinfulness, not by the sinfulness of another*, non alieno, sed suo ipsorum vitio sunt obstricti." Idem. Stapfer also lays down the doctrine of original sin in the same manner. "God in imputing this sin, *finds* this whole moral person (the human race) ALREADY a sinner, and NOT merely constitutes it such." Polemic theology, ch. xvi. 63. So Boston's Body of Divinity, vol. 1. p. 308. "Adam's sin is imputed to us *because it is ours.* For God doth not reckon a thing to be ours, which is not so; for God's justice doth not punish men for a sin which is in no way theirs. As if a person that has the plague infect others, they die by their own plague, and not by that of another."

The same statement is fully made by Edwards. "The sin of the apostacy," says he, "is not theirs merely because God imputes it to them, but it is *truly* and *properly* theirs, and on *that* ground God imputes it to them." Original Sin, part iv. ch. iii. Again, "This in reality and propriety becomes *their* sin." Idem. "God," says he, "in every step of his proceeding with Adam, looked on his posterity as being *one*

with him. This will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a *constituted oneness or identity* of Adam and his posterity in the affair." Idem. "If any have supposed the children of Adam to have come into the world with a *double guilt*—one the guilt of Adam's sin, and another arising from their having a corrupt heart—they have not so well conceived of the matter. The guilt a man has upon his soul, is one and simple, viz. *the guilt of the original apostacy.*" Edwards is supposed, therefore, to have held the notion that there was *a constituted identity* between Adam and us; in such a way that we are held answerable for the original guilt as being ours; that it was not *made ours* by imputation, but *being ours* by the identity; or being *properly* ours, in the same sense as the guilt of A. B. in childhood, is the guilt of A. B. in manhood, it is justly chargeable on us; and this is what is meant by imputation. This is believed to have been the original structure of Calvinism—this the doctrine of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith.

This doctrine it was the intention of the Sermon to deny; and the author of the Sermon wishes now to be distinctly understood as disavowing it as his belief. It was denied for the following reasons: 1. Because it was not believed to be in the Bible. The arguments which have been alleged in proof that it is in the Scriptures, have never appeared to the writer of the Sermon to be valid, and he could not, therefore, believe it. The only passage which has, with any appearance of propriety, been alleged in proof of this doctrine, has been Rom. v. 13, 19. But without going into a

critical examination of the passage, it may safely be affirmed that it does *not* teach, 1. That we are *one* with Adam; nor 2, that we *sinned* in him; nor 3, that we *fell* with him; nor does the passage suppose that we had either a *constructive* or *real* existence at that time, or that six thousand years before we lived, we were capable of acting at all.

For the same reason the writer did not use the words *federal* or *representative*, because they are not found in this connection in the Bible. Neither of those words is *ever* applied to the transactions with Adam in the Scriptures. It adds to the force of the consideration, that the word "representative" is supposed not to be applied to this transaction in the Confession of Faith. How, then, the Protestants could make the not using of those words a grave offence, is a matter of difficult solution. 2. The doctrine is believed to be intrinsically absurd, and a violation of the principles of common sense. Notwithstanding the high authority and ingenious speculations of President Edwards, it must still be an indisputable principle that an *identity* such as to make united responsibility, cannot be constituted between one man and many millions of separate men, and that at intervals of many generations. 3. That doctrine was supposed to be abandoned by the modern defenders of Calvinism. It had not been the happiness of the author to find any among the living who would now defend it. Thus, it is expressly denied in the Christian Advocate, vol. 3, p. 531. It is said, "We do not by any means say, that Adam's personal act or sin was *our* personal act or sin. This would be unintelligible and impossible."

So the Biblical Repertory for January, 1830, p. 90, says, that "This sin is not strictly and properly *theirs*, (*i. e.* the descendants of Adam,) for those not yet born could not perform an act." If, then, the ancient and authoritative writers on the subject of Calvinism, be allowed to interpret the expression, "We sinned in him"—if the meaning of it be that his sin was properly *ours*, and that being ours it was therefore imputed to us; and if to deny this be a fundamental error, and be broaching doctrines contrary to our doctrinal standards, then the author is happy in erring with the Bible, with common sense, with the Christian Advocate, with the Biblical Repertory, and as he sincerely believes with ninety-nine of a hundred of all the ministers of the Presbyterian Church.

The only other notion of imputation of sin which has been held, is the one now understood to be the commonly received opinion, that the sin of Adam, *as his*, is set over to our account, not because it was previously and properly *ours*, but *made ours* by imputation. As I do not understand this to be original Calvinism, and as it is not contained in the Confession of Faith, I do not suppose that I am called upon to make on it any statement of opinion. This I supposed to be a notion of imputation which was "an invention of modern times." It need only be remarked, that unless it be shown to be in our standard of doctrine, it cannot be considered as proof of *disregarding* those standards to doubt its correctness, however aged, or venerable, or numerous, may be its defenders.

The Sermon is charged with denying the doctrine of original sin. Calvin defines original sin to be

"*a hereditary pravity* and *corruption of our nature*, diffused through all the parts of the soul, rendering us obnoxious to the Divine wrath, and producing in us those works which the Scripture calls works of the flesh." Institute, b. 11, ch. 1, sec. 8. This is a set and formal definition. This has *not* been denied in the Sermon. The doctrine of man's native destitution of holiness was fully stated. Pictet, lib. v. cap. vi. sec. 1, says, "*this corruption* which we derive from Adam is called original sin." This is also a set and formal definition. So also in the tenth article of the Theological Theses, he says, "His sin (the sin of Adam) is propagated, and will be, to his posterity, *which* is called original sin." Pages 5, 6, 7. "By original sin," says Edwards, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, "is meant the *innate sinful depravity of the heart*." Original Sin, part 1, ch. 1, sec. 1. This statement in regard to its nature, has not been denied in the Sermon, but is fully affirmed. In the explanation which Edwards subsequently makes, he has introduced the doctrine of the union with Adam. So the Confession of Faith has also used the *same* illustration of the *mode* and *extent* of men's depravity. The *essential idea* is still the same, that men are the subjects of a hereditary depravity. The doctrine includes a *fact*—the universal hereditary depravity and a statement of a particular *mode* in which that *fact* is to be accounted for. The Protestants are respectfully asked to adduce a passage or phrase in the Sermon where that *fact* is denied. It is again and again affirmed, with all the explicitness which it was in the power of the author, with his use of language,

to do it. A statement was made respecting the manner of accounting for it, affirming that the common mode in supposing that the act of one man was charged on millions *not being properly theirs*, did not explain it. The objection was to this particular *mode* of explaining it, as being unsatisfactory, and not to the *fact itself* about man's native depravity. The heresy, if any, was then in not being satisfied with the mode of explaining this fact usually adopted. In respect, however, to the *modes* of explaining this hereditary depravity, the author is happy to adduce the authority of the Christian Advocate, as expressing his own views. Vol. iii. p. 530. "I am not able," says the editor, "to recollect a single passage of Scripture which professes to explain the *mode* or *method* in which this depravity is transmitted, or to give any clear information on the subject beyond what has been already mentioned, *that the posterity of Adam resemble their first parents.*" How the denial of that *mode*, which affects none of the definitions of original sin that have been given, can be wrought into a formal charge of denying original sin itself, is to me a subject of great mystery. To express doubt about the way of explaining a fact, is not to deny that fact; nor is evidence at hand to show why the Protestants should approach a minister of the Presbyterian Church with a broad charge of denying a *fundamental article* of the church, when the statement only went to effect a mode of explaining it; and when all that the writer had found in books as containing the essence of original depravity, was urged as the foundation of the Christian scheme.

The Sermon also states, that the influence of Adam's sin on his posterity is to be explained on the same principle as also other similar facts, where the conduct of a father travels over and terminates on his offspring. This has been deemed also an exceptionable part of the Sermon. The statement was made for the following reasons: 1. Because it was not believed that God had more than one principle of action in respect to the same class of offences. His dealings now were deemed an illustration of his conduct respecting Adam. 2. This very illustration is used uniformly by the advocates of the imputation of Adam's sin, showing that *they* also regard the facts as to be explained on the same principle. 3. It is the clear law of the Bible. Eze. xviii. 4. It may also be added, that the same sentiment is contained in books professing to explain the Calvinistic scheme. Thus, in the Christian Advocate, vol. iii. p. 482, it is said, "That Adam's being made the federal head of his posterity, both standing and falling, *was just one instance of this universal law of propagated beings*—that like shall produce its like—that the offspring shall resemble the parent."

It has also been supposed that the Sermon denied the depravity of infants. As the discourse did not mention infants at all, as it made no affirmation about their character, or that had reference to their condition, this charge seems to have been gratuitous. At any rate, it would seem to have been proper to suppose that the author held orthodox opinions, until he had taken the opportunity of declaring his own views. Gratuitous charges against a minister of the Gospel should not be lightly made; and the author claims the

common privilege of all ministers in the Presbyterian Church, of being supposed to hold opinions in accordance with the standards, until he denies them. As there was no affirmation, express or implied, literally or by fair construction, in the Sermon respecting the native character of infants, the author does not suppose himself now called upon to make any explanation. Any other charges of heresy, might as well have been affixed to the Sermon as this.

If now it be asked, what doctrine is held on the subject of man's apostacy, the author of the Sermon begs leave to state, that he has always held and taught that man was created holy; that he had power to stand, but was free to fall; that the fall of the first man secured as a certain result the entire apostacy of the race; that he was so far their head and father, that his trial was a virtual trial of all mankind, and his fall made it certain that they would come into the world with a hereditary depravity; that this constitution is the wise, though mysterious appointment of God; that every man comes into the world under this constitution of things; that there is something, which secures as a result the fact, that all will sin as soon as they become moral agents; that their sin is not owing solely to example, or evil teaching, but is to be traced back to the wise constitution of things connected with Adam; that the first act of a moral agent on earth is sinful, and his continued acts will be sinful, and only sinful for ever, unless he is renewed and saved by the free grace of God. Further than this, in regard to the *mode* in which sin comes into the world, the author knows nothing; and here, in the

perplexity of a very mysterious subject, he would sit at the feet of the Protestants, or any other body of men, who can teach him wisdom.

The second thing alleged against the Sermon is that on the subject of *atonement*, it "maintains sentiments in direct opposition to those set forth in our doctrinal standards." The points specified are, that Christ did not endure the penalty of the law; that the atonement did not of *itself* secure the salvation of any; and that it was general in its applicability. In regard to the first specification, that he did not endure the penalty of the law, I beg leave to say, that the meaning of that phrase was supposed to be so expressed that it could not be misunderstood. The *penalty of the law* was *defined* to be "*what God will inflict on its unredeemed violators, neither more nor less*,"—that is, the sufferings of the wicked in the world of wo. In those sufferings, it was said, were included, among other things, "*remorse* of conscience, and direct *eternal* infliction of suffering in hell." p. 11. Those two things, *remorse* and the *eternity* of the suffering, were regarded as essential and indispensable ingredients of the penalty of the law, because these turn out to be actually its *inflicted penalty*. It was intended in the Sermon to deny that our Saviour either suffered *remorse of conscience* or *eternal sufferings*. The first was denied, because there is no record that he suffered remorse, and because the New Testament assures us that he was holy, harmless, and undefiled—and it did not appear how a HOLY being could be subjected to the pains of remorse. Remorse is the "keen pain, or anguish, excited by a sense of guilt; compunction

of conscience for a crime committed." As our Saviour had committed no crime, it seemed self-evident that he could not have endured remorse of conscience, and in this sense could not have borne the penalty of the law. It was denied that he endured eternal suffering, another part of the penalty of the law, simply because it was a plain matter of fact that he did not. And in this sense, and this only, was the expression used, concerning which so much anxiety has been expressed, that it was "not possible to conceive that the sufferings of a few hours, however severe, could equal pains, though far less intense, eternally prolonged." It was meant to be said, that in comparison with eternity, his sufferings were but the sufferings of a few hours, admitting that they continued through his whole life. The sufferings of thirty years, in comparison with an eternal duration, were supposed to be only a few years, or hours, or minutes; and it was said that those sufferings were not eternal, and could not therefore be the proper penalty of the law. It was denied, then, that he bore the penalty of the law, as he did not endure remorse of conscience; and did not suffer for ever. If the Protestants hold that he did endure remorse of conscience, and eternal suffering, and as the author's views were fully stated, and as they have *protested* against those views, they *must* hold it, then, I humbly conceive, they maintain a doctrine which has not hitherto been held in the Presbyterian Church, and which is certainly not found in the Confession of Faith.

The Protestants refer in proof that Christ did endure the penalty of the law, to Confession of Faith.

Ch. viii. 5, 8, and Larger Cat. Q. 38. The only things affirmed in those places bearing on this subject are, that he "satisfied divine justice, and that it was requisite that the Mediator should be God that he might sustain and keep the human nature from sinking under the infinite wrath of God, and the power of death." But in neither of these places is it affirmed that the Lord Jesus endured the penalty of the law, still less do they charge him with enduring remorse of conscience—as if he were personally criminal; or affirm the absurdity, and impossibility, that he endured *eternal* sufferings.

The second specification is, that the atonement did not of itself secure the salvation of any man, and in illustration of this, a reference was made to Dr. Owen in these words, "The atonement of itself secured the salvation of no man"—stating in few words, the substance of a remark much more extended. The original passage in Dr. Owen is the following:

Owen's Works, vol. v. p. 398, 399. "Answers to Arguments for Universal Redemption." "Sufficient we say then was the sacrifice of Christ for the redemption of the whole world. This sufficiency of his sacrifice, hath a two-fold rise. The dignity of the person that did offer and was offered. Secondly, the greatness of the pain he endured, by which he was able to bear, and did undergo, the whole curse of the law and wrath of God due to sin; and this sets out the innate real true worth and value of the bloodshedding of Jesus Christ. This is its own true internal perfection and sufficiency. That it should be applied unto any, made a price for them, and become beneficial for them, ac-

cording to the worth that is in it, is EXTERNAL to it, doth not arise from it, but merely depends upon the intention and will of God. It was of itself of infinite value, and sufficiency to have been made a price, to have bought and purchased all and every man in the world. That it did formally become a price to any is solely to be ascribed to the purpose *of God*, intending their purchase and redemption by it. This is external, but its fitness and value to be made a price, arises from its own internal efficiency." So again, vol. v. p. 219, he says of the value of the death of Christ, that it was infinite and unmeasurable, fit for the accomplishing of any end, and the procuring of any good, for all and every one for whom it was intended, had they been millions of men more than ever were created." And this is saying that the application of the atonement depends not on *its own nature*, but on the will of God; which is equivalent to affirming that its efficacy depends on the intention of God to apply it; which is the same as to say that it did not of itself secure the salvation of any man; which is what was affirmed in the Sermon.

In denying that it was in itself efficacious, it was meant to affirm that the atonement was something which could be contemplated apart from the purpose to apply it; that it had a dignity and value which could not be adequately measured by its actual application; that it was in its nature applicable to any number of men; that if God had chosen to apply it to to all the world, or to have greatly increased the number of the elect, the Redeemer would not have been required to increase, renew, or prolong his suf-

ferings. Its actual application to man was supposed to be the result of the good pleasure of God. It was supposed that there was a covenant transaction between the Father and the Son, assuring him that he should see of the travail of his soul and should be satisfied, and that his people should be willing in the day of his power. It was *not* supposed that the exact *amount* of this number was fixed by the *nature* of the atonement, but depended on the mercy and promise of God.

To the Redeemer's sufferings and death contemplated apart from the actual purpose to apply His merits, I chose, in accordance with many writers, to apply the word *atonement*. The actual application of his work, I supposed might be appropriately expressed by the word *redemption*. It was not thought that this was a departure from Scripture usage. The word *atonement* occurs but once, as applicable to the death of Christ in the New Testament; the word *redemption* often, and this latter word it is supposed always with reference to the purpose to apply it. It did not seem then to be a gross violation of Scripture usage, to describe by the word atonement a thing which may and must be contemplated—the highest and best gift of God—the sufferer, the bleeding victim, the atoning sacrifice; still less can it be seen how this usage can be construed into an offence against the Confession of Faith. In all our standards of doctrine the word *atonement* never occurs. Nor is it the purpose of the standards to describe the *thing* which I wished to express by the word—the original independent applicability of the sufferings of Christ. The

Confession of Faith states only its *application.* For that it uses the word redemption. It affirms of that, that it is limited, and was intended to be limited. *That* the Sermon never denied—and by what rule the Protestants have arraigned me, for using a word not in the Confession of Faith, and in a sense in which I chose to use it in accordance with the best writers; and used in describing a thing which the Confession does not profess to describe, but which it in no instance denies; how this can be a grave offence against our standards does not appear. If this is the measure by which justice is to be meted out every where, it will not be difficult to find crimes under the most orthodox exterior, and heresy, where any order of men may have an insatiable thirst to find it.

The other specification is the affirmation, that the atonement was general—that it has reference not so much to individuals, as to the law and perfections of God. This statement was made, because the writer was satisfied that the fair interpretation of the New Testament demanded it; nor can he now, without an entire revolution in his opinions about the proper laws of exegesis, be brought to make a different statement. *All* the author's views could have been conveyed in Scripture language. He did believe, and he *still believes*, that Christ was the propitiation for the sins of Christians; and not for theirs only, but also for the sins of the whole world; that by the grace of God he tasted death for every man; that he died for the sins of the world; and, like Paul, he judged that if one died for *all*, then were all dead; and on the ground of that as an argument, preached the doctrine

of total depravity: that the gospel—the good news of salvation—was to be preached to every creature, on the ground of the atonement; and that God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. If to state his views in this language—in the most open, frank, and undisguised manner, without any attempt to narrow these passages by an exegesis adapted to the latitude of the doctrine of a particular atonement, be heresy, the author is guilty; and has yet seen no reason why he should not continue to be so.

The Sermon stated that this, in the author's view, was not a departure from our standards of doctrine. It affirmed that the doctrine of *the original applicability of Christ's work* to any class of men, was not contained in the "Confession of Faith." That statement is now repeated. The places to which the Protestants refer do not state it; no passage which the author has ever seen in the confession, affirms it. And he may safely challenge any man, to point out the place in the whole book, where it is affirmed that the *work of Christ, in its original applicability*, is necessarily confined to any number or class of men. If this cannot be done, how can I be a heretic, for denying what the Confession does not affirm? How are these such gross and dangerous errors, when the Protestants themselves have not referred, and cannot refer, to a proof—or the shadow of a proof—that there is in them any departure from the standards?

The statement moreover, it is believed, is in full accordance with the prevalent belief of the defenders of Calvinism. Thus Dr. Owen says that the work of

Christ was sufficient for all men. So this was the doctrine which the author was taught in Princeton.

This is the sentiment of the Christian Advocate, vol. iii. p. 118. "Such is the infinite worth and value of" the "atonement, that if it were applied, it would save the whole world."

See also Ridgeley's Body of Divinity, vol. ii. p. 309, where it is said that the atonement of Christ is "sufficient for the redemption of the *whole world* had God designed it as a price for them, on the ground of its infinite value."

See also Boston's Body of Divinity, vol. 11. p. 13. "There was also virtue and efficacy enough in his oblation to satisfy offended justice for the sins of the whole world."

This is the common statement from the chair, the desk, the press. If any thing is meant by this, then *all* is meant, that is intended by the author by the doctrine of general atonement—or that it is in its own nature applicable to all men. If sufficient for all; if there was such dignity in the sufferer, that his agonies had ample merit to save all mankind; if there would have been no need of more suffering, if more had been to be saved, and if it be not, as we hold, actually *applied* to all mankind, then this is equivalent to saying that its application depends on the will of God, and this is saying that it had no native, original applicability to any exclusive class of men; and this is just what is affirmed in the Sermon. And if this be true, it can be contemplated apart from the purpose to apply it; and this is not different from saying that its being applied does not depend on its own nature; and

this is equivalent to the assertion that it had not original reference exclusively to individuals; and this is to affirm that it did not secure *of itself*, apart from the covenanted purpose to apply it, the salvation of particular individuals; and this is just what is affirmed in the Sermon. And if this be correct, it is *general* in its nature. If no more suffering could have been demanded if there had been a purpose to apply it to all; if it was sufficient for them, then this is equivalent to saying that it might have been applied to all men; and is *general* in its nature, and on the ground of its salvation may be offered to all. And if this is not to be admitted, then the only consistent ground of holding the atonement is that which affirms of Christ that he was criminal; that he endured the same amount of suffering that the elect would have done in hell; that he was subjected to remorse, and the personal wrath of God, and eternal horrors; that there was a complete transfer of sin; that the universe has gained nothing by the atonement, but the transfer of sin and punishment from the guilty to the innocent; and that if more had been to be saved, Christ would have been called on to deepen, prolong, and extend even those infinite sufferings: a doctrine manifestly equally unknown to the Bible and the Confession of Faith, and denied by the great mass of Presbyterian ministers in the United States. If the author has erred, therefore, he has not erred alone. He strays with some of the best defenders of Calvinism, among the living and the dead. Nay, he has the happiness of wandering, he believes, arm in arm, with the *majority* of the Protestants themselves.

The Protest also charges me with denying that "Christ is a vicarious sacrifice." The Sermon affirmed that Christ "died in the *place of sinners*:" (p. 6.); "that he endured so much suffering, bore so much agony, that the Father was pleased to accept it *in the place* of the eternal torments of all that by him should be saved." (p. 6.) Webster defines the word "vicarious" to mean—first, deputed, delegated; secondly, acting for another; thirdly, substituted *in the place* of another. In the Sermon it is twice affirmed, that Christ died *in the place* of sinners—the very idea contained in all definitions of the word "vicarious." The author of the Sermon is unable to account for the fact, that this charge has come against him from aged and respectable ministers of the gospel. He cannot see how a charge so serious could be the result of inadvertence. He is unwilling to suppose for a moment, that it was the result of a previous purpose to make charges at random; to adopt their own interpretation of the Confession as infallible; and to allege, without proof, any accusation which they might choose, against a minister of Christ in as good standing as themselves. He is still more at a loss to account for it, after the Sermon had been entirely read through in their presence, and had been subjected to a protracted criticism from them and others. He now solemnly affirms, that *it is not true* that he has ever denied, or means to deny, that Christ *was a vicarious sacrifice;* and he cannot but deem the charge that he *does*, whether recorded on the minutes of the Presbytery, or otherwise recorded or circulated, as being an injury to his character, for which he is ex-

ceedingly anxious to find a substantial plea of justification.

The statement, then, of his belief in the atonement, which the author meant to make was, that Christ died in the place of sinners; that his sacrifice on the cross was indispensable to the salvation of any; that it was a vicarious expiatory offering; that it was satisfactory to the rectoral justice of God; that it opened the way of pardon; made it consistent for God to forgive, was in its own nature applicable to all men: that Christ being holy, could not endure remorse—his sufferings being finite, could not be eternal; and that in this sense he did not endure the penalty of the law; that the atonement is capable of being contemplated apart from any purpose to apply it; that the application is the result of a covenant engagement between the Father and the Son, in virtue of which it shall be applied to all who were given him, and thus shall surely secure their repentance, faith, and holy living, and thus their salvation: that in its actual application it is limited; and that still in consistency with this—on the ground of the original applicability of the atonement—the gospel is to be preached to all mankind.

The third charge against the Sermon is in the following language, viz. "that on the subject of man's ability Mr. B. employs language which is contrary to the standards of the church." The specifications are the following: 1. On p. 14 of the Sermon, where it is said, "It is not to any want of physical strength that this rejection is owing, for men have power enough in themselves to hate God, and their fellow men, and

it requires less physical power to *love* God than to *hate* him. It is supposed to be an evident reflection on the Deity of a most serious nature to say that he has required under the penalty of eternal vengeance, that which he has in no sense power to do. This is a matter of common sense. If God requires more of men in any sense than they are able to perform, then in the practical judgment of all men he is unjust." The second specification is on p. 30, where speaking of the reason why men perish it is said, "it is simply because *you will not be saved.*"

The design of these passages was to affirm, that salvation was offered to all men—that they were under no compulsory measures—no physical force to ruin them—that they were not under a defect of any natural power of intellect, judgment, or conscience to do this duty—that the duty which God required had been measured by the nature of the human faculties, and that if he went beyond that limit it must be unjust. The *common sense*—the universal understanding of all men, it was supposed, was a sufficient proof of these very plain positions, nor did the author know that they had ever been formally called in question by any theologians, until he learned the opposite views of the Protestants.

The Sermon also affirms that it is easier to love God, than to hate him, and this was also a matter of experience. By this is meant, that those who actually do love God, find less difficulty, anxiety, and remorse, than those who persevere in opposition to him. It was supposed by the author that a man's *reason* suggested the propriety of loving him; that revelation urged many

additional cogent arguments *why* a man *should* love him, that his *conscience* also united its voice in favor of this duty; and that when a man *did* actually love God, all these combined to render it a pleasant and delightful operation of the mind—while, on the other hand, the man who obstinately resisted all the motives, who met various appeals which God makes to him in his Providence and by his Spirit, was engaged in a struggle which often rendered his life one of extreme anxiety and remorse. It was believed that the act of loving a kind and tender parent, was far more pleasant, and required no more physical powers, than obstinately to hate and disobey such a parent; and the same thing, it was presumed, was the testimony of Christians of every age who had uniformly spoken of the comparative peace, and ease, and joy, of loving God. And it was also supposed that the anxieties and corrosions of conscience of the wicked throughout the world, compared with the peace of Christians, was in entire accordance with this fact. Nor did it occur that there could be a difference of opinion in so plain a case, until it was protested against by eight ministers and four elders of the Presbyterian Church, as being contrary to the received standards of doctrine.

The Sermon also contained the idea that the will of man is the only obstacle in the way to his conversion. By this was meant that he was *wholly* inclined to evil, and opposed to good; and that this native propensity was so strong as never to be overcome but by the influence of the Holy Spirit. This was supposed to be sufficient to account for the fact that men did not of themselves become Christians, and was affirmed

to be the only obstacle to their conversion. It was meant that it was not any defect of the proper faculties of a moral agent—of his reason, or judgment, or intellect, or capacity to understand a law, or his ability to obey it if he had chosen to do it, but simply such an *indisposition* to obey it; such an obstinate determination not to obey it, as forever to make certain his disobedience until removed. At the same time, it was meant to be affirmed, that if men had had the proper *disposition* and *choice* in regard to it, there would have been no other obstacle. This opinion is still most distinctly affirmed. This opinion the Protestants deem hostile to the Confession of Faith.

Now when we open that book on the subject under consideration, we find the following remarkable declarations, Ch. ix. v. 2, 3. "Man in his state of innocency had power *to will* and *to do*, that which is good and well pleasing to God. Man by his fall into a state of sin hath wholly lost all ability OF WILL—to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man being altogether AVERSE from that which is good and dead in sin, is not able by his own strength to convert himself."

In this passage the following things are thought worthy of observation. 1. That here is an express and formal definition of what the framers of the constitution meant by *inability*. This is the object of the chapter to explain the state of man since the fall, in reference to obeying the law of God. 2. That they expressly affirm that the difficulty is in THE WILL, "having lost all ability of *will*." Nor do they mention any other difficulty or obstacle in the way of

man's conversion, but what lies *in the will.* That is evidently implying, that if *the will* were right, there were no other obstacle; which is the same as saying, in the language of the Sermon, that the "only reason why sinners are not converted, is because they *will* not be." 3. That the effect of the fall is to render them *averse* to holiness, "being altogether *averse* from that which is good." And 4. That this aversion is the definition and gauge of man's inability. "Being *averse* from that which is good, is NOT ABLE," &c. Now, they evidently meant to say, that man's aversion to holiness was the cause, the measure, and the extent of his inability. Nor is any other cause mentioned. It is true the words *unable, inability,* &c., are elsewhere used in the Confession. But it is a fair rule of interpretation, that when a word has been expressly and formally defined, it is to be understood elsewhere in the same book subject to the definition. When, in books of geometry, we meet with the words rectangle, circle, or parallelism, the words are to be understood subject to the express and formal definitions. Nor would it be a fair rule of interpretation to apply to these words definitions of our own, or well authorized definitions of the words in other books.

Now, in applying this rule to the case before us, it is admitted that men, by affixing to the words unable, inability, &c., ideas with which they may have been very familiar, and definitions which may have been often used, and which the words might *possibly* bear, *might* persuade themselves that all man's inability, according to the Confession, was *not* in the will. And this would be just the same as for a man to have im-

bibed the idea, that parallel lines are *not* always equidistant from each other, and to have often taught men so, and to have denounced all other opinions as heresies; and then, when some affirmation was made departing from this singular, though *stereotyped* view, charging the man with broaching opinions at variance with the orthodox books on geometry. After all, the question would be, What, in the proper place of definitions, did *the book teach?* And so of the Confession of Faith. It is certainly possible that a man reading the word *unable* in the Confession, may have learned to suppose that it meant *all kinds of inability* possible, and having done so, will be likely to charge every man with heresy, who was so unfortunate as to take his view from the place where the word is formally defined. Nor would any reference to the proper place of defining, save from the anathemas of set and formal "protestations." The author of the Sermon supposed that the framers of the Confession were honest men; that when they formally *define* a word, they adhere uniformly to that definition; that when that word occurs in the standard, it is to be taken subject to the limitations which they themselves have affixed to it. In the case before us, he supposes that they have formally, in the proper place, defined men's inability as consisting in the *will;* that it is because man is *averse* to holiness, that he does not obey God; that this *aversion* is the measure of his inability. Nor do they ever refer to any other notion of inability than this. And it is believed still, that the true doctrine of the Confession of Faith, as it is of the Bible, and the Sermon, is that the reason

why men do not repent and believe, is because they *will not* come to Christ that they might have life. It is not a little remarkable that the Protestants should have referred to *the very passage* in the Confession of Faith, which teaches the identical doctrine contained in the Sermon; and should then have declared their unwillingness to receive a man who believes it. And it is not less wonderful, that men skilled in cautious and experienced polemics, should have ventured their names on an accusation of heresy, and adventured formal charges of guilt, to be preserved on the records of the Presbytery, for maintaining a doctrine *in the very words of the Confession of Faith.*

The fourth charge against the Sermon is, that it "makes no mention of the doctrine of justification by the imputed righteousness of Christ." In regard to this charge, I beg leave to state: 1. That the doctrine is not *denied* in the Sermon, nor is there any thing which the Protestants were able to shape into the appearance of such a denial. When a minister of the Presbyterian Church has declared his assent to its standards in the solemn vows of his ordination, he is to be presumed to hold to these standards unless he formally rejects them. Public and recorded charges of heresy without proof against a minister, made by responsible men, and by men sustaining the office of ministers of God, are no trifling things in the view of men, and in the view of the Head of the Church. 2. The whole scope of the Sermon was such, as to imply the usual doctrine of justification. For this, the formal and extended proof, that man had no native merit—that he was renewed by the Holy Ghost—and

that he came to the Saviour destitute of righteousness: all implying, that if he was justified, it must be by the righteousness of another. 3. The doctrine was stated in express language, and with an intention of making the usual statement on the subject. Thus, in p. 23, it is said, "*all this is done through the merits of the Son of God*, IN VIRTUE ALONE OF HIS DEATH, and in connection with two acts, made indispensable by the authority of God. These high feelings, these exalted hopes, are conferred on no one who repents not of his sins, and believes not in the Son of God. The former act implies a deep sorrow that God has been offended; the latter implies a sense of the lost condition by nature; a conviction of helplessness and unworthiness, and a sensible reliance on the merits of the Lord Jesus; and, in connection with this act of believing, the sinner is pardoned and *justified*." 4. It was repeatedly and fully stated in Presbytery by the personal friends of the author, and by those who had heard his sentiments in the pulpit, that he taught fully the common doctrine on the subject of justification, without the appearance of variation from the standards. 5. Statements written, and oral, were made by the author himself in Presbytery, fully affirming that he received cordially the standards on this subject—that he taught the doctrine inculcated by his theological teachers at Princeton, as he understood them; and that he has never varied, to his knowledge, from the common mode of stating the doctrine of justification by faith. And yet, notwithstanding this, the Protestants continue to vote, and act on this subject, as if no such declarations on this subject had ever been made. 6. The author again fully

affirms, that he receives and teaches the doctrine, that men are justified by the righteousness of Jesus Christ, and not at all by their own works and deserts; that it is reckoned to them, or set over to their account, for all the purposes of their salvation; that he has taught no other doctrine, and has no other reliance for his own personal redemption. 7. If, after the presumptive evidence in favor of any minister that he holds a doctrine of the Confession until he denies it—if the whole Sermon was based on the essential recognition of this doctrine—if the Sermon contained a full statement of the thing, declaring, explicitly, that in this way a man was justified—if, after repeated written and verbal statements that the author held this opinion, and not the shadow of evidence that he ever, in form or in fact, denied it—if, after all these things, a reason be asked why eight ministers of Jesus Christ have publicly, repeatedly, and on record, charged him with denying it, the author *hopes* that the reason will not be found in a previous purpose to find heresy in his Sermon; in an attempt to prejudice the minds of men against him; or, in a set and formal combination, to appal a young man and a stranger; and, by exciting suspicion against his character, to prevent his usefulness as a minister in good standing in the Presbyterian Church. On this point, as on others in the Protest, he feels himself aggrieved, and desires to make permanent record of his feelings.

The only other point noticed by the Protestants is in these words, "the author of the Sermon makes certain general declarations which induce us to believe that he does not properly regard his obligation to

adhere to the standards of the Presbyterian Church." The "general declarations" to which exceptions are taken, are the following: On p. 6, in language already quoted respecting the imputation of Adam's sin. The other exceptionable passage is on p. 12, in the following words: "The great principle on which the author supposes the truths of religion are to be preached, and on which he endeavours to act is, that the Bible is to be interpreted by all the honest helps within the reach of the preacher; and then proclaimed as it is—let it lead where it will, within or without the circumference of any arrangments of doctrines. He is supposed to be responsible not at all for its impinging on any theological system, nor is he to be cramped by any frame work of faith that has been reared round the Bible."

To this language the Protestants object; and by objecting to it, it follows of course that they hold different views, and have other principles on which they interpret the Scriptures. By entering a solemn protest against these views, it would seem to follow that they hold: 1. That a minister of the gospel is *not* to interpret the Bible by all the honest helps within his reach, and then proclaim it AS IT IS. 2. That he is to shape his investigations of the Bible, and of course, his views of truth, by some frame work that has been reared around the oracles of God. 3. That he is responsible for the effect which God's own truth, drawn by honest interpretation, shall have on systems of human arrangements. 4. That his views of truth are to originate not from the Bible, but from a human standard; *i. e.* in interpreting the Scriptures, he is to

ask himself primarily, not what is the fair grammatical construction of the text, but what doctrines does the Confession *require* him, on pain of violating ordination vows, to draw out of the sacred Scriptures. 5. That when in his view the Bible teaches a doctrine or exhibits a shade of opinion different from the letter of the Confession, he is either to bury it in lasting silence, or disguise the incipient heresy; or bend his rules of interpretation to ward off the evils held up *in terrorem* over the head of the daring man who interprets the New Testament without first asking the standards of doctrine. Whether these are the *real* opinions of the Protestants, with a single exception which shall be quoted presently, the author has no means of ascertaining, except the fact that they have, under pretence of great claims of conscience, and of great regard to the purity and peace of the church, recorded their solemn protest against the contrary. If such be the views entertained by ministers of the Presbyterian Church, the author of the Sermon has only to say, that *he* has never had such apprehensions of the nature of his ordination vows. The principles on which he ever has acted, and on which he purposes still, by the grace of God, to act, are to investigate the Bible by all the honest helps within his reach; to look at that book as a source of independent original information; in examining the words of the Bible, never to ask himself what particular opinions have been held or denied by any class of men, or to suffer the inquiry for a moment to stay the progress of his investigations. Having according to the best of his ability obtained the views of the Bible, he feels himself

called on to proclaim them every where, and at all times, meeting thus his responsibility to God, and not being further answerable for their effect on men or things. If this be heresy, the author of the Sermon has no expectation of being less a heretic than when he penned the discourse, and is willing that these sentiments should be deemed a recorded expression of his views.

At the same time, he owes it to himself to state, that while he holds that no reference to any Standard of Faith, is to *originate* any views respecting the proper interpretation of the Scriptures, he has no doubt their fair interpretation will lead to the system taught in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith. Such has been thus far the result of his inquiries, and that system substantially he has endeavored to teach. But to prevent the possibility of being misunderstood, it is still affirmed to be a very serious purpose, while God spares my life, to investigate the Scriptures without reference to any human theological system, to preach what is found there without fear, disguise, or shrinking; and to proclaim what I believe to be truth, let it lead where it will, or whatever may be the result. This course is adopted because in this way only can I meet my responsibility to God; thus only can I express my views of the Bible, as supreme and authentative over all creed and councils of men, and thus only can I have any pledge that God will own my labors and make them useful. This was indubitably the path in which the apostles and reformers trod. This course I owe to God; to the Confession of Faith itself; to the age in which I live; to the congregation

where I minister; to my own soul; and to my fellow-men. My views on this subject cannot be better expressed than in the language of the Christian Advocate.

"We are of the opinion that every commentator on the sacred volume ought, as far as possible, to divest himself of all prepossessions whenever he opens the sacred pages, and resolve to let the inspired text *guide* him, and not endeavor to *guide* it. The inquiry of the biblical student should be, not what is Calvinism? or what is Arminianism? or what is Unitarianism? but what is the mind of the Spirit of God in the text which he examines." Vol. 8, p. 475.

If it were proper, and I did not deem such professions when often made suspicious, hypocritical, unmeaning, or presumptive proof of heresy, I could use language of attachment for the Presbyterian Church, as strong as any ever used by the Protestants themselves. But I prefer to attempt in my feeble manner, by the grace of God, to evince my attachment to that church and its standards, by labouring to promote its real peace—not the peace of spiritual death and indifference; its real orthodoxy—not a heartless assent to standards not read, and not understood, but sentiments drawn from the sacred Scriptures that may be entwined with all the principle of moral action; and its real welfare—a welfare less to be sought by a frigid and formal statement of orthodoxy, than by efforts made, with humble reliance on the aid of the Holy Ghost, to defend the truth, to produce revivals of religion; and to advance the glory of that day, when the watchmen upon the same walls, and es-

pecially *on the towers of the same city*, shall see eye to eye.

With these remarks I close; lamenting that the Protestants have given me occasion for a defence so irksome to me; and so long. It does not come into the proper design of answering the Protest, to remark on the way in which occasion has been given for this answer. Of the manner in which myself a stranger—yet a stranger known to be unaccused in a co-ordinate judicatory, was met by the members of the Presbytery, who have felt it their duty to sign this Protest, I do not deem myself called on to make any remarks. It may be proper only to add in a respectful manner, that the constitution of the Presbyterian Church supposes all its ministers to be *innocent*, until they are *proved* to be guilty; that it has taken care to guard their character; secure their rights; extend their usefulness; and to defend them from erroneous imputations, and unfounded charges. It gives them the right to a fair trial; and subjects those who unjustly accuse them to the penalty of being "censured as slanderers of the gospel ministry, according to the *malignancy* or *rashness* that shall appear in the prosecution." Book of Discipline, ch. v, viii. Even when formally arraigned and on trial, it demands that "a minister should be treated with Christian and brotherly tenderness." Idem. ch. xiv. It demands that "frequent *conferences* should be held with him, and proper admonitions administered." Idem. To these rules, the Protestants, by the solemnity of their ordination vows, sacredly promised to adhere. Whether *they* have suitably "regarded

THEIR obligation to adhere to the standards of the Presbyterian Church," the author of the Sermon is not disposed to inquire. He is willing to leave others to judge. He asks the privilege only of presenting the following facts. That the author of the Sermon was in good standing in his own Presbytery, unaccused by them, and dismissed with honorable testimonials of their confidence:—that he has never been arraigned, or accused in a manner contemplated by the standards of the church:—that a Sermon of his has been attacked, accused, criticised, in a form unknown to the constitution:—that efforts have been made, tests applied, as to some nondescript substance in minerals, to prove his affinity with all that has been known as heresy—not excepting Socinianism:—that this has been done in his absence, and without apprizing him, or the Presbytery to which he belonged, of the intention:—that it has been done in his presence, in language, and in a form, which he desires should be buried in lasting oblivion; where no opportunity was given, or could be taken, legally to defend himself:—that twelve men, and among them the most aged of the Presbytery, and those who best knew that the Book of Discipline demanded great kindness and candor, have chosen to record on the books of the Presbytery, and to propagate from the press, their deliberate opinion of a minister, unaccused, and untried, that he has violated the constitution, disregarded his ordination vows, and broached dangerous errors:—that all this has been done after he had solemnly declared his adherence to the Confession of Faith; when he stated no intention to renounce this

adherence; and when the Protestants had not reason to suppose he ever purposed such a renunciation:—that this has been done with an evident intention to give that construction to the Sermon, which was in their view most remote from truth; and without admitting any verbal or written explanations from the author or his friends:—that this has been done, where not one of them has ever sought with the author a personal interview; when no "conferences" have been held with him; when no friendly explanations have been asked by letter or otherwise; and when the customary courtesies of Christian ministers, and of common urbanity, have been withheld:—that to all this is to be added the fact, that former personal friends and acquaintances, have felt it to be their duty to be insensible alike to the courtesies of Christian friendship, the higher demands of religion, and the authority of the Confession of Faith. With these facts before them, the world can judge whose conduct, in these memorable transactions, has been most in accordance with the doctrinal standards of the Presbyterian Church, and with the spirit of the gospel of Christ.

ALBERT BARNES.

DEFENCE

OF

ALBERT BARNES,

AGAINST THE CHARGES OF THE

REV. GEORGE JUNKIN, D.D.

PRESIDENT OF LAFAYETTE COLLEGE,

TRIED BEFORE THE

Second Presbytery of Philadelphia,

JUNE 30—JULY 8, 1835.

DEFENCE, &c.

THE charges here alleged, are ten in number, for erroneous doctrines taught and published in the "Notes on the Epistle to the Romans." Before proceeding to answer them at length, it may be proper to advert to three remarkable circumstances in regard to the manner in which they have been brought.

The first is, that the prosecutor and the accused belong to different presbyteries and to different synods. In my own Presbytery, I was in good standing; and enjoying, so far as I had, or still have any reason to suppose, the confidence of my own co-presbyters. I was pursuing, peacefully, the duties of a most laborious pastoral charge—requiring all my time and strength; and, indeed, exhausting the vigor of my life, and rapidly undermining my constitution, by arduous and incessant duties. I was surrounded by a Church, perfectly united and harmonious—having confidence, so far as I know, in my ministry, my character, and my orthodoxy. It is not known that the voice of complaint had been heard among the people of my own charge, of any dereliction from the doctrines which had been taught in the First Presbyterian Church in the United States for a period of one hundred and thirty years. Charges similar to these had

been alleged against me; not, indeed, in a formal and regular manner, but in an *irregular* manner by the Presbytery of Philadelphia. These accusations had been laid before the General Assembly, and the highest judicature of the Presbyterian Church had fully acquitted me of them. The agitations of that time had died somewhat away. I was permitted to return to my labor, with the hope that I might pursue it in peace.

These charges are substantially of the same nature, and are not pretended to be different by the prosecutor himself. In the midst of my labors and my plans for the welfare of my pastoral charge, my attention has been arrested, and a demand made on my time, and patience, and strength, to answer again substantially the same accusations. They are brought by a member of another Presbytery, and another Synod. To Dr. Junkin I had done no injury; I had made no allusion. His opinions I had not attacked; nor in the book on which these charges are based, have I made the remotest allusion to him or his doctrines. I admit, indeed, the right of any minister of the Presbyterian Church to bring charges of heresy or immorality against any other minister; but the question instinctively arises, in looking at the circumstances of this case, Why should *Dr. Junkin* feel himself called on to stand forth as the defender of orthodoxy, and as the accuser of his brethren? Why should the president of a literary institution feel himself called on to bring solemn and grave charges of error against a pastor in another Presbytery? Why should *he* feel it to be his duty to excite suspicion, and disturb the

peace of a church of Christ, and unsettle their confidence in their pastor, and allege charges fitted and designed, doubtless, to depose him from the ministry—to blast his good name, and arrest his schemes of labor, and put a period to the little good which he might be doing? Why should *he* be the man to tear open old wounds scarcely healed, and raise again the cry of alarming heresy, fast dying away, and throw the Christian community again into agitation. There *may* possibly be such an eminence of talent, learning, piety, and eloquence, as to constitute a man a guardian of the orthodoxy and the peace of the churches; but it is a very material question, whether it is wise for a man to put forth any thing which can be construed into any such claim of ecclesiastical pre-eminence and guardianship. On *any* consideration of this subject, it is not easy to see why the President of Lafayette College should have felt himself called on to allege these charges.

A second circumstance that is remarkable is, the manner in which these charges have been brought. Our Saviour has laid down a rule which it is conceived is equally obligatory on all his followers, and in all cases, whether pertaining to public or private transactions. Matt. xviii. 15, "Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother." That this direction is applicable to all the cases of *offence* which may occur in the church, there can be no reasonable doubt. Charges can be brought against a man in no other way than as they are supposed to constitute some

offence or *crime*, either of a public or private nature. They can be brought by an individual only as that individual has been injured or offended. If the deed be of a public nature, it is an offence against the prosecutor only as a part of the public, and he can be considered as injured only *as* a part of the public. If on this ground, therefore, charges are brought, the rule of the Saviour should be regarded as applicable and binding.

It is equally manifest that our Saviour mentions *no case* where any other course would be proper. He speaks of no public offence where this course would not be demanded. He specifies no instance of an offence where this course might be dispensed with. Had there been any such cases, they would have been referred to; and he would not have concealed the instance where an offence might have existed in which it was not proper or necessary for the brother "to go and tell him his fault" alone. Every instance, therefore, of offence comes under this rule of the New Testament.

The wisdom of the rule is manifest. No small part of the trials for injury, for heresy, for error, for offences of any kind in the church, would be avoided by the observance of this simple direction. A frank and friendly intercourse between brethren would often show them that there was no ground of offence; that no crime had been intended or committed; and that all that was necessary was a simple statement of the facts as they occurred, and of the intention which led to them. This is as certainly true of doctrines as of alleged moral offences. In most cases of supposed

error, all the difficulty can be removed by a frank and free interchange of sentiments.

If it be alleged that *a book* is an exception to these remarks, that it is public, and the offence spread abroad, I reply that the Saviour made no exceptions in any such case: nor should he have done. A *book* comes under the same general direction as offences of any kind. If a man feels that he is injured by a book, it must be either as *one of the public*, because the book holds erroneous sentiments, or that he is particularly intended by slanderous or other injurious words: and in either case, if he supposes that an injury is done so as to demand his attention, the rule of the Saviour is applicable. Further, there is this difference in the case of *a book* from other forms of public or private injury. A book can be corrected. The correction can flow in the same channel, and it can become a *permanent* and wide spread attestation of the author of his conviction of his error, and he may thus do more to repair an injury than in the case of any other mode of offence. It is evident, therefore, that the fact that the alleged injury was done in *a book*, does not remove it from the operation of the Saviour's rule.

Now I have cause to complain that this plain and obvious rule of Jesus Christ was not regarded by Dr. Junkin in regard to a minister in good standing. By bringing these charges, Dr. J. alleges, impliedly, that he has been injured, either *personally*, or as *one of the Christian community* If *not* injured in one of these senses, there could have been no justifiable pretence for bringing them. *If* injured, he was bound to go and tell his fault to the offending brother, and

endeavor to recover him from his errors. But this was not done. No interview was sought. No explanation was asked. No fraternal admonition was addressed suggesting error and injury to the cause of truth. *Nothing* was done until the charges were fully made out, and ready to be prosecuted; and *all* that was then done was a letter apprizing me of that fact. This letter is in the following words:

LAFAYETTE COLLEGE, March 16th, 1835.

Rev. and Dear Sir:—In your Notes on the Epistle to the Romans, there are doctrines set forth, which, in my humble opinion, are contrary to the standards of the Presbyterian Church and to the word of God.

It also appears to me, and has long so appeared, that these, and certain affiliated doctrines, have been the chief causes of the unhappy distractions over which we all mourn.

A third opinion, operating to the production of this communication, is, that peace and union in evangelical effort, cannot take place, so long as these important doctrinal points remain unsettled; and that, therefore, all the friends of such union and peace ought to desire their final adjustment by the proper judicatories of the church. It is certainly true that many have wished to see them brought up, fairly and legally, before the proper tribunals, unconnected with mere questions of ecclesiastical policy, and without any admixture of personal or congregational feelings. Regret has often been expressed by many, and by myself among others, that the Presbytery of Philadelphia had not, at the outset, instituted process against yourself instead of the course they pursued. I am sure, however, they did what they thought for the best. It is much easier to find fault after a measure has been put into operation, than to foresee its defects and prevent them.

Now, dear brother, your recent publication has re-opened the door, and, unworthy as I am, and incompetent in the solemn duty, yet duty I feel it to be to enter it; and by an open, fair, candid and Christian prosecution of the case, to bring out a formal and legal decision of your Presbytery on the points alluded to. I therefore intend, *Deo volente*, to prefer charges against you, founded solely upon your Notes on Ro-

mans, and referring to no other evidence for their support, than what shall be deduced from that book.

In prosecuting these charges, I hope I shall be enabled to act with gravity, solemnity, brotherly affection, and all the respect due to a court of Jesus Christ. The object is peace through union in the TRUTH; and I hope the God of Truth and Peace will direct us to a happy issue. Most conscientiously do I believe that you have fallen into dangerous error. I feel that your doctrine shakes the foundation of my personal hopes for eternity. If it be true, then I cannot "read my title clear, to mansions in the skies." Around the discussion of a subject so solemn, I cannot doubt the Son of God will throw a hallowed influence, which will call up feelings very different from those that too often agitate ecclesiastical bodies, where principles of minor consequence acquire exciting power from adventitious circumstances.

May I now ask of you the favor to transmit to Mr. Henry M'Keens, No. 142 Market street, a note, with responses to the following queries, viz:—1. Will you admit the Notes on Romans, bearing your name, to be your own production, and save me the trouble of proving it? 2. Will you waive the constitutional right of ten days, &c., [Book pp. 396—402,] and so let the case come up and pass through the Presbytery with as little delay as possible; provided I furnish you with a copy of the charges at least that number of days beforehand?

To these postulates I can see no reasonable objections on your part, and presume there will be none.

A friend of mine will receive your reply and dispose of it agreeably to arrangements already made; and will also inform me of the time and place of the Presbytery's meeting.

Your Brother in the Lord,
GEORGE JUNKIN.

Of this conduct I have a right to complain as a departure from the express authority of Christ; as preventing the possibility of conference and explanation; as giving unchristian publicity to charges and accusations tending to injure my character and usefulness, without the possibility of meeting it *in the precise spot* where Jesus Christ contemplated that such accusations should be met; and as depriving me of that

protection and defence which at this point the Saviour has appointed for all his professed followers, and all his ministers.

A third circumstance, not less remarkable, is, that even when the charges had been brought, no charge of crime was alleged, nor even of heresy. The Book of Discipline of the Presbyterian Church, proceeds on the supposition that a minister can be arraigned only for crime or heresy, ch. v. s. 4, 5, 6, 11. It never contemplates that suspicions may be breathed, or published against the character of a minister, unless some one shall undertake to make out a specific *offence* or *crime;* never supposes that that character may be held up as matter of convenience in reference to which theological difficulties may be discussed and settled. His character is supposed to be sacred: and as in all other cases, he is to be held innocent until he is proved to be guilty.

Yet in this instance, Dr. J. alleged neither crime nor heresy. Though in his letter to me, he charged me as holding opinions that, if true, took away his personal hopes of heaven—that is, in effect, with teaching doctrines that would destroy the soul of a minister forever in hell, yet he brought no charge of crime or heresy. From some cause there was a reluctance to give these charges a name. When a man is accused before a civil tribunal, it is indispensable that the crime be specified in the indictment. If murder be the crime charged, it is indispensable that it be legally denominated; if an assault, that it be specified; if treason, that there be no shrinking from the name. Yet in these charges there was no specific offence charged. It was

neither crime nor heresy of which I was accused. Nor was it until after much delay, nor until there was a prospect that the Presbytery would not proceed to a trial on charges so vague, that Dr. J. declared that he regarded the charges as substantially charges of HERESY. Why there was this shrinking from specifying the intended nature of the charge, has never been explained. It has thrown an air of mystery over all this transaction, which it is difficult to reconcile with the principles of the New Testament, and with the requirements of the Presbyterian Church in regard to the character of its ministers.

The Notes on the Epistle to the Romans, against which these charges are alleged, were written in pursuance of a plan formed several years since. That plan was, to prepare a brief explanation of the New Testament in a style and manner adapted to popular use, and especially to the wants of Bible Classes and Sabbath Schools. The want of such a book was every where deeply felt, and it became apparent, that this want must, from some quarter, be supplied. The demand was supposed to be, not of a work deeply learned and profound; not stating the critical process by which the meaning of the sacred Scriptures is arrived at, but the *results* of such an investigation; and such heads of practical remarks as might furnish topics of useful illustration to be enlarged on at pleasure by instructors in Sunday Schools and Bible Classes. A part of that plan was executed in the publication of "Notes on the Gospels;" and although I felt deeply that there were many defects in the execution, yet the consciousness that such a work was

demanded, that I might be contributing in some degree to form the views of the rising generation to just views of the oracles of God, encouraged me in my work. Amidst the anxious cares and responsibilities of an important pastoral charge, the work was prepared for the press; and the favorable reception of that portion of the work by the Christian public, favorable beyond my most sanguine expectations, showed how much such a work was demanded, and how ready the Christian churches were to avail themselves of any effort, however humble, to diffuse just views of the interpretation of the New Testament.

The Notes on the Epistle to the Romans, are a part of the same general plan; and having the same design. Their character is varied only as the nature of the subject is varied, and as the difficulties of the book required a somewhat more labored exposition. The fact, also, that, as supposed, some important erroneous views had prevailed respecting the true interpretation of the epistle; that it had been explained under the influence of erroneous philosophical opinions, required additional labor to remove the influence of that philosophy, to leave, if possible, nothing but the simple sense of the inspired writer. The primary design was not to attack any system of philosophy or religion, but to arrive at the simple doctrines of the apostle—an object which necessarily led to some of the statements in reference to which these charges are brought.

In preparing the Notes, which have given occasion to these charges of heresy, I was not ignorant that the exposition of the epistle was attended with great difficulty. It was known that this epistle had been

regarded as the great *arena* of controversy, and that many different modes of interpretation had been proposed and defended with great zeal by their respective advocates. The *reasons* of this variety of interpretation, I have endeavoured to state in the introduction to the "Notes." (p. ix. x.)

, I am not conscious of being so obstinately attached to the exposition which I have adopted, as to be unwilling to be convinced of error; and, if convinced, to abandon the sentiments which I have expressed. Whether the mode that will be most likely to secure a change of opinion, is that of arraigning me for the high misdemeanor of *heresy*—is the Christian mode, and the most desirable to secure such a result, I shall not now take upon myself to inquire. I may just be permitted to say, that it is not the use of hard names, and the language of reproach, that will secure the result. In this land, and in these times, a change of opinion is to be effected, not by the language of authority—not by an appeal to the fathers—not by calling on us simply to listen to the voice of other times, however venerable and desirable such a deference may be in its place—but by the sober and solid exposition of the oracles of God. Men, even in error, listen respectfully to those who attempt to *reason* with them, and to *convince* them that they are wrong: they turn, instinctively, away, when denunciation takes the place of argument, and the cry of heresy is a substitute for a sober appeal to the understanding.

As the discussion in which we are now engaged is one that may deeply affect my character and my ministry, and still more as it may have a material bearing

on the prevalence of truth, I may be permitted to state, a little more fully, the principles of interpretation in which I have written these Notes. These principles are stated in a summary manner in the preface.

"The design has been to state, with as much brevity and simplicity as possible, the real meaning of the sacred writer—rather the *results* of critical inquiry, as far as the author had the ability and time to pursue it, than the *process* by which these results were reached. The design has been to state, what appeared to the author to be the real *meaning* of the epistle, without *any* regard to any existing theological system; and without any deference to the opinions of others, farther than the respectful deference, and candid examination, which are due to the opinions of the learned, the wise, and the good, who have made this epistle their particular study."

In regard to this statement I may observe, that my design was to give the true meaning of the sacred writer. I aimed to arrive at the exact sense which the apostle intended to convey. My object was, not to *attack* any system of theological opinion which is now held, or which has ever been held, but to arrive at the true doctrine of the inspired writer—and that only. If, in arriving at this, there is an appearance of having *attacked* any existing and prevalent opinions, I may be allowed to expect the credit of sincerity when I say, that it was from no design of waging war on those dogmas, but because it did not seem to me possible, in the existing state of theological opinion, to give the *true* exposition of the epistle, without attempting to remove that which was false; and which almost, by prescription, had come to be considered as the real sense of the sacred writer. He that wishes to rear an edifice that shall be permanent, is under a necessity of removing any obstruction that may lie in his way. It will

be observed, that in the statement which I have made of the *principles* on which I am to interpret the sacred writers, I do not claim infallibility, nor exemption from the common infirmities of human nature; I do not assume, that I am free from all prejudice or bias; nor do I intend to speak with disparagement of the opinions of the wise and good of other times. I simply say, that "*my design* has been, to state what appeared to me to be the real *meaning* of the epistle, without any regard to any existing theological system, and without any deference to the opinions of others, *further than the respectful deference and candid examination which are due to the opinions of the learned, the wise, and the good, who have made this epistle their particular study.*"

It was, further, my intention, in preparing those Notes, not to be influenced in the interpretation by a regard to any creed, or confession of faith, whatever. I make this frank avowal, because it is the deliberate and settled purpose of my mind; and because it is the principle by which I expect always to be governed. I therefore state, that, in preparing these Notes, I have never had the Westminster Confession of Faith before me, nor any other confession; I have never framed a sentence, to the best of my recollection, with any design that it should be conformed to the doctrines of any confession of faith; nor have I ever framed a sentence, with any desire or intention that it should in any way depart from any such confession. I have not made any such confession of faith the *rule* of interpretation; but have all along endeavored to ascertain, if I could, what was

the mind of the Spirit of inspiration. That from this rule I have never unconsciously departed, would be to assume a freedom from bias, and from the prejudice of opinion, to which I by no means lay claim, and which would be more than human. That I am exempt from the secret influence of long-cherished opinions, would be to lay claim to what my knowledge of human nature forbids me to think possible; and which would be abundantly refuted and rebuked by what I know of the proneness of my own mind to err. I speak now of the *rule*—not of the conscious imperfection of the execution. My meaning is, that I regard the Bible, with the usual auxiliary helps arising from philology, criticism, archæology, history, and the principles of common sense, in explaining language as designed to be interpreted, without any aid to be drawn from any previous cherished opinions of men. I mean, that the *mould* should not be first formed, and then the system run into it; that the masses of truth of the sacred Scriptures should not be chiselled to make them conform to any previously cherished views of what the model of truth should be.

It is not necessary, I presume, to say any thing in defence of this principle of interpretation. It is the common, the universal principle, laid down in the books; and I doubt not, the principle acted on as honestly by those who differ from me in opinion, as by myself. No man can be qualified to be an interpreter of the Bible, or of any other book, except as he endeavors to act on this simple and obvious rule. Neither by authority, by tradition, nor by the apprehension of heresy, is a man to be deterred from the

application of this principle; and the moment a different rule is acted on, in fact or in form, that moment the authority of the Bible, as the original fountain of truth, as "the only infallible rule of faith and practice," ceases. That this is the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church, cannot be doubted. Thus in the form of government it is said, that "the Holy Scriptures are the only rule of faith and manners." Chap. i. 37. Again: in the service of ordination and licensure, the candidate is required to declare his belief that "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the word of God, the ONLY infallible rule of faith and practice." Chap. xv. 37. And in the Large Cat. Q. 3, "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the word of God, the only rule of faith and obedience."

I may here be permitted to state, that I am no enemy of creeds and confessions of faith. Never have I penned a sentence against them; and no man has ever heard me speak in their disparagement or condemnation. In my humble way, and whenever an opportunity has been presented, I have advocated their use. I have regarded them as not inconsistent with the spirit of the New Testament; as of value to express the agreement of Christians organized into the same body, to acquaint the world with their sense of the doctrines of the Scriptures, and to apprize others of the opinions which they will be expected to hold, if they become members of that communion; as in fact existing in all churches, either in a written or unwritten form; and as of service in aiding in the defence and extension of the truth. A passage in my

Sermon on "The Way of Salvation," which has been often referred to, has been as often misunderstood. In that passage it is declared, that "the great principle on which the author supposes the great truths of religion are to be preached, and on which he endeavors to act, is, that the Bible is to be interpreted by all the honest helps within the reach of the preacher, and then proclaimed *as it is*—let it lead where it will, within or without the circumference of any arrangement of doctrines. He is supposed to be responsible not at all for its impinging on any theological system; nor is he to be cramped by any frame work of faith that has been reared around the Bible." In this passage it was never intended to discard, or undervalue creeds, in their proper place. It was designed only to assert a great principle of interpretation; that the Bible is to be interpreted, not by reference to such creeds, but by those canons which regard it as the original fountain of truth; that its meaning is to be ascertained by honest industry, and humble prayer; and that its heavenly truth is not to be adulterated by any impure mixture; or frittered away by any softening down of its high doctrines; or accommodated to the opinions of men, however high or venerable those opinions may be, or modified by any human system, however ancient or excellent; and that those truths are to be preached, not because they coincide with a theological system, but because they are the truth of God. And I here take the liberty of affirming before my Presbytery, and once for all, that I never have doubted the propriety of creeds and confessions of faith in the church. And I also maintain, that, where

a man finds his views of truth to be at variance with the "system of doctrines" in the church of which he is a member, so as to be in fact another "system," he is bound in common honesty to leave its communion, and to seek to spread those doctrines in other connexions, or in an independent ministry. What will constitute such a departure; what will be a fair interpretation of the confession itself; and how far this is to depend on his own judgment, is an inquiry which it is not needful here to attempt to investigate.

In the exposition of this epistle, I have made it an object to avoid the use of some technical words which have been long employed in theology; and which have usually been deemed valuable in the interpretation of the epistle to the Romans. And it is to be presumed, as I shall endeavor to show, that no small part of the charges of error and heresy, which have been made against the book, have arisen from this circumstance. Had I retained language which has been almost consecrated for ages in the exposition of the epistle, it is to be presumed that the voice of alarm would not have been heard, and that these charges would have never been brought against me. The course which I have pursued, was adopted for the following reasons: (1.) My main design was to express the meaning of the apostle, and not to give currency or permanency to the technicalities of theology. That belongs to departments of theological instruction which I have not undertaken. (2.) I was writing chiefly for the young, and the uneducated; and it was supposed that those technical terms and phrases would not convey to them

the knowledge of the apostle's meaning, so well as plainer language. Common minds are little accustomed to the technical terms of art or science; and to most young persons, such terms might require a more labored exposition than the language of which they might be a professed exposition. In conveying my ideas to children and youth, I conceived that I could employ terms more direct and intelligible than those which belong to the profession of divinity, and which are appropriate to a chair of didactic or polemic theology. (3.) The words themselves are the subject of controversy. Their meaning is not yet settled. As I shall have occasion yet to show, the terms *guilt, imputation, representation, covenant-head, federal head, &c.*, convey to one class of men, one idea; to another, another; to one, it may be a correct idea of the doctrine of the apostle; to a second, an erroneous idea; and to a third, no idea at all. They have been employed, as it seems to me, on the one hand, to sustain false and erroneous views of the meaning of Paul; and on the other, have furnished occasion to the sinner for his continuance in sin, and a plea for his self-justification, and it appeared to me undesirable to make use of those terms in an exposition designed for Sunday schools and Bible classes. (4.) It appeared to me that an unfounded philosophical theory had been attached to many parts of this epistle, and that those technical terms had arisen from that theory, and were still insisted on by many to give it countenance. As in explaining the epistle, it became necessary to show, as well as I was able, that that theory was unfounded, and embarrassed the interpretation, it seemed desirable

to employ language which did not pre-suppose the theory, and which could be understood by the common mind. Whether I have acted wisely in this, it is now for the Presbytery to inquire.

Before proceeding to the direct consideration of the charges alleged against me, I may be permitted to make a remark on my views of the standards of the church to which we belong. I have already expressed my belief of the utility of creeds, or articles of faith. Of the Confession of Faith of the Westminster Assembly, I may be allowed to say, that when I expressed my assent to it as "a system of doctrines," I did it cordially, and that I have never had occasion to regret the act. I then regarded it as I do now, and ever have done, as the best summary of the doctrines of the Bible which I have seen, and as expressing my views of the true scheme of Christian theology in a manner far better than any other articles of faith which I have ever examined. The *system of truth* contained there, as distinguished from all other systems—the Socinian, the Pelagian, the Arian, the Arminian, &c., has appeared to me to be the true system; and without hesitation, or fluctuation, I have received it. I have not forgotten, however, that nearly two hundred years have elapsed since it was formed; that language often varies in meaning; and that views of philosophy, which insensibly insinuate themselves into theology, seldom continue the same for two hundred years. I have thought that there was, perhaps, somewhat too much of harshness, and severity of language, in the general cast of that Confession; and that a few expressions do not convey, without much labored exposition,

the meaning of the sacred Scriptures. To a few of those expressions, small in number, and not affecting the *system* as a system, I have always taken the exceptions which others have been allowed to do. My views have not been disguised, neither before, at the time, nor since my licensure and ordination.

I have not changed my views materially since I was licensed to preach the gospel. In the Theological Seminary at Princeton, my views, which were the same as now, were fully known. By the Presbytery of New-Brunswick, by which I was licensed, they were, or might have been, fully known; and had those sentiments been of the dangerous character which these charges suppose, it was to be presumed that the venerable father and brethren of that Presbytery would have admonished me to pause, and have refused me their sanction as a preacher of the gospel. The "system of doctrines" contained in the standards, I received as a system. I received it, not indeed ever expressing my assent to *every* expression and form of expression; not to be interrupted by one or more persons in the church who might assert the *authority* to interpret it for all their brethren, and who might modestly presume that none but themselves were competent to understand the language; not to be explained by the traditions of the elders—but as reserving to myself the right, in common with all others, of examining the language, and forming an opinion, under proper responsibilities, of its meaning. The reasons for adopting it, with this understanding, will appear presently.

The question which this Presbytery is now called on to decide, is, whether the views which are expressed

in these Notes, are any longer to be tolerated in the Presbyterian Church in the United States; whether a man who held them at the time of his licensure and ordination—who has held and preached them for ten years—and who holds them, in common, with no small part of the more than two thousand ministers in our connexion, is to be allowed peaceably to hold them still—and to labor, under the influence of these views, in endeavoring to save souls;—or, whether he is to be pronounced heretical and unsound—his character to be ruined, so far as a decision of his brethren can ruin it—himself to be harassed in his feelings, and embarrassed in his preaching—and the large number of ministers, and elders, and communicants in the churches who hold the same views, declared to be unworthy an office, a name, and a place in the Church of God?

That the statement of the question now before the Presbytery is not made in too strong language, is apparent from the following considerations:—(1.) The prosecutor himself has expressed a similar view of the nature of his charges. He has alleged, in his letter to the Presbytery and to myself, that these doctrines *shake the foundation of his personal hopes for eternity; and that, if they are true, he cannot read his title clear to mansions in the skies.* There can be no more serious charge against a minister of the gospel, than that he teaches doctrines which take away a man's hope of heaven; that his opinions tend to unsettle the title to eternal rest; that his instructions tend to beguile, and destroy the souls of men; and that, instead of saving them according to the high design of

his office, he is leading them down to destruction and perdition. When a minister of the gospel is charged with inculcating sentiments that destroy the hope of heaven, the highest point of accusation against his ministerial character is reached; and, if true, he is unfit to be a guide to the souls of men. (2.) A minister of the gospel will not take upon himself the task of bringing charges against another, unless he believes them to be of a very serious and alarming nature. He is aware, that he makes himself liable to be censured as a slanderer of the gospel ministry. (Book of Dis. ch. v. s. 7.) He is aware that his own character must suffer, if they are not sustained; and he cannot but be aware, that in thus bringing charges, he is producing agitation, alarm, and suspicion; that he is disturbing the peace of the churches; and, what is of not less importance, that he is laying a tax on the time and patience of those who are called to investigate the charges. It involves no common responsibility to call a Presbytery from the direct work of saving souls, to engage in the strifes of public discussion. A man who regards his own character will not bring charges against a minister of the gospel, until he feels that the heresy is so great that all these hazards are to be met; nor until he feels that the benefit to his cause is likely to be a compensation for all the great and acknowledged mischiefs which the very act of bringing charges of this nature must produce. (3.) If it should be said, that the purpose of thus bringing charges was to discuss certain abstract doctrines; to obtain a judicial decision on the *propositions* rather than on the *man*; to ascertain the truth, and to settle

a controversy, rather than to impeach the character of a minister, then I reply, that if this was the design, it should have been so stated. A proposal should have been submitted to the Presbytery to organize itself into a court of judges, on a trial of skill in controversy, and the propositions should have been submitted for discussion; and charges should not have been brought against a minister of the gospel. But this could not have been the design. When a man is *arraigned* on specific charges, it is not for *discussion*, it is for *crime*. It is to bring *him* to a trial for an *offence;* and I utterly deny the *right* of any man to arraign *me* before a court, merely to make me the occasion for a *discussion* of an abstract doctrine, in theology, politics, or morals. Two civilians may agree to discuss before a moot court, the abstract question of the precise nature of the crime of murder; or larceny; to examine the authorities to determine what constitutes malice prepense, or what would be the proper evidence of the fact of theft, and all would be well. But when one of them goes before a grand jury, and charges the other with the malice prepense, and the act of larceny, the case is materially changed. It becomes then, not a moot question, but a serious business involving character, happiness, or life. Suppose that Dr. Junkin had arraigned me before a court, having competent jurisdiction, on a charge of adultery. Suppose that the fact was proclaimed abroad, and suspicions were excited, and counsel was employed, and a jury impannelled. Suppose the public mind had had time to be agitated on the subject, and a strong bias should set against my character, and peace should flee from

my family, and my public work should be closed. And *then* suppose that the public should be gravely told, that all this was not designed to injure *me*, but to settle certain mooted points about the crime in question; and that all this array of indictment, and of testimony, and of trial, had been merely designed to bring up the subject before a tribunal in order to obtain a decision on the law. And would it be possible for the community to repress its indignation against conduct like this? And yet how would this differ from the act of formally bringing charges of *heresy* against a minister, and publishing them abroad, and exciting suspicions, and using all the influence of the name of the accuser to destroy ministerial character, and then gravely saying that all this is designed merely to settle *some litigated question of theology?* Yet this is evidently the object aimed at professedly in the charges of Dr. Junkin. Thus he says, in his letter, that "peace and union in evangelical effort cannot take place as long as these important doctrinal points remain unsettled, and that, therefore, all the friends of such union and peace ought to desire the final adjustment," &c., that "many wished to see them," that is *those doctrinal points*, "brought up fairly and legally before the proper tribunals," &c. "Now, dear brother," he adds, "your recent publication has re-opened the door," that is, *for discussing those points*, "and unworthy as I am, and incompetent to the solemn duty, yet duty I feel it to be to enter it, and by an open, fair, candid, and Christian prosecution of the case, to bring out a formal and legal decision of your Presbytery ON THE POINTS ALLUDED TO," that is, to settle certain abstract

mooted doctrines. "I therefore intend," he adds, "to prefer charges against you," that is, to hold me up as a convenient *starting point*, to sacrifice my time, and strength, and lacerate my feelings, and obstruct my work, if I understand it, to give convenient *occasion* for the discussion and decision of certain abstract doctrines before the ecclesiastical tribunals. Against this claim I lift up the voice of remonstrance, as a violation of the rights which every man has. No man has a right to *arraign* me, to give him the occasion to display his talent, or eloquence, or learning, in a moot question of theology. The moment charges are tabled against a minister, the whole subject assumes a character involving reputation, integrity, and usefulness. It is not then a business of *abstraction*, it is an affair of *crime*.

The *extent* of the matter at issue, at any time, is to be judged of by an examination of the charges. In this case, the specifications are ten in number, in each one of which there is charged a violation of the Confession of Faith, and of the doctrines of the Bible. In each one of which there is a separate and solemn specification of violation of ordination vows, and of unfaithfulness to the high trust reposed in a minister of the Gospel. The *aggregate* of *ten* such instances of a violation of ordination vows, if true, must affect, and must be *designed* to affect, a man's character for life; and such as to draw on him the sentence of disqualification for the office which he holds.

After these preliminary observations, whose length it is hoped will be excused by the circumstances in the case, I proceed to the main inquiry, whether the

sentiments I have taught are to be tolerated in the Presbyterian Church?

There are two points before the Presbytery to be considered. One is, whether the "charges" now alleged, express the true sense of the book against which they are brought; and the other is, whether if they do, the sentiments themselves are contrary to the Scriptures and the Confession of Faith. This remark is of importance, because, whatever may be my belief on the points referred to, if the charges do not express the sense of the book, and are not sustained by this, they cannot be sustained. My real belief I do not hesitate at any time to avow; but the Presbytery is now concerned with that, only so far as belief is expressed in the Notes on the Epistle to the Romans. Against several of the charges under consideration, I shall urge this plea, that they accuse me of sentiments which are by no means advanced in the book before us. In regard to the others, I shall endeavor to show that they express the true sense of the Bible according to the best means which I have of interpreting it; and that they are not a departure from the standard of the Church.

And here a very important inquiry meets us. *What are the standards of the Church;* and what principles are to guide the Presbytery in determining whether these sentiments are, or are not, in accordance with those standards? Do those standards consist in the Confession of Faith, and the Catechisms to be interpreted with the utmost strictness, in every phrase and expression? Do they require assent to every shade of doctrine, and to every word, as if they were infallible?

Are they to be interpreted according to the views of any one, or any number of self-constituted expounders of the law, who claim *their* interpretation to be "the only infallible rule of faith and practice?" Are we to rely on the tradition of the elders, and ask how our fathers understood them? Or are we to interpret them as we interpret all other writings, by the acknowledged use of language; by the common sense of men; by our own views of the meaning of words; and by that obvious latitude in regard to certain expressions, not affecting the *essential* features of the system, which seems indispensable in an uninspired composition embracing so many particulars, and so many profound doctrines, and so much that pertains to the philosophy of mind, as the Confession of Faith?

The following circumstances may perhaps lead us to just views of the question, *what are the standards*, and *whether these sentiments are to be tolerated any longer in the Presbyterian Church?*

(1.) At our ordination we express our assent to the Confession of Faith "as containing the system of doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures." What is the obvious import of their expressions? Is it not that the holy Scriptures are to be regarded as the original source of truth; the "ONLY infallible rule of faith and practice?" To this we express our solemn assent at our ordination. Form of Gov. ch. xv. 3—12. The phrase, "system of doctrines," is evidently a qualifying phrase, meaning that the *Animus imponentis* is that the Confession is to be regarded as the arrangement which expresses the general sense of the sacred Scriptures. A system is "an assemblage of things

adjusted as a whole plan or scheme, consisting of many parts connected in such a manner as to create a chain of mutual dependencies."—*Webster.* We speak of a system of logic; a system of astronomy; a system of philosophy; a system of botany, chemistry, morality, government, &c. In these we mean to distinguish one arrangement of doctrines on these subjects from another—not to express our unqualified assent to every feature, and every particular, in the system. We express our assent to the system which we embrace, as distinguished from some other system. A man who embraces the Linnæan system of botany, as preferable to another system, is not precluded from expressing his dissent from the propriety of the classification of some of the plants which may be enumerated. The system may be maintained as a system, while the propriety of certain minute arrangements may be doubted. A man who embraces the Copernican system of astronomy in preference to the Ptolemaic, may have doubts about some of the minute statements in regard to the system, while still its great and distinguishing features shall be maintained. To deny this, would be to repress all investigation, and give to the system the idea of infallibility.

So also in the doctrines of religion. To embrace the "system of doctrines" in the Confession of Faith, must mean to denote the embracing of that system, as distinguished from the Socinian, the Arian, the Pelagian, the Arminian. If this was not the meaning, the term "system" would never have been inserted. And to deny this, is to suppose that the Confession is invested with infallibility, and occupies the place of the Scriptures as a rule of faith and practice.

(2.) The "system of doctrine" in the Confession of Faith, is, undoubtedly, embraced by those who adhere to the substantial or essential nature of those doctrines, but who may, in some unimportant points, differ as to the modes of explanation. For example, men may agree in the fact of the doctrine of the Trinity, in opposition to the doctrines of the Socinian and Sabellian, who may yet not be able to subscribe to every word in the Athanasian Creed. They may agree in the fact of the doctrine of the vicarious sufferings of Christ, in opposition to the Unitarian, and yet one may adhere to the *quid pro quo*, or Gethsemane view; a second may adopt the idea of the infinite value of the atonement; a third may hold, that it was originally applicable to one man as much as another; and a fourth may hold, that it was designed for all. In the same way, men may agree in the substantial facts respecting the introduction of sin into the world, stated in the Calvinistic plan, in opposition to the views of the Pelagian, or the Unitarian, and yet differ as to a philosophical explanation. All may agree, that it was by the sin of one man—that his sin secured their fall and ruin—that in virtue of the connection with him, all come into the world subject to sin, and wo, and death; and that all this is in accordance with a divine arrangement—and yet one may suppose that this is to be explained on the theory, that all were one with Adam, and that there was a personal identity between them and him: another, that he acted as their representative; and that thus, though personally blameless, his sin is charged on them: and a third, that neither of these theories explain, but rather embarrass the subject; and that it is

wise to be contented with the simple facts as they are presented in the Scriptures, and in the world. Now while the facts in the case which are essential to the "system of doctrine" are held, who shall assume that his explanation is the only one possible, and that the others are to be deemed heretical? Whether the main, or essential facts in the case have been adhered to, or departed from, is for the Presbytery to decide in all cases of licensure or ordination; and no man, or set of men, have a right to assume, that all orthodoxy is with them—all heresy with others.

(3.) It is impossible, in the nature of the case, to secure entire and perfect uniformity in every minute article of doctrine in a book so large as our Confession of Faith, and in a church so large as ours. We embrace, in our communion, more than two thousand ordained or licensed preachers, and two hundred and thirty thousand communicants. The Confession of Faith, and Catechisms of the Church, profess to go over the whole ground of Christian doctrine and duties. The doctrines are expressed in form and language purely human; and often, from the very nature of the case, intermingled with philosophical views which were prevalent when the Confession was framed. In a book like the Bible, where all is inspired, perfect uniformity, in regard to professed belief, must be maintained. In the Roman Catholic communion, where the Head professes to think for all its members, and where all is settled by authority, such a uniformity might, with more show of reason, be expected: but, in the Protestant Churches, where it is the birthright of every minister and member to think

for himself, and where thought and investigation must be free, no such thing is practicable. If any man has ever cherished the hope, that a quarter of a million of minds in one generation could be made to think just alike, on the various and multitudinous subjects in our standards—that every one of those minds must be adjusted on this bed of Procrustes, and that this process can be kept up to meet the advancing millions of coming generations who shall adopt the Confession, he has sadly mistaken the nature of mind, and the spirit of the age in which he lives. And while, from the nature of the case, it is impossible but that there should be some differences of opinion, it is for the church to declare, in a constitutional manner, what shall be regarded as a departure from the *essential* doctrines of the Confession, and shall deserve deposition or excommunication.

4. That the Presbyterian Church in this country, did not contemplate, in its organization, any such literal and exact uniformity of opinion, is apparent from the difference in the terms of subscription here, and in the church in Scotland, from which, according to the Biblical Repertory, "by far the greater portion of our rules and habits are derived." In our church we express assent to the "*system of doctrine*" therein contained. In the Scottish church, every licentiate is required to give his assent to "the whole doctrine contained in the Confession," and to disown all other doctrines, and tenets, and opinions, whatsoever, contrary to, or inconsistent with the foresaid Confession. This is the kind of subscription which is contended for in our church; but which, it is evident, our

standards did not intend to require. That this interpretation is correct, is manifest from the fact, that the Presbyterian Church has made a difference in the ordinary assent of licentiates and ordained ministers to the Confession, and the subscription required by the professors in our theological seminaries. In the latter, every professor is required solemnly to promise that he will not inculcate, teach, or insinuate, any thing which shall appear to him to contradict or contravene, either *directly* or *impliedly*, ANY THING taught in the Confession of Faith or Catechism. Minutes of General Assembly, 1811. This great particularity and exactness would not have been required, if it had been supposed that this point had been sufficiently secured by the fact of their having adopted the Confession, as containing "the system of doctrine," at their ordination. The fact that this office is so strongly and minutely guarded, shows that greater latitude and liberty are contemplated among the ordinary ministers of the gospel, and members of the churches.

5. The same thing is put beyond all possibility of controversy by the "proviso," which was adopted in the synodical act, when the Westminster Confession and Catechism were received as the standards of the Presbyterian Church. That act was passed by the Synod, in 1729, and the proviso is in the following words, viz:

"And in case any minister of the Synod, or any candidate of the ministry, shall have any scruple, with respect to any article or articles of said Confession, he shall, in time of making said declaration, declare his scruples to the Synod or Presbytery; who

shall, notwithstanding, admit him to the exercises of the ministry within our bounds, and to ministerial communion of the Synod or Presbytery, and shall judge his scruples not essential, or necessary in doctrine, worship, or government."

The act of the Synod was the basis of the union in 1758; and this proviso has never been withdrawn or repealed; and is, in fact, *an essential part of the standards of the Presbyterian Church.* In that article, provision is made for a difference of opinion which may be known, and admitted, and tolerated, in the Presbyteries, where that difference does not amount to a denial of what is "*essential or necessary in doctrine, worship, or government.*" It is the inalienable privilege and right of each and every Presbytery to judge in this matter; and this right is secured, no less by the constitution of the church, than by the word of God. Whether I, since my ordination, have violated the principles of this "proviso," is for this Presbytery to judge.

6. The views of the Presbyterian Church on this subject, and the proper interpretation of the standards, may be known from the uniform practice under the constitution, for more than a century. I refer here for proof to the following circumstances:—[*a*] The known character of the men who, in 1729, composed the Synod, that adopted the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, with the proviso. The very fact that such a proviso was then adopted, shows that there was a difference of opinion, on *some* points, among the ministers of that time. It is inconceivable that such an article should ever have been thought of,

unless there was some ministers or presbyteries that cherished differences of opinion in regard to the meaning of the articles. [*b*] The same thing is apparent, and well known, in regard to the men who composed the synods in 1758. The act of 1729 was the basis of that union; and, among the men of that time, there were material, though not essential, differences of opinion on the doctrines of the church. [*c*] The same thing is expressly stated to have been the practice in the time of President Davies. "We allowed," says he, "the candidate to maintain his objections against ANY PART of the Confession, and the judicatures judged whether the articles objected to were ESSENTIAL TO CHRISTIANITY; and if they judged they were not, they would admit the candidate, notwithstanding his objections." Here it is evident, that a very wide latitude was given in the admission of candidates to licensure and ordination. Nothing which was not deemed "essential to Christianity" was regarded as sufficient to exclude him;—a latitude of interpretation certainly quite as wide as has ever been desired or contended for in more modern times. It shows, at least, the catholic spirit of the founders of our church; and in those times large and liberal views had obtained in regard to the interpretation of the standards. He is not in much danger of error, in regard to Christian doctrine, whose views accord with those of that illustrious and holy man. [*d*] The same thing has been evinced in the General Assembly, with a very marked uniformity. In particular, since the unhappy contentions in the church commenced in 1830, the subject has been in various ways before the

Assembly, and with uniform results. For four successive years, decisions were obtained, not *immediately* pertaining to the doctrines in question, indeed, but of such a character as to leave no doubt in the minds of either of the parties in the church, of what the disposition of the Assembly has been. Perhaps no stronger evidence of that disposition could be given than the fact, that those decisions have been perfectly satisfactory to those in the church who have desired a liberal construction of the constitution, and *unsatisfactory*, in a high degree, to the other party. It is to be remembered that the *very doctrines*, in substance, if not in form, have been the subject of these unhappy contentions, and of the successive decisions of the General Assembly. The prosecutor in this case does not pretend that he has discovered any thing new. He even avers (in his letter) that the doctrines are the same; and that his object is to bring "*those doctrines*," unembarrassed by constitutional questions, before the Assembly. It is true that those doctrines have not been brought *directly* before the Assembly, and that the Assembly has not formally expressed an opinion on them. But the case is now referred to—[1] because it shows the strong disinclination of the Assembly to make them the subject of discipline, or in other words, their inclination to *allow* the usual latitude of interpretation; and [2] because, in the only case where those doctrines did, in any form, come before the Assembly, (in 1831,) the Assembly decided that after the explanation which had been given, of the objectionable passages in the Sermon, ("The Way of Salvation,") "the Presbytery ought to have

suffered the whole to pass without further notice." Minutes, vol. vii. p. 180. This case shows that the Assembly, in accordance with the large and catholic spirit of the Presbyterian Church from its origin in this country, is still disposed to allow a liberal construction of its articles, and to maintain a spirit in accordance with its former history, and with the present age. For more than a century of remarkable prosperity, that spirit has been evinced. It remains to be seen, whether now, and in this Presbytery, the spirit which has so long and happily characterized the Presbyterian Church, is to be arrested, and a new career to be commenced under different auspices, and with a purpose to place every man on the bed of Procrustes. Hitherto, in the history of man, it has been an unwise experiment to endeavor to shape man's belief by authority; to cramp the freedom of inquiry by ecclesiastical decisions; and to suppose that those decisions can long avail to breast the spirit of investigation, or to prevent large and liberal views of Christian doctrine. The Presbyterian Church has, for more than a century, maintained a character eminently liberal and catholic. Strongly attached indeed to her doctrines, yet she has looked with an eye of kindness on those who differed from her in views, and has ever been disposed to cooperate with them in all great plans of Christian benevolence. It is a striking circumstance, also, that in 1801 the General Assembly originated and proposed a plan of union designed to produce peace, in regard to the congregational churches that had been formed, and that were rapidly forming in the new settlements

of this country—a plan that was cordially acceded to. Yet that plan was to introduce into the Presbyterian Church, if they chose to enter it, ministers, and private members trained in the schools of New-England theology; holding the same views, substantially, which are now held on the subject of the atonements and of imputation, and of human ability; and for more than thirty years that plan has been acted on, to the manifest advantage of the whole Presbyterian Church. I refer to it, as an instance of the large and liberal spirit which the Presbyterian Church has been disposed, in all its history, until these unhappy times, to follow. A *party* in this church, in violation of its general spirit, demands that the course shall be now abandoned. But the moment this is done, one bright feature of this church is obscured. It travels backward, even in the nineteenth century, towards the regions of night; and the result would be that its strength would be gone, and its beauty lost forever.

7. My views of this whole subject cannot be better expressed than in the words of the BIBLICAL REPERTORY, in the extract which I beg leave to read. (Bib. Rep. vol. iii. 521, 522, 523.)

"The great dividing question is, how is the subscription or assent to our standards to be interpreted? Or with what degree of strictness is the phrase, 'system of doctrines,' as it occurs in the ordination service, to be explained? On this subject, which is one of vital importance, there are, if we do not mistake, two extremes equally to be lamented. On the one hand, there are some who seem inclined to give the phrase in question such a latitude that any one, who holds

the great fundamental doctrines of the gospel, as they are recognised by all evangelical denominations, might adopt it; while on the other, some are disposed to interpret it so strictly as to make it not only involve the adoption of all the doctrines contained in the Confession, but to preclude all diversity in the manner of receiving and explaining them. They are, therefore, disposed to regard those who do not in this sense adopt the Confession of Faith, and who yet remain in the church, as guilty of a great departure from moral honesty. This we think an extreme, and a mischievous one. Because it tends to the impeachment of the character of many upright men, and because its application would split the church into innumerable fragments. That it is an extreme, we think is apparent, from the following considerations: It is making the terms of subscription imply more than they literally import. Two men may, with equal sincerity, profess to believe a doctrine, or system of doctrines, and yet differ in the mode of understanding and explaining them. 2. Such a degree of uniformity never was exacted, and never has existed. The Confession, as framed by the Westminster divines, was an acknowledged compromise between two classes of theologians. When adopted by the Presbyterian Church in this country, it was with the distinct understanding that the mode of subscription did not imply strict uniformity of views. And from that time to this, there has been an open and avowed diversity of opinion, on many points, among those who adopted the Confession of Faith, without leading to the suspicion of insincerity or dishonesty. 3. It is clearly impossible that any

considerable number of men can be brought to conform so exactly in their views, as to be able to adopt such an extended formula of doctrine precisely in the same sense.

"The very term 'system of doctrines,' conveys a definite idea—the idea of a regular series of connected opinions, having a mutual relation, and constituting one whole. In professing to adopt the system of doctrines taught in the sacred Scriptures, a man professes to believe the whole series of doctrines taught in that system, in opposition to every other: that is, he professes to believe the whole series of doctrines which go to make up the Calvinistic system, in opposition to the Socinian, Pelagian, Semi-Pelagian, Arminian, or any other opposite and inconsistent view of Christianity. These doctrines are clearly expressed: such as the doctrine of the Trinity—the Incarnation, and Supreme Deity of Christ—the Fall, and Original Sin—Atonement—Justification by Faith—Personal Election—Effectual Calling—Perseverance of the Saints—Eternal Punishment of the Wicked, &c. Now, every man who *ex animo* and *bona fide* believes all these doctrines, does, according to the correct interpretation of language, hold the 'system of doctrines' contained in the Confession of Faith; and, we think, so long as this is done, we are safe. With respect to each of these several points, there are, and may safely be, various modes of statement and explanation consistent with their sincere reception. Thus, with regard to the Trinity, some may be able to adopt every expression found in the Nicene Creed, or in Bishop Bull's exposition of it—while others may feel a strong repug-

nance to many of its phrases, and yet adopt every idea essential to the doctrine. And thus, too, in relation to the vicarious atonement of Jesus Christ, some may adopt the strict *quid pro quo* system; others, the infinite value theory; others, that of universal applicability; and yet all hold the doctrine itself. But ** the Presbytery has a right of judgment in all such cases. *** It is their business to decide this very point, whether the candidate believes or not the doctrines of our standards; and, they are under the most solemn engagements to God and the brethren, to do this honestly. And here the matter must be left."

In the examination of these charges, however, it will be my object to show that there is no real departure from the system in the standards, in the Notes on the Romans. A part of those charges, I shall show, pertain merely to philosophy; a part are irrelevant, on which the Confession had decided nothing; a part arise from misconstruction of my language; a part accuse me of heresy, in holding the very expressions of the Bible; a part depend on distinctions which the Bible and the Confession do not make; a part consist of a statement of a doctrine which I *do* hold, and an inference which I do *not* hold, wherein the inference is charged as heretical; a part are based on my rejection of certain terms and phrases which are not in the Bible, and which are not necessary to the "system of doctrine" in the Confession of Faith; and a part charge me with heresy in regard to doctrines which have been held in the church from the beginning. In examining this somewhat peculiar and irregular system of charges—if they can be reduced to a system—

I shall have occasion to ask the patience of the Presbytery, that I may present the true nature of the case before them. I would observe here, that I have been subjected to great perplexities and embarrassment, by the *manner* in which Dr. J. has thought it his duty to bring these charges. Besides the embarrassed and undigested nature of the charges themselves, the mode in which they are presented to me is exceedingly perplexing. He first furnished the Presbytery with a set of charges with reference to the pages of my book, but without *any* references to the standards of the church or the Scriptures supposed by him to be violated. This was evidently contrary to the constitution of the church, as expounded by the General Assembly in 1824 (vol. v. p. 219.) He subsequently, in a private communication—not *through* the Presbytery, and of course of no authority—sent me a list of references to the articles in the constitution supposed to be violated, and with references to the *book* on account of which I am arraigned, MATERIALLY DIFFERENT from that which I had received through the Presbytery. In this perplexity, the only *inference* which I could draw from the subject, was in accordance with the one which forced itself on the mind when the charges were presented, that the whole subject was undigested in Dr. J.'s mind, and unarranged; and the only *resolution* which could be formed by me, was to adhere almost entirely to the original references which were put into my hands by the Presbytery.

Charge I.

The first charge is in the following words:

"That all sin consists in voluntary action."

Proof 1st. Notes on Romans, p. 249. "In all this, and in all other sin, man is voluntary."

Proof 2d. Same work, p. 123. "There is no reason to believe, that they [men] are *condemned* to eternal death, or held to be guilty of his sin [meaning Adam's sin] without participation of their own, or without personal sin, any more than they are approved by the work of Christ, or held to be personally deserving, without embracing his offer, and receiving him as a Saviour."

Proof 3d, p. 192. "They [Jacob and Esau] had *done* nothing good or bad; and where that is the case, there can be no character—for character is the result of conduct.

(2.) That the period of moral agency had not yet commenced."

Proof 4, p. 124. "As the work of Christ does not benefit the race, unless it is embraced, so does not the reasoning of the Apostle lead us to the conclusion, that the deed of Adam does not condemn, unless there be some voluntary act on the part of each individual?"

Proof 5, p. 118. "Men will not be held guilty, unless there is a law which binds them, of which they are apprized, and which they voluntarily transgress."

That this doctrine is contrary to the standards of the Presbyterian Church, will appear, by referring to Confession of Faith, chap. vi. 5. "This corruption of nature, during this life, doth remain in those that are regenerated; and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet *both itself*, and all the *motions thereof, are truly and properly sin.*" 6. "Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the law—and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal." Lar. Cat. Ques. 27; Shorter Cat. 19, Con. ix.

The only statements which can be supposed to have a bearing on the subject, occur on pp. 249 and 192. In the former, this passage occurs: "In all this,

and in all other sin, man is voluntary. He chooses his course of evil, and God is under no obligation to *compel* him to do otherwise." In regard to this passage, I observe: [1.] That its design was not to teach any thing about the doctrine of what is commonly called original sin, or hereditary depravity. It has no reference to the native disposition, or tendency of our nature. Its object is simply to teach that man is *voluntary* in sin, in opposition to the doctrine that he is *compelled*. This is the manifest scope of the passage, as is evident, indeed, from the part repeated here. It occurs in a comment on ch. xi. 32: "God hath concluded them all in unbelief," &c. and the scope of the comment, which has reference not to infants, but to adults, is to show that the word "concluded" does not imply that God uses any *compulsion* to *make* them reject the gospel, but that they are *voluntary* in doing it. And in this connexion, the remark occurs, that in *all sin* man is voluntary. (2.) This is the very doctrine of the Confession of Faith; ch. ix. § 1: "God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor *by any absolute necessity of nature, determined to good or* EVIL." To maintain the very doctrine of the Confession, assuredly is not heresy. (3.) It is the undoubted doctrine of the Scriptures, that man is not *compelled* to do evil. For in the following places it is either expressly taught or implied: 1 John iii. 4: "Sin is the transgression of the law." James i. 13: "The Lord is not tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man."—Deut. xxx. 19, John v. 40—The doctrine that man is *voluntary* in sin, or is a free agent, is manifest from all the threat-

enings of God which forbid it: for God would not forbid that which is involuntary; from all his entreaties and commands to forsake it; from all his injunctions to choose life; and from all the motives which are presented in the Bible to induce men to abandon it. If it were *not* so, and if men were *compelled* to the course for which they are condemned and punished, it would be a violation of all our views of freedom, and of just government. No definition of tyranny could be more exact and precise than would be involved in that doctrine; and the human mind and heart, and all God's requirements and dealings even the world would revolt against it. My plea to *this* passage therefore, is, that I *did* mean to teach that man is *voluntary* in his sin, *in opposition to the doctrine which would teach that he is compelled against his will*, and that this is the express doctrine of the Confession of Faith, of the Bible, and of common sense.

The only other passage which is supposed to sustain this charge, which has any conceivable reference to it, occurs on p. 192. The *design* or *scope* of this comment was to explain the expression in regard to Jacob and Esau: "neither having done any good or evil."—Rom. ix. 11. The object there was to show that the apostle taught that the purpose, or electing design of God, was laid antecedent to the formation of their moral character. The affirmation of the apostle is, that they had *done* nothing good or bad. And as *character* is the result of conduct, it is supposed that the apostle meant to teach that the electing purpose of God, in regard to them, was *antecedent* to any such

acts as could form a *character*, or a *basis* from their character, on the ground of which he would choose one and reject the other. This is believed still to be the correct interpretation of the passage. When it is said that the passage proves that "as yet they had no moral character," the word *character*, and the sense in which it is used, is immediately explained to mean "the result of conduct;" and the idea which is to be derived from this expression is to be interpreted by the definition which I had a right to give, and to give which, violates no article of the Confession of Faith. Whether I am right in that definition, is another question; and one which it does not fall within the province of the Presbytery to decide. I am sustained in it, however, by the common use of language among men, and by the best lexicographers. *Webster* says, "a character is not formed, when the person has not acquired stable and distinctive qualities." The idea which I wished to convey, is, that *character* is that by which a man is marked, or known, by the manifestation of some quality, disposition, or act, which serves to distinguish him from others. This idea is still supposed to be correct; and the sentiment which I wished to convey was, that the apostle taught that Jacob and Esau had not formed such a character, by *doing* any thing, ("neither having *done* any good or evil") as to be the basis of the electing purpose of God.

This idea is charged to be a violation of the doctrines of the Confession, on the subject of the native propensity of man, in the following places: Con. ch. vi. § 5, 6; Lar. Cat. Q. 27; Sh. 19 Con. ch. ix. § 3, 4, x. 1, 11.

My reply to this is: (1.) That I regarded the exposition, in its scope and design, as the correct one; and if so, and if it cannot be shown to be false, it cannot be heresy. (2.) A man's words and writings are, by one of the most obvious rules of interpretation, to be explained in accordance with the general scope and design. Nothing is more obviously fair and proper, in interpreting a man's language, than this rule. (3.) My remarks on this passage were designed to be confined to the *specific* case, and not to bear on other passages of Scripture which might relate to some other point of doctrine. (4.) In the *comment itself*, this design is *expressly stated*, and it is affirmed that the apostle did not make *any affirmation* about their propensity to evil, but that they had not *actually* committed sin. "This affirmation respecting Jacob and Esau does not prove," I say, in the note on the place, "that they had not a nature inclined to evil, or a corrupt and sensual propensity; or that they would not sin as soon as they became moral agents. It proves merely that they had not yet committed *actual* sin." (5.) In this passage, I have taught the very doctrine of the Confession of Faith, on the subject of man's propensity, or tendency to evil, or what in the Confession is called "original corruption." Thus, p. 192, it is said, "That they, as well as all others, *would* certainly sin as soon as they committed moral acts at all, is proved every where in the sacred Scriptures." It is, therefore, a most unhappy reference to *this* place, to prove the charge which is now alleged against me. (6.) The opinions of an author can be best learned, by a comparison of one part of his book with another; and

to make such a comparison is conceded one of the common laws of exegesis in explaining the Bible, and all other books. In accordance with the views expressed in the case of Jacob and Esau, that "they *would sin* as soon as they committed moral acts at all," I refer to the following places, as being an explanation, and confirmation of that view, almost in the very words of the Confession of Faith, pp. 122, 123. In like manner—"*though men are indubitably affected by the sin of Adam, as* e. g. *by being born with a corrupt disposition; with loss of righteousness, with subjection to pain and wo*, yet there is no evidence," &c. P. 101: "Since *human nature was depraved*, and men *prone to sin*," *&c.* P. 117: "The apostle does not, in this expression, *say* that all have sinned in Adam, or that *their nature has become corrupt, which is true*," *&c.*

The plea which I therefore urge, in regard to this charge, is, that in the passages referred to, I have given a correct interpretation of the apostle's meaning, and that, in doing so, I have maintained precisely, and almost *totidem verbis*, the doctrines of the Confession of Faith.

I might add to this, that whatever may be the truth on the subject, it is a mere metaphysical inquiry, which the Confession of Faith is not to be presumed to have settled; and which it certainly has not attempted to determine. And even had there been any views expressed on the subject, on one side or on the other, to hold or deny them cannot be construed into the high crime of heresy.

Whatever ground of objection there might be *sup-*

posed to exist to the passages as they originally stood in the Notes on Romans, arising from any ambiguity of phrase, it is believed that the cause is now removed, by a change in the phraseology which has been made in the new edition. The passage now reads thus: "This is a very important passage in regard to the question about the purposes of God. (1.) They had *done* nothing good or bad, and where that is the case, there can be, properly speaking, no moral character, for a character is not formed, where a person has not acquired stable and distinctive qualities."— *Webster.*

Charge II.

The second charge is in these words:

"That Adam (before and after his fall) was ignorant of his moral relations to such a degree, that he did not know the consequences of his sin would or should reach any further, than to natural death."

Proof 1. Note, p. 115. "If an inquiry be made here, how *Adam* would understand this, [the threatening of death,] I reply, that we have no reason to think he would understand it as referring to any thing more than the loss of life, as an expression of the displeasure of God. Moses does not intimate that he was learned in the nature of laws and penalties, and his narrative would lead us to suppose that this was all that would occur to Adam. And, indeed, there is the highest evidence the case admits of, that this was his understanding of it. For in the account of the *infliction* of the penalty, *after* the law was violated, in God's own interpretation of it, in Gen. iii. 19, there is still *no* reference to any thing further. "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." Now it is incredible that Adam should have understood this as referring to what has been called "spiritual death," and to "eternal death," when neither in the threatening, nor in the account of the infliction of the sentence, is there the slightest recorded reference to it. Men have done great injury in the cause of correct interpretation, by carrying their notions of doctrinal subjects to the explanation of words and phrases in the Old Testament. They have usually described Adam as endowed with all the refinement, and possessed of all the knowledge, and adorned with all the metaphysical acumen and subtlety of a

modern theologian. They have deemed him qualified, in the very infancy of the world, to understand and discuss questions which, under all the lights of the Christian revelation, still perplex and embarrass the human mind. After these accounts of the endowments of Adam, which occupy so large a space in the books of theology, one is surprised, on opening the Bible, to find how unlike all this is to the simple statement in Genesis. And the wonder cannot be suppressed that men should describe the obvious *infancy* of the race as superior to its highest advancement; or that the *first* man, just created, just looking upon a world of wonders, unacquainted with law and moral relations, and the effect of transgression, should be represented as endowed with knowledge, which four thousand years afterwards, it required the advent of the Son of God to communicate."

How contrary is all this to the standards of the Presbyterian Church will appear, by referring to Con. chap. iv. 2; Large Cat. 17, 20, 22; Shorter Cat. 12.

In regard to this charge, I submit to the Presbytery the following remarks, as my defence.

It is not intended to deny that the death which was threatened to Adam, and which actually comes upon men, as a violation of the law of God involves eternal death, unless man is redeemed. This is fully and expressly stated in Notes, p. 116.

The passage before (Rom. v.) shows in what sense he (the apostle) intended to use the word (death.) In his argument it stands opposed to "the grace of God, and the gift by grace," (ver. 15;) to "justification" by the forgiveness of "many offences," (ver. 16;) to the reign of the redeemed in eternal life, (ver. 17;) and to "justification of life," (ver. 18.) To all these the words death (ver. 12, 17,) and judgment (ver. 16, 18,) stand opposed. It cannot be that the evils involved in the words "death," "judgment," &c., relate simply to temporal death. The evident meaning is, that the word "death," as here used by the apostle, refers to the *train of evils* which have been introduced by sin. It does not mean simply temporal death; but that group and collection of woes, including temporal death, condemnation, and exposure to eternal death, which is the consequence of transgression. The apostle often uses the word *death* and *to die* in this wide sense. Rom. i. 32; vi. 16, 31; vii. 5, 10, 13, 24; viii. 2, 6, 13. 2 Cor. xi. 16; viii. 10. Heb. xi. 14, &c.

The statement which *is* made in the passage on which the charge of heresy is based, is obvious in its meaning. It was intended to convey the idea, that Adam was in the infancy of society—that he had had no opportunity of observing the effect of transgression —that *temporal* death would be likely to be that which would suggest itself to his mind at the threatening—that there is no evidence that he was acquainted with *all* the effects of his sin—and that the account which is usually given of him in the books of theology, is not sustained by any evidence which is furnished in the Bible. This is charged as heresy.

If I should be asked why this statement was made, I would observe, [a.] that it is because it seemed to me to be sustained by the account in the Bible; and [b.] because the ascription of extraordinary endowments to Adam is so often made in theological books, and enters so materially into the systems of many writers, as it seems to me without authority. It is, indeed, a matter of mere speculation, having nothing to do directly with orthodoxy or heresy: but I may be allowed here to refer to some of the older theological writers in regard to the extraordinary endowments of Adam. Moreri affirms, that "Adam was perfectly skilled in the sciences, especially in astrology, several curious secrets of which he had taught his children." According to Josephus, Moreri adds—"Adam engraved the observations he had made on the course of the stars, on two different tables." "Cajetan has been very much censured," says Bayle, "for not allowing him a perfect knowledge of the planets and the elements." "It is asserted," he adds, "that the speculative understanding of the first

man was informed with all the philosophical and mathematical knowledge which the human mind is naturally capable of attaining; and that his practical understanding was endued with a consummate prudence in regard to a man's conduct in all things, whether in public or private life; and besides this, all the moral sciences, and liberal arts—as rhetoric, poetry, painting, sculpture, husbandry, writing, &c." Suidas says of Adam, "that he distinctly knew, and clearly explained, all the differences of the seeds and plants; the virtues of the several roots and herbs; and and whatever else nature had appointed to every animal for their subsistence or cure. That he examined all things, and prescribed them their exact rules and bounds. The arts, sciences, learning, both liberal and illiberal—prophecies, sacrifices, and lustrations—the written and unwritten laws—the several institutions, and every thing that is necessary and commodious to life: all these were his invention." See Bayle, Art. Adam. And as a specimen of the ease and confidence with which men are *accustomed* to speak of the remarkable endowments of Adam, even where the Bible has said nothing, I may be permitted to read an extract on the subject from a review of my Notes in the Biblical Repertory, vol. vii., p. 299. In that review, the writer—who is unknown to me—has felt himself at liberty to speak as if he had been familiar with Adam, with his feelings, and views, and anticipations, as if it were all perfectly revealed in the Bible, and without any expression or mark of hesitancy or doubt. Thus he says "what Adam *understood and felt* was, that if he trangressed he should incur the disapprobation

of God. This was the evil, and the dreadful evil; the sum and essence of all punishment. He felt that transgression would suspend his friendly and delightful intercourse with God, which was the life of his soul; 'that it would separate him from his Maker, which is spiritual death," &c. Now that Adam really felt and understood all this, I am by no means prepared to deny, but the question instantly arises, how came this known to the reviewer? How did he become so intimate with the feelings of Adam? The familiarity and intimate connection which many men seem to have had with Adam, cannot but be a matter of surprise.

The vindication of my statement will be contained in the following remarks:

(1.) The statement which I have made, as far as I knew, accords with the account in the Scriptures, Gen. i. 27, ii. 16, 17, 19, 20. I have not denied to Adam the possession of holiness; I have not denied that he was created in the image of God; nor that he was endued with the knowledge which was requisite to qualify him to act as a moral agent. Nor does the charge before the Presbytery accuse me of such a denial. It accuses me of denying that Adam had a certain amount of *knowledge* in respect to his relations. And for any thing that appears, such a denial, in regard to *Adam's* intellectual endowments, is as innocent, and orthodox, as a similar denial would be pertaining to John the Baptist, or Lycurgus. It remains yet to be seen that a belief that Adam, or any other man, was possessed of certain supposed intellectual endowments is essential to soundness in the

faith, or that a denial of such endowments can be construed into heresy.

(2.) In the ordinary events of moral government, it is not to be supposed that a man should be apprized of *all* the results of an action, in order that just punishment should follow. Lawgivers declare *certain things* as a penalty for transgression; but there may be certain *other* things involved in the results which are *not* declared, and which may be unknown. The law appoints death as the penalty of murder or treason. This may be understood. But the crime of murder, or treason, may have a multitude of *collateral* and *remote* effects, which the law did not specify as a part of the penalty. It may ruin the character, it may destroy the peace of the offender, it may entail disgrace on a family. It may transmit dishonor to a distant posterity, and blight the happiness of a wide circle of friends, or of distant generations. In all this it would be absurd to suppose that the perpetrator would be *apprized* before the act was committed, of *all* the effects which would follow from the commission of crime; or that being thus apprized was essential to the justice of the penalty. All that justice requires is, that he should understand the law, and its more direct and immediate penalty. Such I have not denied was the case with Adam.

(3.) It is absurd to suppose that Adam did know or could have known all the results of his conduct. None but an Omniscient Eye could discern them all. Man has not yet known them. The experience of six thousand years in a sinning and dying world, has not yet fully developed them. And to suppose that a

newly-created man, standing at the head of the race, just opening his eyes on a new world; uninformed of the relations of society; imperfectly acquainted with the nature of penalty; should have been endowed with a knowledge superior to all that we can now obtain even by the aid of revelation, appears to me to be, in the highest degree, absurd and improbable.

(4.) The ordinary course in God's moral government is for the full effect of transgression to be exhibited by the developments of advancing years. Thus Adam was in less favorable circumstances to know the effects than Paul; and thus Paul has *stated* the results of the crime of Adam to include temporal and eternal death—the train of ills which have *in fact* come in upon the world as the consequence of transgression.

(5.) There is no passage of the Bible that has occurred to me, that affirms that Adam was so apprized of his relations, as to know all the consequences which would result from sin. The account in Genesis is simple and natural. He was made a perfect man, in the image of God. He was capable of understanding law; and a simple law, adapted evidently not to a being of angelic stature in intellect and experience, but to man in the infancy of society, was given. Endowed with ample power to obey a simple law of God, he yet chose to disobey, and the penalty followed of course. All this is plain and natural, and such as we find in accordance with the infancy of *all* society, and with all our views of what must have been the origin of the race. It is the simple account in the Bible; and it is striking to observe how much this differs from the account of those writers who describe Adam as en-

dowed with the powers and attainments of an accomplished theologue; who suppose him to have been far superior in the knowledge of moral relations to the Calvins and Edwardses, and even Pauls, of the theological world; and who attribute to him, in addition, a knowledge of the habits of animals, and the properties of matter, and of the heavenly bodies, which greatly surpassed the endowments of Buffon, and Davy, and Newton, and Laplace.

(6.) The account in the Confession of Faith accords with that in the Bible, ch. iv. sec. 2. And the account given in the Confession of Faith, which I am charged with having violated, accords precisely with the statement here given. The doctrine in the Confession is: "After God had made all other creatures, he created man, male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, endowed with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after his own image, having the law of God in their hearts, and power to fulfil it, and yet, under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change," &c. With that account I exactly and entirely accord. It does not affirm that Adam KNEW his moral relations so intimately as to be certified that his transgressions would extend beyond temporal death. My plea is, therefore, that the account in the "Notes" is in accordance with the Scriptures, with common sense, and is precisely the statement to be found in the Confession of Faith.

On this charge, however, I throw myself at the feet of any man who is competent to give me information. If Dr. Junkin, or any other person, is in posses-

sion of historical evidence that Adam *was* endowed with the knowledge which is claimed for him, the historical fact would be valuable to the world. Till such historical evidence, however, is adduced, I must be permitted to believe, that an expression of an opinion that Adam was not blessed with specified *intellectual* endowments, is not to be regarded as a heresy which will render void a Christian's "title to mansions in the skies."

A single expression, obviating, perhaps, some of the difficulties in the mind of the prosecutor in this case, has been changed in the fourth edition of the Notes on the Romans. Instead of saying that Adam was "unacquainted with law," &c., it now reads, "*imperfectly* acquainted with law," &c.

Charge III.

The third charge is in these words, viz.—

"That unregenerate men are able to keep the commandments, and convert themselves to God."

Proof 1, 164. "*The carnal mind.* This is the same expression as occurs in verse 6, (to phronema tees sarkos.) It does not mean the mind itself, the intellect, or the will; it does not suppose that the mind or the soul is *physically* depraved, or opposed to God; but it means, that the *minding of the things of the flesh*, giving to them supreme attention, is hostility to God." "*For it.*—The word (it) here refers to the minding of the things of the flesh. It does not mean that the soul *itself* is not subject to his law, but that the *minding* of those things is hostile to his law. The Apostle does not express any opinion about the metaphysical ability of man, or discuss that question at all. The amount of his affirmation is, simply, that the *minding of the flesh*, the supreme attention to its dictates and desires, is not, and cannot be subject to the law of God. They are wholly contradictory and irreconcileable; just as much as the love of falsehood is inconsistent with the laws of truth; as intemperance is inconsistent with the laws of tempe-

rance; and as adultery is a violation of the seventh commandment. But whether the *man himself* might not obey the law; whether he has, or has not ability to do it—is a question which the Apostle does not touch, and on which this passage should not be adduced. For whether the law of a particular sin is utterly irreconcileable with an opposite virtue, and whether the sinner is able to abandon that sin, and pursue a different path, are very different inquiries.

Is not subject.—It is not in subjection to the command of God. The minding of the flesh is opposed to that law, and thus shows that it is hostile to God.

Neither indeed can be.—This is absolute and certain. It is impossible that it should be. There is the utmost inability in regard to it. The things are utterly irreconcileable. But the affirmation does not mean that the *heart* of the sinner might not be subject to God; or that his *soul* is so physically depraved that he cannot obey, or that *he* might not obey the law.

165. 8. *So then*—It follows, it leads to this conclusion.

They that are in the flesh. They who are unrenewed sinners, who are following supremely the desires of the flesh. Chap. vii. 18. Those are meant here who follow fleshly appetites and desires, and who are not led by the Spirit of God.

Cannot please God—That is, while they are thus in the flesh, while they thus pursue the desires of a corrupt nature, they cannot please God. But this affirms nothing respecting their ability to turn from this course, and to pursue a different mode of life. That is a different question. A child may be obstinate, proud, and disobedient; and *while in this state*, it may be affirmed of him, that he cannot please his parent. But whether he might not cease to be obstinate, and become obedient, is a very different inquiry, and the two subjects should never be confounded. * * * He [the sinner] is engaged in hostility against God; and if he does not himself forsake it, it will be endless, and involve his soul in all the evils of a personal, and direct, and eternal warfare with the Lord Almighty. * * * The Holy Spirit is often represented as dwelling in the hearts of Christians; and the meaning is, not that there is a *personal* or *physical* indwelling of the Holy Ghost, but that he influences, directs, and guides Christians—producing meekness, love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, &c. The expression *to dwell in* one, denotes intimacy of connexion; and means, that those things which are the fruits of the Spirit, are produced in the heart."

Proof 2, p. 108. "*We were yet without strength.* "The word here used (asthenoon) is usually applied to those who are sick and feeble

deprived of strength by disease—Matt. xxx. 38; Luke x. 9; Acts iv. 9; v. 15. But it is also used in a *moral* sense to denote inability or feebleness, with regard to undertaking or duty. Here it means, that they were without strength in *regard to the case which the Apostle was considering*; that is, we had no power to devise a scheme of justification, to make an atonement, or to put away the wrath of God, &c. While all hope of man's being saved, by any plan of his own, was then taken away—while he was thus lying exposed to divine justice, and dependent on the mere mercy of God—God provided a plan which met the case, and secured his salvation. The remark of the Apostle here, has reference *only* to the condition of the case *before* the atonement was made. It does not pertain to the question, whether man has strength to repent and believe, now that the atonement is made, which is a very different inquiry."

The contrariety of this to the Standards, will appear by reference to Con. chap. vi. 4; ix. 3, 4; x. 1, 2; xvi.

In regard to the passages from the "Notes," quoted in proof of the charge, I remark, that it did not seem possible that they should be misunderstood. Whatever may be my sentiments on this point, which at all proper times and places I never hesitate to avow, yet the passages in question teach nothing on that subject. They simply affirm that the expressions of Paul, on which I am there commenting, *teach nothing one way or the other, on the subject of man's ability, or inability*, and this is my defence against the charge. The charge has two counts. 1. That I teach that "unregenerate men are able to keep the commandments;" and 2. That they are able to "convert themselves to God." Now, in regard to these, it is remarkable that on the *first*, I expressly declare in the Notes, that the passages in Paul teach nothing on the subject, one way or the other; and in regard to the second count, it is as remarkable, that there *is not the remotest allusion to the subject of men's convert-*

ing themselves to God. The subject is not even named, or referred to in the remotest degree, to my recollection, throughout the entire volume. The question which the Presbytery is to decide is, whether these charges are sustained by the Notes on the Romans. And my plea here is, that I have expressed *no opinion* on the subject charged on me, and of course that the charge must be dismissed. It is not a little remarkable that grave and formal accusations should be brought against a minister of the gospel, on a subject on which he *expressly* declines giving any opinion in the book under consideration. It certainly *seems* to indicate, that there were certain doctrines which it was deemed *desirable* to bring into the discussion; that on certain points there was a wish, arising from some cause, that the *character* of a minister should be held up to odium for holding certain opinions; and the case now before us, is one striking evidence of what I have before referred to, and of what has given me so much perplexity, the loose, and hasty, and undigested manner in which these charges have been brought against my ministerial character. Of the conduct of Dr. Junkin in this I have cause to complain, and do complain that he has falsely accused me of teaching, that "men are able to convert themselves to God." That expression, neither in written or oral discourse, have I ever used; and it was incumbent on the prosecutor to have alleged the precise expression in proof. Injury has been done by the charge, so far as a gratuitous and wholly unfounded charge could do me injury. Men I know have been held in popular rumor to have advanced

such a sentiment; and no small amount of odium has been excited against them. For myself, I have never *heard* the declaration made; and I distinctly declare, that I have never taught it myself. And I ask, whether it is to be permitted in the Presbyterian Church, that one minister shall be suffered gravely to charge another with that of which there is not, *even in the alleged proof*, the semblance of evidence? Pursuing this course, how easy it would be to ruin the character of any man! Allowing this, what man is safe from wholly unfounded and gratuitous accusations?

If it were called for, I should have no reluctance to engage in a discussion on the subject of human ability. But the case does not demand or admit it. I may just observe, however, that the Confession of Faith of our church, like the Bible, knows of no inability in the sinner that does not exist in the will, and which is not, therefore, moral, and not physical. Its language is, (Con. Faith, ch. ix. § 3, 4,) "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of WILL to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man, being altogether AVERSE from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or prepare himself thereto."

In this statement on the subject of the state of man in regard to conversion, I observe (1.) That it is THE formal statement of the doctrine of the Confession on the subject. Though, therefore, the Confession elsewhere speaks of the sinner's inability, yet it is to this chapter, which professedly treats on the subject, that we are to look for the meaning of the term. 2. There

is no statement, here nor elsewhere, of any physical or natural inability of the sinner to obey the commands of God. Had such been the intention of the framers of the Confession, such a statement would have been made. 3. *All* the inability in the case is traced to the will. "Man hath lost all ability"—of what? Of the understanding? of his physical powers? No, but all ability of WILL; and the effect of this is that he is AVERSE, i. e. *opposed to* holiness, and this is the reason why he is not converted to God. That it was the intention of the framers of the Confession, to say that the inability spoken of existed in the will, or disposition, or heart alone—that is, that it was a moral and not a natural inability, is manifest. Nothing could be more clearly expressed than this; and with this statement I entirely accord, and this I have always held. 4. This accords with the Bible, and with common sense. There are two kinds of inability—one arising from the want of physical power, the other from a want of inclination or will. The inability of a man to remove a mountain is one thing, and an inability to do right, arising from the strong love of sin, is another. The one excuses, the other does not. The latter is that which is to be charged on men; for [*a*] it is that only which is referred to in the Bible. The Scriptures, when they account for the reason why men do not become Christians, trace it to *sin*, and to disinclination. John v. 40, 44. Particular sins are specified, the love of the world, pride, passion, lust, &c. [*b*] They address men as subject to no other ability. They command men to choose, &c., to make themselves new hearts, all of which suppose that man has power to

obey. Deut. xxx. 19; Josh. xxiv. 15; Job xxxiv. 4; Luke x. 42; Ezek. xxxiii. 11; xviii. 31, 32. [c] If not, man is excusable for not obeying. This is a matter of common sense. The distinction is made by all men, by all parents, teachers, lawgivers, &c. [d] The contrary doctrine tends to produce the neglect of religion, and security in impenitence and sin. If Dr. J. charges me with error in this, he holds the contrary, that is, "that unregenerate men are not able to keep the commandments; that there is no ability of any kind to yield obedience; that in no conceivable sense has man any power to repent, to believe, and to love God, or to love his fellow men; that there is an inability on these subjects which does *not* lie in the disposition, the heart, or the will, but which lies in something that is *independent* of the will, and which is therefore of a physical nature; that it is the same kind of inability which a man should labor under if he were commanded to drain the ocean, or to lift a mountain, or to create a world, or to raise the dead; and that therefore a command to do one would be as reasonable as to do the other." And this is the same as to say, that God has given men commands which in no sense they are able to obey. Now to say this, is the same as to charge God with tyranny. What was it that made the government of Pharaoh tyrannical, but laying tasks on the Israelites which they had no power in any sense to obey, commanding them to make bricks without straw? And what will be the effect of preaching this doctrine? Is it not evident, that it will be to convince men that the government of God is one of tyranny? Will it not be to confirm them in sin? Why should

man make an effort when he has no power of any kind to move? Is it not so obviously in the face of the common sense of men—so much at variance with the great original impressions of truth, made on their minds, that they will reject it, and reject the system which professes to hold it, with abhorrence? Would Dr. Junkin dare to preach it to my people, or to any other people? or if he did, would he expect that men would be roused by it to repent, and turn to God? Is it not known that the tendency of it every where is to annihilate a sense of responsibility, and free agency, and to make revivals of religion cease? [e] The Bible no where requires more of men than they can perform. Thus our Saviour says that the sum of the law and the prophets consists in this, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with ALL thy heart, and with ALL thy soul, and with ALL thy strength, and with ALL thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself." Luke x. 27. In this passage the requirement is expressly limited to the capacity of the subject. ALL the heart, the soul, the strength, is required; and this is the whole of the requirement. It does not lay a claim on any power which man does not possess; nor beyond any power which he possesses. It is definitely limited to the extent of the capacity, in accordance with all the rules of common sense, and the operation of all laws. But suppose the principle contended for by Dr. Junkin were to be applied to this law of God. Suppose the enactment had been framed with reference to the doctrine that God may demand of man that which in *no* sense he is able to render. What a different form would at once have been given to the commandment.

To meet that supposition, it must have read, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with MORE THAN ALL thy soul, and thy mind, and thy STRENGTH"—or "Thou shalt love him not only to the measure of thy capacity and capability, but with the measure of the powers of *some other* being, of an angel, or an archangel," &c. Would not such a statute have been a burlesque on all legislation? And yet this is the legitimate statement of the doctrine, unless it be admitted that the divine law, in accordance with common sense, and with all other law, is adapted to the capacity of the subject. [*f*] The same thing occurs every where. The principle of adapting requirements to capacity, law to the powers of moral agency, obtains in all families, and in all governments; nor could they possibly exist on any other principle. It is a principle which commends itself to all men; and the distinction is one which all men make. This has been abundantly proved by Edwards, [on the Will, part 1, § 4.] It enters into all our notion of moral agency and of government. Every parent punishes a child for disobeying when he has power to obey; he would excuse him, and justify him, if he had no power. A man without limbs cannot be required to walk; without eyes cannot be required to see; without hands cannot be required to labor. If, in a moment of desperate wickedness, a servant has cut off a hand, or put out an eye, he cannot be required to labor with the hand that is removed, or to see with the organ that is extinguished. He is responsible for the original act by which he deprived himself of ability, and the moral turpitude of that act is to be measured by the intention,

and by his obligation *not* to do it. But to hold him answerable *now* for the use of a hand which is removed, or to require him to *see* with an eye which is blind, would be a requirement that would be the definition of tyranny. [*g*] This distinction has been made by the church in all ages. It is not only recognised in our Confession of Faith, and in the Bible, and the common sense of men, but has been the common doctrine of all the wise and good in the church at all times.*

I may here, however, add my full belief, which in no instance I have ever denied or varied from, that such is the depravity of man by nature; such his love of sin, and opposition to the law and government of God; such his *moral inability*, *i. e.* his strong, and decided, and constant opposition to God by nature, that he will always remain a sinner unless he is aided from on high. No man ever was, or ever will be, it is my full conviction, awakened, convinced, or converted, but by the agency of the Holy Ghost, an agency which is needful to arrest his attention; to alarm his fears; to dispose him to inquiry and to prayer; and to convert his heart to God. No man becomes a Christian, or goes to heaven, without being disposed by the Holy Ghost, and without being brought to eternal life from the commencement to the close of the work, by the sovereign mercy of God, and by the agency of his spirit. No man ever did or will repent, except as influenced by the Spirit; so that in all this

* See the trial of Lyman Beecher, D. D., where this is abundantly proved.

work it is true *as a fact*—as a historical verity, in which sense I understand the passage, that "no man can come to the Saviour, except the Father which hath sent him draw him." John vi. 44.

As, however, the charges alleged against me are for doctrines taught in the "Notes on the Romans," I demand that the sentence in this case be solely on the sentiments *in* that book; and as in that book I have taught nothing on the subject, either one way or the other, the charge is not sustained; and the Presbytery cannot find me guilty.

The only *semblance* of an argument here must be, that I have *removed* certain texts which have been usually supposed to prove the doctrine of the sinner's inability, from the category of proof-texts on that subject. But assuredly, if the interpretation of those texts is *correct*, that is not to be regarded as an offence. It cannot be *assumed* that a certain *interpretation* of a text is orthodoxy, and that to doubt it is heresy; or that a man, by subscribing the Confession of Faith, is precluded from an examination of the Bible. If the *interpretation* of those texts is erroneous, the error can be stated and corrected; but because I have ventured to give a different interpretation of those texts from that which Dr. Junkin supposes to be the correct one, or which has been commonly held to be correct, I am not, therefore, to be charged with denying the *doctrine* of the Confession. To make this perfectly plain, it is only necessary to apply it to other cases. The text in 1 John v. 7, has been applied in all ages of the church, by the majority of the orthodox, to prove the doctrine of the Trinity.

But if a man should express a doubt in regard to the genuineness of that text, is he, therefore, to be charged with the denial of this doctrine? The passages in Jer. xvii. 9, and in Eccl. vii. 29, have been usually applied to prove the doctrine of total depravity. But if a man should venture to give a different interpretation to these texts, and to show that they are not pertinent as proof, is he, therefore, to be charged with denying the doctrine of depravity? Yet this is the principle on which this charge is brought; and on this principle, the orthodoxy of no man in the land, who examines the Bible for himself, can remain long unsuspected; and on this principle I could convict of heresy the most illustrious man for learning and piety that ever adorned the church or the world.

Charge IV.

The fourth charge is in the following words:

"That faith is an act of the mind, and not a principle, and is itself imputed for righteousness."

Proof 1. p. 94. "*Abraham believed God.*" In the Hebrew, "Abraham believed *Jehovah.*" The sense is substantially the same, as the argument turns on the *act* of believing. The faith which Abraham exercised was, that his posterity should be like the stars of heaven in number. This promise was made to him when he had no child, and of course when he had no *prospect* of such a posterity. See the strength and nature of this faith further illustrated in verses 16–21. The reason why it was counted to him for righteousness was, that it was such a strong, direct, and unwavering act of confidence in the promise of God. *And it.* The word "it" here evidently refers to the act of believing. It does not refer to the righteousness of another—of God, or of the Messiah; but the discussion is solely of the *strong act* of Abraham's faith, which in *some sense* was counted to him for righteousness. In what sense this was, is explained directly after. All that is material to remark here is, that the *act* of Abraham, the strong confidence of his mind

in the promises of God, his unwavering assurance that what God had promised he would perform, was received for righteousness. The same thing is expressed more fully in verses 18–22. When, therefore, it is said the righteousness of Christ is accounted or imputed to us; when it is said that his merits are transferred and reckoned as ours; whatever may be the truth of the doctrine, it cannot be defended by *this* passage of Scripture. Faith is always an act of the mind. It is not a created essence which is placed within the mind. It is not a substance created independently of the soul, and placed within it by Almighty power. It is not a *principle*, for the expression, *a principle of faith*, is as unmeaning as a principle of joy, or a principle of sorrow, or a principle of remorse. God promises, and the man believes, and this is the whole of it. Beyond the mental operation, there is nothing in the case; and the word is strictly limited to such an act of the mind throughout the Bible. There is not a place that can be adduced, where the word means any thing else than an act of the mind, exercised in relation to some object, or some promise, or threatening, or declaration of some other being." p. 95. "Remark (1.) That it is evidently not intended that the act of believing, on the part of Abraham, was the *meritorious* ground of acceptance; for then it would have been a work. Faith was as much his own act, as any act of obedience to the law. (2.) The design of the Apostle was to show that by the *law*, or by *works*, man could not be justified. Chap. iii. 28; iv. 2. (3.) *Faith* was not that which the law required. It demanded complete and perfect obedience; and if a man was justified by *faith*, it was in *some other way* than by the law. (4.) And as the law did not demand this, [faith, 'confidence in God,' see page 30,] and as faith was something different from the demand of the law, so if a man were justified by that, it was *on a principle* altogether different from justification by works. It was not by personal merit. It was not by complying with the law. It was in a mode entirely different."

How contrary this to the Confession of Faith is evident. See Chap. xiv. 11. Large Cat. 72, 73.

This charge consists of three counts, or specifications, which it is necessary to dispose of in their order.

The first is, that "faith is an act of the mind." The proof is in p. 94. In regard to this portion of the

charge, I admit that I meant to teach, as charged, that "faith is always an act of the mind." And the meaning is so obvious, that it scarcely requires elucidation. I designed to teach that it was not a created essence independent of the soul; and that there was nothing *in* faith which could not be appropriately described by the mind *receiving*, and *resting* on Christ; *exercising* confidence in him; *believing* his promises, *fearing* his threatenings, and *depending* on him for salvation, all which are *actings* of the mind, or are the *mind acting*. And I do not wish to be understood now as holding any thing on this point different from that which is here charged upon me.

I hold this opinion for the following reasons: (1.) It seems to me to be a matter of common sense, and one which commends itself to all who examine their own minds. To *believe* is evidently an act of the mind, and yet this *believing* is all that is understood by faith. To believe a historical narrative; to believe a mathematical proposition, is evidently an *acting* of the mind in relation to such a narrative, or proposition; and this is expressed by the word faith. To *believe* is as much an act of the mind as to think, to remember, to hope, to love, to fear. So obvious is this, that I should be unwilling to make these remarks, of my *believing this in my own mind*—in which I am conscious of an *acting*, or operation of mind, were it not charged on me as gross and dangerous heresy. (2.) The account which is given in the Bible accords with this. Christians are described as *believing*—implying an acting or operation of the mind in reference to certain propositions. They are called *believers*,

or those who *believe*, that is those who put forth such acts of mind. Matthew xxi. 22; John xx. 27; Acts xvi. 21; xxiv. 24; viii. 17; John ii. 23; iv. 39; xi. 45; xii. 42, and *passim*. And in the detailed statement which the Apostle Paul has given (Heb. xi.) of the nature of faith, he has described a succession of *acts* of mind in relation to different individuals who put confidence in God; and this is what in this view constituted *faith*. Comp. ver. 1. (3.) Unless it were such an acting of the mind, it could not be commanded as a duty to believe. If faith were of the nature of a created essence; an independant substance lying in the soul; a matter which could be affected by no acting of the mind, it could never be the subject of command; nor could its existence or absence be the occasion of praise or blame. This is so apparent as to need no argument.

My vindication from this charge, I put on the following grounds: [1.] It is in accordance with the Bible and with common sense. [2.] It is not a violation of the Confession of Faith, but accords with it. "By this faith, a Christian BELIEVETH to be true, whatsoever is revealed in the word, for the authority of God speaking therein; and ACTETH differently upon that which each particular passage thereof containeth; *yielding obedience* to the commands, *trembling* at the threatenings, and *embracing* the promises of God for this life and that which is to come. But the principal ACTS of saving faith are *accepting*, *receiving*, and *resting* upon Christ alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life, by virtue of the covenant of grace." Con. ch. xiv. § 2. In this place, *all*

the operations of faith are described as *actings* of the mind; or as the *mind acting* in relation to certain objects or truths. It is represented as "yielding obedience," "trembling," "embracing," "accepting," "receiving," and "resting on;" all of which imply an acting of the mind. It would be impossible for the Confession to be more explicit. Nothing else is spoken of *but* such an acting of mind. And the Confession undoubtedly was designed to teach, in accordance with the Bible and with common sense, that *to believe* implies an operation of mind; or the mind acting in relation to certain truths. The views which I have expressed in the specification are, therefore, precisely in accordance with the Confession of Faith. [3.] It would be easy to show that this accords with the sentiments of all those who have usually been regarded as orthodox. One testimony, however, must suffice. It is from the Biblical Repertory of Princeton, where the sentiment which I have advanced, is advanced in explicit terms. In speaking of the proposition that "faith is an act of the mind, and nothing but an act of the mind," the conductors of that work say: "We should be sorry to think that the Assembly had denounced this as a 'pestiferous error,' for we confess ourselves guilty of this opinion. We cannot conceive what faith is but the act of believing; it is one of the manifestations of that *principle* of holiness which we believe to be the result of the Spirit's operation on the heart." Vol. vii. 480.

The second count in the charge is that "faith is not a principle." In the passage referred to in the Notes as proof, this is expressly stated as my belief, that faith

is not *a principle.* By this, I meant to affirm that it was not any thing *independent* of the acting of the mind; any created or conceivable essence of the soul that was lying back of the act of believing. By bringing this charge, Dr. Junkin evidently supposes that faith is *not* an act of the mind, but *is* a principle; that it does not consist in the mind's acting, or in any mental operation, but in something distinct from all such operations, and independent of them. In other words, that the mind does *not act* in believing, but that there is something *in* the mind independent of any such acting that is to be called faith. As he has not told us in his charges what he means by this, it is impossible for me to know how to meet the accusation. If it is meant that faith is such an independent, created essence that has no connection with an act of the mind, it was my purpose to deny it. But if it be meant that the Christian, the man who believes—is a man of principle; that he has certain great principles of conduct, by which he is regulated, it was not my purpose to deny it, but to affirm it. I understand by "a principle" of action, not a created and irresponsible essence of the soul, a part of the physical structure of the mind, but an adopted rule of life; a purpose or determination of the mind to act in a certain way; a fixed resolution to do *right* whatever may be the result; the great rules and laws which a man adopts, and by which he intends to regulate his conduct. In this sense, it does not differ from a firm and established purpose of the mind itself; a purpose which becomes strengthened by every successive decision of the mind; which ripens into habit by frequent repetition; and which

may thus be called the habitual *bent* or *disposition* of the soul. As intended to describe the *leading purpose*, the established preference and habit of the man's mind, it was not my intention to deny that there *are* such principles of action, and that the Christian is thus a man of principle. But in this case, we speak of the *man* as a *man of principle;* we do not intend to describe the *act of the mind* as a principle. We say that a man who will act right in the face of opposition and persecution, is a man of principle; but we do not describe his *acting right*, the operation of his mind, as a principle. We do not speak of a principle of joy, a principle of sorrow, &c., but we speak of the great principles or leading determinations by which a man regulates his conduct. When a child obeys a parent, we do not speak of the act of obeying as *a principle;* but we may speak of the son as acting according to principle in this. When Howard exercised compassion on the suffering prisoners in Europe, we do not speak of his self-denial and sacrifices as a principle; but we speak of the man as influenced by principles of action which he had adopted, and from which he had never swerved. So of the Christian. The great leading, deeply-cherished principle of his soul is to obey God. It becomes the habitual bent and disposition of his mind; an inclination or disposition, for the formation and cherishing of which he is responsible—an inclination, or preference, or disposition which lies *back* of any specific *act* of believing, just because it is the deeply-cherished preference of the man's soul; the purpose which he has formed thus to live, and thus to act. This principle is strengthen-

ed by action; fortified by repeated exercise; confirmed by every new act of resisting temptation; until it becomes the *law* of our renewed nature; the indomitable principle of attachment to God and his cause.

My vindication from this count in the charge is (1.) That the confession of Faith does not any where affirm that this faith *is a principle*, which it is incumbent on Dr. J. to show *is* affirmed; and (2.) That the whole subject is one that pertains simply to the philosophy of *mind*, and not to theology. It would be as proper for Dr. Junkin to allege an error in my views pertaining to *memory*, or *imagination*, or the powers of mind in regard to *abstraction* or *analysis*, as to charge me with heresy for differing from him in regard to a mental operation on the subject of faith.

The third specification in this charge, is, that I have taught, that "faith itself is imputed for righteousness."

In regard to this, I observe, [1.] that so far as I am able to understand the Apostle Paul, this is his very language and sense—Rom. iv. 3. "Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him [or imputed elogisthe] for righteousness." The word "it" in our translation, I understand as referring, unquestionably, to the act of Abraham's mind; since his strong act of faith was the subject, and the only subject of discussion. That it should refer to any thing else, seemed to me to be a departure from all the proper laws of interpretation. If I have been in an error in supposing that the Apostle meant to refer to Abraham's faith, or to his believing, I am not unwilling to be corrected. If my interpretation is a correct one, then it is not a

little remarkable, that I am accused of heresy that renders void Dr. Junkin's title to heaven, for teaching a doctrine *in the express words of the Apostle Paul*, and that those words are seriously charged with containing dangerous error. My defence here is, that I coincide with the Apostle Paul in belief on this subject, and that the doctrine which I have expressed is in his very language. [2.] I have not taught, that either Abraham's act of believing, or the act of faith of any other man, is the meritorious ground of acceptance with God. In the very passage now under consideration, this has been disclaimed. In reference to this, we may remark, [1.] That it is evidently not intended that the act of believing on the part of Abraham was the *meritorious* ground of acceptance. * * * * [5.] By being justified by faith, it is meant, that we are treated as righteous—that we are forgiven—that we are admitted to the favor of God, and treated as his friends. * * * * It is, in no sense, a matter of merit on our part, and thus stands distinguished entirely from justification by works, or conformity to the law. From beginning to end, it is, so far as we are concerned, a matter of grace. *The merit by which all this is obtained, is the work of the Lord Jesus Christ; through whom this plan is proposed, and by whose atonement alone God can, consistently, pardon and treat as righteous, those who are themselves ungodly.*" The doctrine which I have defended, is, that the merits of the Lord Jesus are the *only* ground of the justification of a sinner before God; and that in this, faith is a mere instrument, a *sine qua non* in the work of justification. This I have taught in as explicit language as possible.

Yet I did not suppose that the appointment of faith in this work was arbitrary. I regarded the want of faith in God, in the earth, as the great crowning evil—producing the same sad effects under the divine administration, which the want of confidence in a father, a wife, a neighbor, a commercial house, does in a community; and that the grand desideratum in a plan of salvation, was, to restore to an alienated world, *confidence in the existence*, the *government*, and *the perfection of God*. This Abraham evinced; and it was such a state of mind as furnished the proper *evidence* of reconciliation, and he was reckoned as *in fact* a justified man. His faith in God was so strong as to give an unerring indication that he was recovered, and was reckoned to him "for righteousness," or, "in order to justification," just as faith is now. The same principle of the divine administration was evinced in *his* case as in ours; acceptance with God not on the ground of faith as a meritorious cause, but because his faith evinced a state of mind to which God had promised acceptance. In his case, as in all others, the ground of acceptance with God, according to my unwavering view, is the anticipated or the accomplished merit of the great atoning sacrifice, the Son of God. The statement of this view, will occur more at length in another part of this Defence. My vindication here is, that I have not taught that the act of faith is imputed as the meritorious ground of acceptance with God, but the contrary; I may here remark, that perhaps a part of the objection to my statement will be removed by adverting to a correction which I have made in my Notes, p. 95. In the comment on the phrase "for

righteousness," Rom. iv. 3, instead of "*as* righteousness" the corrected edition reads "IN ORDER TO JUSTIFICATION;" which more accurately expresses my meaning, and avoids an ambiguity in the expression which was before employed. And also by a change which has been made in the Notes on p. 94. Instead of reading—"Beyond the mental operation, there is nothing in the case, and the word is strictly limited to such an act of the mind throughout the Bible. There is not a place that can be adduced where the word means any thing else than an act of the mind, exercised in relation to some object, or some promise, or threatening, or declaration of some other being;" the following passage has been substituted in the fourth edition, viz:—"While the word *faith* is sometimes used to denote *religious doctrine*, or the system that is to be believed [Acts vi. 7; xv. 9; Rom. i. 5; x. 8; xvi. 26; Eph. iii. 17; iv. 5; 1 Tim. ii. 7, &c.,] yet when it is used to denote that which is required of man, it *always* denotes *an acting of the mind*."

Charge V.

The fifth charge is in the following words, viz:—Denying

"That God entered into covenant with Adam constituting him a federal or covenant head, and representative to all his natural descendants."

Proof 1. p. 114. "From these remarks it is clear that the apostle does not refer to the *man* here from any idea that there was any particular covenant transaction with *him*; but that he means to speak of it in the usual popular sense; referring to him as being the fountain of all the woes that sin has introduced into the world."

Proof 2. p. 128. "The most common (explanation) has been that Adam was the representative of the race; that he was a covenant head,

and that his sin was *imputed* to his posterity, and that they were held liable to punishment for it, as if they had committed it themselves. But to this there are great and insuperable objections.

(1.) There is not one word of it in the Bible. Neither the terms representative, covenant, or impute, are *ever* applied to the transaction in the sacred Scriptures. (2.) It is a mere philosophical theory."

Proof 3. p. 115. As quoted under Charge II.

Proof 4. p. 120, 121. "A comparison is also instituted between Adam and Christ in 1 Cor. xv. 22—25. The reason is, not that Adam was the *representative* or *federal head* of the human race, about which the apostle says nothing, and which is not even implied, but that he was the first of the race; he was the fountain, the head, the father; and the consequences of that first act introducing sin into the world, could be seen every where. The words *representative* and *federal head* are never applied to Adam in the Bible. The reason is, that the word *representative* implies an idea which could not have existed in the case—*the consent of those who are represented.* Besides, the Bible does not teach that they acted in him, or by him; or that he acted *for* them. No passage has ever yet been found that stated this doctrine."

Proof 5. p. 128. (2.) "Nothing is said of a *covenant* with him (Adam.) No where in the Scriptures is the term *covenant* applied to any transaction with Adam. (3.) All that is established here is the simple fact that Adam sinned, and that this made it certain that all his posterity would be sinners. Beyond this the language of the apostle does not go; and all else that has been said of this is the result of mere philosophical speculation. (4.) This *fact* is one that is apparent; and that accords with all the analogy in the moral government of God. The drunkard secures commonly as a result that his family will be reduced to beggary, want, and wo. His sin is commonly the certain occasion of their being sinners; and the immediate cause of their loss of property and comfort, and of their being overwhelmed in wretchedness and grief. A murderer will entail disgrace and shame on his family.

How utterly opposed all this is to the standards, will appear by reference to Confession of Faith, Chap. vii. 1—11; xix. 1; Lar. Cat. 20, 22; Sh. Cat. 12—16.

This Charge and the two following relate to the same subject; and can scarcely be separated. I shall endeavor, however, to consider them, as they are pre-

sented by my accuser, as separate charges. I must beg of the Presbytery to bear in mind the real point in debate, and concerning which I am accused. My statement in my "Notes" is definite, and designed to be so. *It is simply that the terms "covenant," "federal-headship," and "representative," are not applied to the transaction with Adam, in the passage under consideration in my Notes, nor in the Bible.* And the simple inquiry is, whether this *is* so, or is *not*—and on this, the Presbytery is to find a verdict. That this is my statement, I shall now show. In the Notes on Rom. v. 19, I say: [1.] "Nothing is here said of the doctrine of representation. It is not affirmed that Adam was the representative of his race, nor is that language used in regard to him in the Bible. [2.] Nothing is said of a covenant with him. No where in the Scriptures is the term covenant applied to any transaction with Adam." P. 128. And again: [1.] "Neither the terms representative, covenant, or impute, are *ever* applied to the transaction in the sacred Scriptures. [2.] It is a mere philosophical theory, an introduction of a speculation into theology with an attempt to explain what the Bible has left unexplained." In my Defence, in regard to this charge, I observe, then—

That I have here taught the same doctrine which I have held ever since I entered the church as a candidate for the ministry. My views have never changed on the subject, that I can now recollect. These views I always avowed. With these views I was licensed. With the same views I was ordained; and these views, I have reason to think, were always known to

the fathers and brethren who introduced me into the sacred office. And these views, I have every reason to suppose, are held by a very large portion of the ministers and members of the Presbyterian Church. I have not supposed that in them I was advancing any thing peculiar; nor do I now suppose it. Whether it be from early prejudice; or from not correctly understanding the doctrine in question; or whether the language conveys to my mind ideas different from those conveyed to others; or whether it be from want of apprehension of the true doctrine of the Bible, yet I frankly confess, that I have always preferred to express my views of the relation of Adam to his posterity, in language different from that which has been commonly employed on the subject. The reasons of this I shall state soon. Before doing that, it may be proper, in few words, to state what I have been accustomed to hold and to teach. My own belief is, that while I have chosen to make use of different words, yet that I have always held to the *facts* and essential doctrines which are intended to be stated in the Confession of Faith, and which are taught in the Bible.

The facts, then, in the case, which I have supposed to be true, are briefly these:

[1.] That Adam was created holy; apprized of his relations to God, as his creature, and as a moral agent; capable of obeying a law; yet free to fall. Gen. i. 27.

[2.] That a simple law was given him, designed to operate as a test, by which it should be known whether he would obey or rebel. Gen. ii. 16, 17.

[3.] That this law was adapted to the condition of the man—simple, plain, and easy to be obeyed; and fitted

to give human nature a trial in circumstances as favorable as possible.

[4.] That its violation exposed him to the first threatened penalty—to the penalty as he had understood it; and to all the penal collateral woes which transgression might involve in its train—involving, as subsequent developments have showed, the loss of God's favor; his displeasure evinced on earth, in the toil, and cares, and sweat, and sickness, and death of man; in the subjection of the soul to hereditary depravity and the curse; and to the pains of hell for ever.

[5.] That Adam was the head of the race; that he was the fountain of being; that he was the organ of society; and that human nature was so far tried in him, in favorable circumstances, that it may be said he was on trial, not for himself alone, but for his posterity, inasmuch as his fall would affect them, and involve them in ruin.

[6.] That by a constitution of divine appointment, which the framers of our Confession call "a covenant made with Adam, as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity," it was so arranged that his fall should involve his posterity in ruin, without any exception, save only the Messiah; that that apostacy secured as a certain result the fact, that all his posterity would be sinners, and would die.

[7.] *That his posterity are subjected, in consequence of this act of Adam, to the same train of ills as if they had themselves, personally, been the transgressors*—that is, that his posterity are "indubitably affected." I use now the language of my Notes on

the Romans, (p. 122, 123;) "By the sin of Adam, as *e. g.* by being born with a corrupt disposition, with loss of righteousness; with subjection to pain and wo." In this I have never doubted, that they are treated not as personally ill-deserving or criminal, but are subjected to the same train of evils as they would have been, had they been the personal offenders; or as Adam deserved to be after his fall, And in using this language, it was my design to deny that children are born without any thing that may be regarded as a tendency or hereditary disposition to depravity; and to deny also that they become sinners, as the Pelagians taught, simply by imitation. By hereditary tendency, or disposition, however, I did not mean to express my belief that the substance of the soul was corrupted, or that the depravity is physical, or that it consists in a weakening or destroying of the intellectual faculties, or that it consists in any created essence or substance which is placed in the soul. I mean to say that there is something which I do not profess myself able to explain—antecedent to the moral action of the posterity of Adam, and growing out of the relation which they sustain to him as the head of the race, which makes it certain that they will sin as soon as they begin to act as moral agents, however early that may be. This hereditary tendency to sin, I suppose, is what has been usually called "original sin;" and the existence of this I have not denied, but have always affirmed, and do now most firmly hold. What the precise metaphysical nature of this is, I do not pretend to know; but wished simply to state my belief of the existence of the fact, that by a divine constitution

their sinning was made certain in all cases, except that of the Messiah. I reject, therefore, with no slight impressions of injustice to myself, every charge which is brought of my denying original sin. In the first edition of my "Notes," the following passages occur, showing that I hold this doctrine, viz: "In like manner, though men are indubitably affected by the sin of Adam, as *e. g.* by being born with a corrupt disposition; with less of righteousness; with subjection to pain and wo," &c. P. 122, 123.

"*Unto condemnation.* Producing condemation, or involving in condemation. It is proved by this that the effect of the sin of Adam was to involve the race in condemnation, or to secure this as a result, that all mankind would be under the condemning sentence of the law, and be transgressors." P. 124.

"As the sin of Adam was of such a nature, in the relation in which he stood, as to affect all the race," &c. P. 125, 126.

"All that is established here is the simple *fact*, that he sinned, and that this made it certain that all his posterity would be sinners." P. 128.

"The simple fact in regard to Adam is, that he sinned; and that such is the organization of the great society, of which he is the head and father, that his sin has secured as a certain result that all the race will be sinners also." P. 129.

"The apostle, in this expression, does not say that all have sinned in Adam, or that their nature has become corrupt, *which is true*, but which is not affirmed here," &c. P. 117.

[8.] This constitution, or arrangment, I have sup-

posed was to be eradicated from objections on the same *principle* of the divine government as all other similar facts. Facts like this are common every where in the government of God and the dealing of men—where the effect of one man's conduct, sustaining certain relations to another, passes over from him, and effects them as if they had themselves sinned. Thus the drunkard commonly secures, as a result, that his children will be beggared, wretched and ruined; *e. g.* they are subject to a train of ills of these subjects the same in regard to their character, property, peace, and perhaps health, as if they, not their father, had been intemperate. So of the traitor, the murderer, the pirate, and especially when such a man is at the head of a community or a race. This I regard as an *illustration* of the general arrangment in regard to social liabilities, and as fully vindicating the principles of the divine administration from all the objections which can be urged against it. I may here be permitted to say, that I have never declared nor believed, "that we have no more to do with the sin of Adam than with the sin of any other man." In most important respects, I regard our relation to him as peculiar. While the dealings of God with him and his posterity can be vindicated on the general principles of his administration, and as they now occur, and while all the objections which have been made to it can thus be removed, it is still my belief that there is much that is peculiar in his relation to us—much that does not occur in the case of a traitor, a drunkard, a pirate. One peculiarity, and a very material one, is, that the sin of Adam secured us a certain result, the

sin of all his posterity. The sin of a drunken father, pirate, murderer, does not. The consequence *may* follow in their cases, and does often: but in the case of Adam it not only *may*, but it does inevitably follow always.

Adam was the head or root of all; and his act had this tremendous pre-eminence, that it involved all ruin, as if all had been on trial for themselves, and all had fallen.

The facts occurring under God's administration, I have supposed could be defended on the same principle. I have not supposed that God had different principles in regard to facts of a similar nature. My belief has been that the same principle that would vindicate the one class, would vindicate also the other, and that the same weapons by which I can repel the attacks of men on the existing order of things, would avail to repel the attacks of the infidel on the statement in the Bible in regard to the primeval condition of man, and the organization of society. I have loved to contemplate the government of God as one to find the elements of the same administration every where, and to find the demonstration that one part could be sustained by the argument from the analogy of acknowledged facts in all the divine arrangements. I have found a reluctance, therefore, to suppose that I was to take a new and independent set of principles when approaching the facts that are stated in the Bible, and have found nothing that relieved my difficulty by the use of the terms "covenant-head," and "federal relation."—The facts in the case I have been willing to leave, as all others are, to be

fully understood, perhaps only in the clear light which shall attend all these developments in a future world. These are the views which I have always held, and intended to express on this subject, so perplexing, and so full of controversy. If any expressions occur in the Notes on the Romans which seem to convey any different views, they do not express the idea clearly which I intended to convey, and I profess any willingness to correct them accordingly, if they are specified. The simple *facts* in the case I hold as they are held in the Bible, and in the Confession of Faith.

[9.] The principles on which I have supposed these facts may all be vindicated, I have stated in my Notes, p. 129.

The reasons why I have not chosen to use the terms in relation to this transaction which are often employed, I shall now proceed, in few words, frankly to state:

1. In regard to the term "covenant," and "covenant, or federal head."

[1.] The terms are NEVER applied to the transaction with Adam in the Bible. No place has ever been adduced, where the Hebrew ברית Berith, the Greek διαθήκη, diatheke, or συνθήκη, suntheke, or the English term covenant, is applied in the Scriptures to this transaction. Now, I would not altogether reject the use of words which are not found in the Bible—for there are important advantages in the use of the terms *Trinity*, *Person*, &c., as applied to the divine nature, and of total depravity as applied to man, &c.—but, assuredly a reluctance to employ these *terms*, provided the Scripture doctrine be retained, cannot be charged as heresy. On

this ground I put my defence; and maintain, that while I hold the substantial *facts* which the Confession of Faith designs to state, I am not chargeable with gross heresy, for not employing a word that is not found in this connexion in the Bible. [2.] The words, to omit the use of which is here charged as heresy, would convey no idea to the class of persons for whom I wrote. My aim was, to benefit, mainly, the young; and I did not suppose that it would contribute, materially, to their information, to be told that Adam was the "federal head" of his posterity. After the numberless times which I have heard these terms used, and have found them in books of theology, I acknowledge, that the idea which they convey to me, has never been as clear and explicit as could be conveyed by other terms. It is language remote from common life; not used in reference to the common transactions of men; and very imperfectly adapted to the common mind. [3.] The terms were not used in the passages in the Epistle to the Romans, on which I was commenting. I did not feel myself called on, therefore, to make use of terms which the Apostle had not used, and which were not necessary to give a fair and full idea to his meaning. [4.] The use of the terms "covenant," and "federal headship," applied to Adam, is remote from the usual signification of the words. They naturally imply the idea of *equality* between the parties—the notion of a *compact*, where either of the parties should be at liberty to *decline* the agreement. But, it is evident, that there could be no such *equality* between God and man; and though the term "covenant" is often, in the Bible, applied to transactions

between God and men, yet it is evidently in a *metaphorical* sense. The Hebrew word, in accordance with a usage in all languages, means, properly, a *compact, league, agreement*, between man and man—[*Taylor, Gesenius*, &c.;] a compact "which puts their affairs into a new state"—[Taylor's Heb. Con.;] and implies the idea of equality, or liberty to reject the terms, &c. It occurs some hundreds of times in the Old Testament; but not in a single instance, it is believed, in regard to the transaction with Adam. It is often applied, indeed, to transactions between God and man; [See Taylor;] and, when so used, it is evidently equivalent to *law*, or *constitution;* and *had* the term been applied to the transaction with Adam, it would have been as proper as its use in the other transactions with men which are mentioned. The simple observation in my "Notes" is, that the *term* is not used in regard to the transaction in the Bible; and whatever may be the bearing of the remark, such is the unquestionable fact. [5.] To many minds, the term conveys an erroneous idea. It has been made the basis of false doctrines in regard to the subject of the imputation of Adam's sin. It constitutes, in fact, *the argument* by which many defend their peculiar views of the imputation of the sin of Adam on his posterity, on the supposition of a personal identity between him and his descendants. And there are many men, perhaps, who hold that doctrine, who would be themselves surprised to learn how entirely their views are based on the supposition of a covenant with Adam, of which the Bible says nothing. As it was not my intention to teach that doctrine, it did not appear desirable to retain the use

of language which seemed to lead to it. [6.] So far as I have examined the standards, the phrase, "federal or covenant head," is not to be found in the Confession of Faith, or in the Catechisms of the Presbyterian Church. Not to use them, therefore, cannot be charged as heresy. [7.] The Confession of Faith evidently means, by the term "*covenant*," a *constitution* or *law*. Thus in chap. xix. § 1, it says, "God gave to *Adam* A LAW, AS a *covenant* of works by which he bound him, and all his posterity, to personal, entire, exact, and perpetual, obedience," &c. And again, § 2: "The LAW, after his fall, continued to be a perfect rule of righteousness," &c. And again, § 3: "Beside this LAW, commonly called *moral*, God was pleased," &c. In these places, it is evident that the framers of the Confession did not intend to use the term "covenant" in its strict and proper sense, but as synonymous with *law*, and as expressive of the same thing as the "*moral* law" which was given to Adam as a moral agent; and in this sense it denotes the *law, or constitution*, under which man was placed. My answer, therefore, is, [1] that the *term* covenant is not applied to the transaction in the Bible—which is all that I affirmed; and [2] that I hold the substantial doctrine on the subject—the same statement of *facts* about the effect of Adam's sin on his posterity, which occurs in the Confession of Faith.

It has been said indeed that a representative may be appointed to act for a people, very few of whom concur in his appointment. Thus it is said, that "Under the British Constitution, not a twenty-fifth part of the people have the right of suffrage; and yet the parlia-

ment is regarded as representing the whole nation, and their acts binding on all. In France the proportion is still less. And in our own country not more than one-sixth of the people have a voice in the choice of the representatives of the people." Bib. Rep. vii. 333, 334. To this the reply is obvious. *Consent, contract*, of some kind is essential to the idea of representation in England, France, and America, alike. The moment a man should claim the right of acting as representative, without the proper form of consent and contract, his claim would be rejected at once. Further, it is, in fact, in these cases, a contract not only with the party who may appoint, or the small number of voters, but it is the consent of the nation who have adopted the constitution that it shall be thus governed. Every man who chooses to live under such a government gives his *consent* to this arrangement; and though he may have his preferences in regard to individuals, yet he consents that the man who shall be chosen in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, shall be his representative, and consents to be bound by his acts. The moment this doctrine is denied, the idea of representation ceases. If he does not *consent* to be bound by his acts, though he might individually prefer another, one of two things would follow, either he must withdraw from the nation and place himself beyond its jurisdiction, or he must be regarded as rearing the standard of rebellion, and defy its laws.

There is a more remote sense in which the word *representative* is sometimes used, though in a loose and unauthorized manner. It is where it is applied

to a guardian in law to manage the affairs of a minor. [Bib. Rep. vii. 334.] But in this case the idea of *representation* ceases, and it is believed that the term is not applied to the transaction in the books which treat on the subject. The idea of guardianship, not of representation, is that which is conveyed and retained in the appointment. The court of chancery acting for the country, takes the place of the natural parent, to do what the natural parent would do, and makes the appointment; and as the true idea in relation to my parent's acting is not that he is my representative, so is the true idea of a guardian. See 2 Kent, 219. Who would think of calling his father his representative? In what laws or language of men, is this term used in this relation? In testamentary guardianship, where a guardian is appointed by the will of a father, the guardian might be called the representative of the father, though this language is not in fact used in the courts, but in no conceivable sense as the representative of the child. See 2 Kent, 224. A *legal* representative is never an ancestor, a parent, or a guardian, but an heir is in law called a legal representative, as he, by a fiction of the old Roman law, is supposed to represent the *person* of the ancestor, where it was held, as Kent says, "by a strange feature of law, that the heir was the same person as the ancestor." 4 Kent, 379. Affected I may be with the loss of character, property, and health, by the conduct of a father or a guardian, yet it is not the idea of representation, but by a constitution of things to be called by another name. I do not regard myself as blameworthy, nor do I suppose that the appointment

to act as a representative, was ever made. Com. 2 Kent, 219, &c.

Now, I admit, that to this arrangement in human government, and in the divine government, I cheerfully submit. I admit the authority of a court to appoint a man to act as guardian in the place of the natural parent, or as the representative of the state, who, on the death of the parent, becomes *loco parentis* to the child. I admit the perfect propriety of God's appointing the existing state of things as a moral governor, and so ordaining as that the conduct of Adam should so affect the character and destiny of all his posterity; but to call either the one or the other a representative, is a violation of one of the essential principles of such a representation; it stands apart from the common use of language; from the common sense of men; and from an original, deeply fixed principle in the human mind; and in all law this consent or appointment is essential to all proper ideas of agency or representation.

With great propriety, therefore, and in entire accordance with all the modes of speech and thinking among men, has the Bible—and the Confession of Faith also—abstained from the use of the term representative, as applied to the transaction with Adam. How my neglecting to employ such a term can be construed as heresy, is a question of difficult solution. Our Confession of Faith was drawn up by men admirably skilled in the use of language. The terms which are employed, are, usually at least, employed with great precision, and with admirable guards against misconstruction. The men who framed it were pro-

soundly acquainted with the English tongue, and expressed their ideas with great accuracy. That the term is found in books of theology is undeniable; but the only inquiry of any moment here is, whether it is to be found in the Bible, or the Confession of Faith. The use of the term in the books of theology, I have ventured to call a mere "philosophical speculation." Notes, p. 128. Whether in thus urging the propriety of using language as it is found in common life, in the lexicons, in books of law, the Bible, and Confession of Faith, I have acted erroneously, remains for the Presbytery to judge.

2. In regard to the other term—"representative"—I remark, in general, that its use was avoided for the same reasons which have led me to prefer *not* to use the terms "covenant" and "federal head." My *specific* defence against this charge, however, is this. (*a*) The terms *representative* and *representation*, are not to be found in the Bible as applicable to this transaction. In expressing my views of this transaction, I have supposed it better, for the purposes which I had in view, to confine myself, as strictly as possible, to the language of the Scriptures. (*b*) The term, so far as I know, is not to be found in the Confession of Faith, or the Catechisms of the Church. I have not felt myself called on, therefore, to make use of this term in order to maintain my orthodoxy; nor is it easily seen how a failure to do this can be construed into heresy. (*c*) The term most obviously, and to most minds inevitably conveys an idea which never *could* have existed in regard to the transaction with Adam. I mean *the consent of those who are repre-*

sented. Now it is evident that no such consent of the posterity of Adam that he should act for them, no appointment of him by themselves to act as their representative, could ever have existed. In this transaction they were not consulted; nor were they apprized of any such arrangement. I say that the word most obviously, and to most minds inevitably conveys this idea. A representative is defined to be "an agent, deputy, or substitute, who supplies the place of another, or others, *being invested with his or their authority.*—WEBSTER. This idea is familiar to us. An *attorney* is the representative of his client or employer. "Attorney is an ancient English word, and signifieth one that is set in the turn, stead, or place of another—whose warrant from his master is *ponit loco suo talem attornatum suum*, which setteth in his own turn or place such a man to be his attorney. *Coke upon Littleton*, iii. p. 352. A member of the House of Commons, or of the House of Representatives, is the representative of his constituents. An ambassador is the representative of his government or nation abroad. In all these, and in all the other cases of *agency*, the obvious and natural idea is, that there has been a delegation of authority or power to act in the case, from the person or persons in behalf of whom the representative acts. Where there is a departure from this, or where the agent exceeds his instructions, the representative character of his doings is destroyed, and becomes void. "If the agent does what he is authorized to do, and something more, it will be good as far as he was authorized to go, and the excess only would be void. 2 *Kent*, p. 19. "The

principal cannot be bound if the agent exceeds his power." *Ibid.* 620. This principle in regard to agency, that the power to act is founded on "contract either express or implied," is abundantly stated in the books that profess to treat on the subject. I beg leave particularly to read from Kent's Commentaries, vol. ii. p. 613, 614, 615, 616, 617: "Agency is founded upon a contract either express or implied, by which one of the parties confides to the other the management of some business to be transacted in his name, or on his account, and by which the other assumes to do the business, and to render an account of it. The authority of the agent may be created by deed or writing, or verbally without writing; and for the ordinary purposes of business or commerce, the latter is sufficient. The agency may be inferred from the relation of the parties, and the nature of the employment, without proof of any express appointment. *It is sufficient that there be satisfactory evidence that the principal employed the agent, and that the agent undertook the trust.* The extent of the authority of an agent will sometimes be varied or extended on the ground of implied authority, according to the pressure of circumstances connected with the business with which he is intrusted.

"The agency must be antecedently given, or subsequently adopted; and in the latter case there must be some act of recognition. But an acquiescence in the assumed agency of another, when the acts of the agent are brought to the knowledge of the principal, is equivalent to an express authority. Thus, where a person sent his servant to a shop-keeper for goods

upon credit, and paid for them afterwards, and sent the same servant again to the same place for goods, and with money to pay for them, and the servant embezzled the cash, the master was held answerable for the goods, for he had given credit to his servant by adopting his former act. It is the prior conduct of the principal that affords just ground to infer a continuance of the agency in that particular business; and the rule is founded on obvious principles of justice and policy."

Such was the defence in regard to this charge which I made before the Presbytery. In that defence, I judged it proper, as my trial was to be on the "Notes on the Romans" as they were at first published, to state the reasons why the statements were made which I did make. On that defence the Presbytery acquitted me of holding any dangerous error, or heresy; or, in other words, judged that I had not departed materially from the "system of doctrine taught in the holy Scriptures." Since that time, however, I have made some changes in the exceptionable passages in the Notes on the Romans, which I trust will remove all cause of offence, and produce peace. Those changes I have made for reasons which I have stated in the preface to the corrected edition, and which are briefly these: 1. Some of the expressions in the former editions had been misunderstood; some I have since seen to have been ambiguous; and some have given offence. I have found that without abandoning any principle of interpretation, or any views of doctrine which I *wished* to express, I could change them in a manner that would more clearly convey my meaning.

2. A sincere desire to do all in my power to allay excitement, and to produce peace, and restore confidence in the churches, has led to the wish to make my work as little exceptionable as possible. Where brethren have been offended: where the expressions were ambiguous, or where a different phraseology would remove the cause of offence, I have felt it my duty and *privilege* to make a change, and have done it. 3. The trial before the Presbytery showed *exactly* where changes were desirable, if they could be made. It made me acquainted with the precise nature and extent of the objections to the book. Before this trial I could not have made them so well; and after the charges were brought, and while the trial was pending, I felt that it would appear as if I were *driven* to an abandonment of principle, if I should make the alterations. When the trial was complete, and my Presbytery had acquitted me, I then felt that it was a proper time for me to endeavor to allay the excitement, and to silence the voice of alarm. The *motives* which led to those changes, were a sincere desire to do all in my power to promote peace, and to make my work better. Both I thought might be done, and the attempt has been sincerely made, with an expectation that the alterations might be satisfactory to all.

In the changes which have been made on this subject, I desire that it may be distinctly adverted to, that I have omitted—1. *All* that has been excepted against, in regard to the use of the words "covenant head," and "representative." In place of the statements on this subject which have given offence, other state-

ments have been introduced, which accord, so far as I know, with the doctrines every where now held, which express views that I have always entertained, but which, I admit, were not fully expressed in the former editions. 2. The exception which was taken to the expression in the Confession of Faith, "they sinned in him," (p. 117,) has been removed, and in the place of that the following phraseology has been substituted, viz. (p. 117.) "As his posterity had not then an existence, they could not commit actual transgression. Sin is the transgression of the law by a moral agent; and as the interpretation '*because* all have sinned' meets the argument of the apostle, and as the Greek favors that certainly *as much* as it does the other, it is to be preferred." On this subject, it is hoped that all cause of offence is taken away. And as that was the *only* expression in the Confession of Faith to which exception was formally taken in the Notes on the Romans, the change which is now made has removed all cause of offence on this subject. 3* A similar change has been made in pp. 120, 121, on which the fifth charge is partly based, where it was denied that Adam "was the *federal head* or *representative* of the race." Instead of this statement, the following has been substituted, in which that denial is wholly omitted, viz. pp. 120, 121. "The reason is, that Adam was the first of the race; he was the fountain, the head, the father; and the consequences of that first act could be seen every where. By a divine constitution the race was so connected with him that it was made certain, that if he fell, all would come into the world with a nature depraved, and subject to

calamity and death, and would be treated as if fallen, and his sin would thus spread crime, and wo, and death, every where. The evil effects of the apostacy were every where seen; and the object of the apostle was to show that the plan of salvation was adapted to meet and more than countervail the evil effects of the fall. He argued, &c." 4. In regard to the relation which Adam sustained to his posterity, a very important change has been made in this edition. The 128th page, in which the exceptionable statements were made, on which the charge is based, has been entirely cancelled, and the following substituted in its place, viz.

"The following remarks may express the doctrines which are established by this much-contested and difficult passage. 1. Adam was created holy; capable of obeying law; yet free to fall. 2. A law was given him adapted to his condition—simple, plain, easy to be obeyed, and fitted to give human nature a trial in circumstances as favorable as possible. 3. Its violation exposed him to the threatened penalty as he had understood it, and to all the collateral woes which it might carry in its train—involving, as subsequent developments showed, the loss of God's favor; his displeasure evinced in man's toil, and sweat, and sickness, and death; in hereditary depravity, and the curse, and the pains of hell forever. 4. Adam was the head of the race; he was the fountain of being; and human nature was so far tried in him, that it may be said he was on trial, not for himself alone, but for his posterity, inasmuch as his fall would involve them in ruin. Many have chosen to call this a covenant, and to speak of him

as a federal head; and if the above account is the idea involved in these terms, the explanation is not exceptionable. As the word covenant, however, is not applied in the transaction in the Bible, and as it is liable to be misunderstood, others prefer to speak of it as a *law* given to Adam, and as a divine constitution under which he was placed. 5. His posterity are, in consequence of his sin, subjected to the same train of ills as if they had been personally the transgressors. Not that they are regarded as personally ill-deserving or criminal for his sin. God reckons things as they are, and not falsely, [see Note ch. iv. 3.] and his imputations are all according to truth. He regarded Adam as standing at the head of his race; and regards and treats all his posterity as coming into the world subject to pain, and death, and depravity, as a consequence of his sin. See Note, p. 122. This is the Scriptural idea of imputation; and this is what has been commonly meant, when it has been said, that "the GUILT of his first sin," *not the sin itself*, "is imputed to his posterity." 6. There is something antecedent to the moral action of his posterity, and growing out of the relation which they sustain to him, which makes it certain that they will sin as soon as they begin to act as moral agents. What this is, we may not be able to say; but we may be certain, that it is not physical depravity, or any created essence of the soul, or any thing which prevents the first act of sin from being voluntary. This hereditary tendency to sin, has been usually called "Original Sin," and this the Apostle evidently teaches. 7. As an infant comes into the world with a certainty that he will sin as soon as he becomes a moral agent here, there is

the same certainty, that, if he were removed to eternity, he would sin there also unless he were changed. There is, therefore, need of the blood of the atonement, and of the agency of the Holy Ghost, that an infant may be saved. The *facts* here stated, accord with all the analogy in the moral government of God. The drunkard secures as a result, commonly, that his family be reduced to beggary, want, and wo. A pirate, or a traitor, will whelm not himself only, but his family in ruin. Such is the great law, or constitution, on which society is now organized; and, we are not to be surprised, that the same principle occurred in the primary organization of human affairs. 9. As this is the fact every where, the analogy disarms all objections which have been made against the scriptural statements of the effects of the sin of Adam. If just *now*, it was just *then*. If it exists *now*, it existed *then*."

These passages express my real sentiments, and are now a part of the book. So far as I know, they express the doctrine of the Bible, and the main and essential doctrine of Calvinism as set forth in the Confession of Faith, and as understood by the great mass of ministers in the Presbyterian Church. All that can be reasonably asked of a man who has, in any manner, expressed himself so as to be misapprehended, or so as to give offence, is, that the cause of the offence should be removed. Desirous of doing this, and of stating more clearly what I have always believed, I have made the alterations noticed above, and which I believe will be satisfactory to the great mass of ministers and members of the churches. I may just remark, that those alterations were made before the meeting of the Synod,

and that this statement was designed to constitute a part of my defence.

Charge VI.

The sixth charge is, "That I deny that the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity."

Proof 1, p. 10. "A melancholy instance of this [substituting theory for fact] we have in the account which the apostle gives (ch. v.) about the effect of the sin of Adam. The simple *fact* is stated that that sin was followed by the sin and ruin of all his posterity. Yet he offers no explanation of the *fact*. He leaves it as indubitable; and as not demanding an explanation in his argument, perhaps as not admitting it. This is the whole of his doctrine on that subject. Yet men have not been satisfied with that. They have sought for a theory to account for it. And many suppose they have found it in the doctrine that the sin of Adam is *imputed*, or set over by an arbitrary arrangement to beings otherwise innocent, and that they are held to be responsible for a deed committed by a man thousands of years before they were born. This is the *theory*, and men insensibly forget that it is *mere theory*."

Proof 2, p. 117. (3.) "It comports with the apostle's argument to state a cause *why* all died, and not to state that men sinned *in* Adam. It would require an *additional statement* to see how *that* could be a cause. (4.) The expression, 'in whom all have sinned,' conveys no intelligible idea. As men had not an existence then in any sense, they could not then sin. What idea is conveyed to men of common understanding, by the expression, 'They sinned in him?' The meaning of the expression, therefore, clearly is, *because* all have sinned all die."

"I understand it, therefore, as referring to the fact that men sin, *sin in their own persons—sin themselves*—as, indeed, how *can* they sin in any other way?—and that *therefore* they die."

Proof 3, p. 119. "The difference contemplated, Rom. v. 14, is not that Adam was an *actual* sinner, and that *they* had sinned only by *imputation*. For, (1.) The expression to sin by imputation, is unintelligible, and conveys no idea. (2.) The apostle makes no such distinction, and conveys no such idea. (3.) His very object is different. It is to show that they *were actual sinners*; that they transgressed law; and the proof of this is that they died. (4) It is utterly absurd to suppose that men, from the time of Adam to Moses, were sinners *only by imputation*."

Proof 4, p. 119. "Death reigned; and this proves that they were

sinners. If it should be said that the death of *infants* would prove that *they* were sinners also, I answer—(a) That this was an inference which the *apostle* does not draw, and for which he is not responsible. It is not affirmed by him. (b) If it did refer to infants, what would it prove? Not that the sin of Adam was imputed, but that they were *personally* guilty and transgressors. For this is the only point to which the argument tends. The apostle says not one word about imputation. He does not even refer to infants by name; nor does he here introduce at all the doctrine of imputation. All this is mere philosophy introduced to explain difficulties; but whether true or false; whether the theory explains or embarrasses the subject, it is not needful here to inquire. (3.) The *very expression* here is against the supposition that infants are intended, and that the sin of Adam is imputed to them. The doctrine of imputation has been, that infants were personally guilty of Adam's sin; that they 'sinned in him;' that there was a *personal identity* constituted between them and Adam; (see Edwards on Original Sin;) and that therefore *his sin* was *theirs*, as really and truly as if committed by themselves. Yet here the apostle says, that those of whom *he* was speaking had *not* sinned 'after the similitude of Adam's transgression. But if the doctrine of imputation be true, it is certain that they not only *had* sinned after the similitude of his transgression, but had *sinned the very identical sin*. It was precisely *like* him; it was the very thing itself; and they were answerable for that very sin as their own. This doctrine, therefore, cannot be intended here."

Proof 5, p. 121. "Nor have we a right to *assume* that this [ver. 15,] teaches the doctrine of the imputation of the sin of Adam to his posterity. For, (1.) The apostle says nothing of it. (2.) That doctrine is nothing but an effort to explain the *manner* of an event which the Apostle Paul did not think it proper to attempt to explain. (3.) That doctrine is in fact no explanation. It is introducing an additional difficulty. For to say that I am guilty of the sin of another in which I had no agency, is no *explanation*, but is involving me in additional difficulty still more perplexing, to ascertain how such a doctrine can possibly be just."

Proof 6, p. 127. "The word is *in no instance* used to express the idea of *imputing that to one which belongs to another*. It here either means, that this was *by a constitution of divine appointment* that they in fact became *sinners*, or simply declares they *were* so in fact. There is not the slightest intimation that it was by imputation.

Proof 7, p. 128. As quoted under V. p. 10.

How inconsistent this is with the Standards, will be seen in Con. Chap. VI. iii. iv. Lar. Cat. 22, 25. Sh. Cat. 18.

My general reply to this charge is, that it is no where taught in the Confession of Faith, that "the first sin of Adam" was "imputed to his posterity;" or that his sin at all was imputed. The doctrine is there stated to be that "THE GUILT of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity descending from them by ordinary generation." Con. of Faith, ch. vi. § 3. And Lar. Cat. Q. 25. "The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consisteth in THE GUILT of Adam's first sin," &c. And Sh. Cat. Q. 18. This may appear to be a *minute* distinction, but it is a real one, an accurate one, and a very material one. To impute *sin itself* to a man is one thing; to impute the *obligation to punishment*, is another thing. The latter is the doctrine of the standards; the former is not. And the fact that the denial of the former, is charged on me as a departure from the standards, shows, with other things, the exceedingly loose and ill-digested manner in which these charges have been drawn up.

But in order to meet this charge more fully, it is necessary for me to explain a little more at length what I actually meant to deny in the portions of my books which are referred to. In order to do this, it is proper to observe that there have been *three* principal theories defended in regard to the relation which we sustain to Adam.

The first is, that which may be denominated as the doctrine of the abler Calvinistic writers. It consists

in the statement that the posterity of Adam are not condemned for his sin as being the sin of another charged on them, but, *as truly and properly theirs;* that they are subject to condemnation, not as in themselves innocent beings made guilty by imputation, but as being guilty, or *ill-deserving*, and *thus* condemned, for a sin which *they* are reckoned to have committed IN their head and representative; that they are regarded as having in fact committed that sin, and as deservedly to be punished for it. According to this view, God's imputations are according to truth, and the posterity of Adam are condemned because they *deserve* to be condemned; and are personally blameworthy for Adam's sin as being one with him, so that it is in fact their own. In order to explain and defend this, the advocates of this doctrine resorted to the theory that there is a personal identity constituted between Adam and his posterity, in the same way as God has "*arbitrarily*" [Edwards] constituted an identity between A. when a child, and A. when forty years of age; by which A. at forty is responsible for the acts of A. at twelve; because, having been *constituted* the same person, he *deserves* to be so held as responsible. In like manner, it was held, that by an "arbitrary" arrangment, or constitution, an identity was constituted between Adam and his posterity, so that they are to be held responsible for his acts. The *peculiarity* of this theory, in contradistinction from that which I shall next mention is, that men are condemned not for the sin of another, but for a sin which is *truly* and *properly theirs;* that they are *blameworthy* for the sin of Adam; that they are subjected to *punish-*

ment for it on the same principle as the murderer of yesterday is punished to day for the crime; that God's imputations are therefore strictly according to truth; that he reckons things as they are; and adjudges those to be guilty only who are guilty. In this theory, therefore, when the older writers speak of *imputation*, they mean that God imputes to men only what properly belongs to them; when they say we are guilty of Adam's sin, they mean that we are under obligation to punishment strictly for antecedent *crime* and *ill-desert*; and when they speak of punishment, they mean those penal ills which are the proper expression of the indignation of a moral governor against personal demerit and crime. Every thing in this theory is consistent, and carried out, and language is used in its obvious and acknowledged sense.

It has been denied that this doctrine was that of the older Calvinists. [See Bib. Rep. vii. 327–331; ii. 436–439, &c.] I admit that there is some confusion of language in the older writers, and that perhaps their statements are not always consistent. My object is to show, by extracts, that this was a theory that was held.

I begin with Edwards, who in a profound treatise on original sin, may be presumed to have examined the statements of his predecessors. His doctrine is in the following words:

"I think it would go far towards directing us to the more clear conception and right statement of this affair, were we steadily to bear this in mind:—that God in every step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established

with him, looked on his posterity as being *one with him*. And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, it yet was as the *head* of the whole body, and the *root* of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their root.

"From which it will follow, that both guilt or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity, just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all co-existed, like a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in as the head and root of the whole. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the root had been attended in the same instant with the same alteration throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I think this will naturally follow, on the supposition of a *constituted oneness or identity* of Adam and his posterity in the affair." P. 542, 543.

"From what has been observed it may appear that there is no sure ground to conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible thing for the race of mankind truly to partake of the *sin* of the first apostacy, so as that this, in *reality and propriety*, shall become *their* sin; by virtue of *a real union* between the root and branches of mankind, [truly and properly availing to such a consequence,] established by the Author of the whole system of the universe; to whose establishments are owing all propriety and reality of union, in any part of the system; and by virtue of the full *consent* of the hearts of Adam's posterity to this apos-

tacy. *And therefore the sin of the apostacy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them;* BUT IT IS TRULY AND PROPERLY THEIRS, *and on that ground God imputes it to them.*" P. 559.

And in support of this doctrine of *constituted oneness* or *identity*, Edwards enters into a protracted metaphysical argument, to prove that *all* identity is constituted in the same way by the arrangement of God; and that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends *on an arbitrary divine constitution*, (p. 549–557;) and, therefore, that God may "establish a constitution, whereby the natural posterity of Adam, proceeding from him, much as the buds and branches from the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as *one* with him," &c. P. 557. The essential idea in the theory of Edwards is, that there is a constituted oneness or identity between Adam and his posterity, constituted in the same way as *personal* identity is every where; and that his sin *is truly and properly theirs*, and is *therefore* charged on them; and that this sin so charged on them is *distinct* from their original corruption and depravity. This he expressly states on p. 543.

That the same was the doctrine of Stapfer, an eminent divine of Zurich, in Switzerland, is proved abundantly by Edwards' Works, vol. ii. p. 545: "Seeing all Adam's posterity are derived from their first parent as their root, the whole of the human kind with its root, may be considered as constituting but one whole or mass," &c. "Seeing, therefore, that Adam with all his posterity constituted but *one moral per-*

son, and are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors in the same law, they are also to be looked upon as having, in a moral estimation, committed the same transgressions of the law, both in number and in kind."

Thus Calvin says, [Comm. on Rom. v. 17,] that "by the sin of Adam we are condemned, *not* by imputation alone, as if the punishment due to another's guilt were exacted from us, but we endure his punishment because we are chargeable with his criminality, since our nature being vitiated in him is chargeable with the criminality of iniquity—"non per solam imputationem damnamur, ac si aliena peccati exigeretur a nobis poena; *sed ideo poenam ejus sustinemus* QUIA ET CULPAE SUMUS REI." The same doctrine Calvin teaches in his Institutes, B. 11, ch. i. 38: "And this liableness to punishment," says he, "arises not from the delinquency of another, neque est alieni delicti—for when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnoxious to the divine judgment, it is not to be understood as if we, though *innocent*, were undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin. Wherefore Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of another, the more carefully to indicate its transmission to us by propagation, yet at the same time he also asserts it properly to belong to each individual, *proprium unicuique*." "And, therefore, he continues, "infants themselves, as they bring their condemnation into the world with them, are rendered obnoxious to punishment *by their own sinfulness, not by the sinfulness of another*." Idem.

Stapfer also lays down the doctrine of original sin

in the same manner. "God, in imputing this sin, *finds* the whole moral person (the human race) ALREADY *a sinner*, and NOT merely constituted as such." Polem. Theo. ch. xvi. 63.

Boston [Body of Divinity, vol. 1. p. 308,] says,—"Adam's sin is imputed to us *because it is ours*. For God doth not reckon a thing to be ours which is not so; for God's justice doth not punish men for a sin which is in no way theirs. As if a person that has the plague infect others, they die by their own plague, and not by that of another."

Turretin held the same doctrine—that we are condemned for his sin because it is properly *ours*, and because we are ill-deserving. Thus, speaking of all as dying in Adam, he says: "They have sinned in him, and are bound with him (communi culpa) in a *common criminality*, for no one can *deserve* (mereri) death, unless he has *with* him, (Adam) and *in* him, a *common sin*, which is the cause of death. So that we are said to sin in him, not merely in the way of *efficiency*, as the cause by which sin is propagated, but as in the way [demeriti] of ILL-DESERT." Theol. p. 683. Again; "Justice," says Turretin, "does not inflict *punishment* except upon him who *deserves* it: [merenti] for in the imputation of Adam's sin, the justice of God does not inflict punishment upon him that does not deserve it, [immerenti,] *but upon him that* DOES DESERVE IT," [merenti.] P. 687.

The sentiments of these men, who were surely competent to state what old Calvinism was, cannot be mistaken. Their doctrine was, that men are condemned for the sin of Adam, not as charged or impu-

ted to them, being innocent, but as being a sin *truly and properly theirs*. There was a *oneness* constituted between them and Adam; and they were reckoned as having sinned in him, and as being ILL-DESERVING or *criminal* for the offence.

Believing this to be the form of the Calvinism of the older schools; regarding these men as competent to explain what they meant, it was my intention to express my dissent from it; and I wish now to be understood as so doing. Without entering at large into the reasons *why* I did this, I may state in general that I did it because, 1. I did not find it in the passages on which I was commenting, nor elsewhere in the Bible. 2. I regarded it, notwithstanding the ingenious reasoning of Edwards, whose opinion I do not readily or willingly dissent from, on any subject, as a violation of the principles of common sense, and at war with the common apprehensions of men. All our notions of *identity* are confounded by it, and all our views of justice destroyed. If an identity can be "arbitrarily" constituted between Adam and his posterity, it may be between any two or more individuals of that race, and *justice* would be confounded and perverted forever. It would be impossible to have any clear and determinate notions of moral agency, of law, of the use of conscience or consciousness; would confound all our conceptions of justice, and all ideas of distinct personality, and throw society into a common mass, where an arbitrary being might cause his judgments to descend on any individuals on whom he might choose to charge the crime, and over whom he might choose to distribute criminality. Every man feels that identity cannot be thus constituted; and to attempt to make

laws, under such a system of things, would be a burlesque on legislation. 3. I supposed that the doctrine was abandoned by the great mass of ministers and members of the Presbyterian Church, and was held by few in these times. And 4. I found that it was expressly abandoned and disclaimed by those whom I had been accustomed to regard as my instructors in the doctrines of religion. Thus the *Biblical Repertory* expressly disclaims it. [Vol. ii. p. 90.] Speaking of Adam's sin, it is said that "his voluntary act may be reckoned that of his descendants not indeed *strictly* and *properly*, [for those not born could not perform an act."] And again, vol. ii. p. 436—"We deny that his act was properly and personally our act; and that the *moral turpitude* of that sin was transferred to us." The doctrine here is, that men are not blameworthy or *ill-deserving* on account of the sin of Adam. 5. The conductors of the Biblical Repertory inform us that *this* is the prevalent and uniform doctrine of "old Calvinists of different denominations" in this country. And again, [vol. ii. p. 448,] they say, "the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin includes neither the idea of any mysterious union of the human race with him, so that his sin is strictly and properly theirs, nor that of a transfer of moral character." And in vol. ii. p. 91, they say that "personal acts cannot be transferred;" and that "the *ill desert* of one man cannot be transferred to another;" which is saying, in almost so many words, that we cannot be regarded as *ill-deserving* or *criminal*, for the sin of Adam—the very doctrine which I designed to teach. See also Bib. Rep. iii. p. 410. 6. The same thing is stated, and the same doc-

trine of the older Calvinists rejected, in a Tract on Presbyterianism by Dr. Miller, published by the "Doctrinal Tract Society of the Synod of Philadelphia," pp. 36, 37.

The second theory on the subject of imputation is the following; and is supposed to be a very prevalent opinion in the Presbyterian Church. It consists in the doctrine that the sin of Adam is not reckoned or imputed to his posterity as *truly* and *properly theirs*, as that for which they are blameworthy or ill-deserving, but is theirs simply by imputation, or putatively; that a sin is reckoned to them, or charged on them, which they never committed, and that they are subjected to punishment for that sin without being personally or really to blame. A part of this punishment is said to consist in *the sin itself* with which man comes into the world, and a part in the penal sufferings to which he is subjected in this life and the world to come, and which are in all respects the same as if the infant had himself committed the sin. This is said to be by a sovereign arrangement of God appointing Adam to be in all respects the representative of his posterity. This statement is that which is made in the Biblical Repertory, vol. ii. p. 90—"his (Adam's) voluntary act may be reckoned that of his descendants, not indeed strictly and properly, [for those not yet born could not perform an act,] but *imputatively*, or by imputation; for this act was not only imputed to Adam, but to all his posterity." Again. "To impute a sin, is to hold the person bound to suffer punishment." Idem. Again, p. 91. "Although the ILL-DESERT of one man cannot be transferred to another,

the punishment due to one can be inflicted on another." Again, vol. iii. p. 410, "Hereditary depravity follows as a penal evil from Adam's sin, and is not the ground of its imputation to men." So Dr. Miller, p. 36, as referred to above. It would be easy to go on to almost any length in making quotations to show that this is now the current doctrine in the Presbyterian Church.

In regard to this doctrine I may observe:

1. That it is an abandonment of the ground of the older Calvinists. It is expressly stated that they do not regard the race as Edwards, Stapfer, &c. did, as one with Adam, by a personal identity constituted by God; it is affirmed that his sin is *not* truly and properly ours; that the *ill-desert* of that sin is *not* transferred to us; that we are *not* really and properly *criminal* for it. Now, this is an evident and open departure from the doctrines of the older Calvinists on the subject, who held, as we have seen, that the sin is *truly* and *properly ours*, and that God reckons it to us because it properly belongs to us as our own. Turretin says, "The ill-desert of Adam is transferred to his posterity," Bib. Rep. vol. iii. p. 436. This theory says it is not.

2. This theory appears, at least, to be a departure from the Confession of Faith. The language of the standards of our church was evidently derived from the theory, that the sin of Adam *was* truly and properly ours. Thus it says, "All mankind sinned in him, and fell with him."

3. It employs the word *impute* in an unscriptural sense. In the Bible, the word denotes to reckon, to

charge on, to impute according to truth, not according to falsehood. God's reckonings are according to *truth*, and not according to error; and when God reckons a creature *to have* committed an act, it is only where the act *has*, in fact, been committed: where he imputes sin to man, it is only where sin exists. He, indeed, *reckons* man to be so connected with Adam, as to be involved in the consequences of his sin; ***but this is to reckon things as they are, and not as they are not.*** In the theory which we are now considering, man is *reckoned* as having committed a sin, which, in the same breath, we are told he *never committed;* he is charged with a crime, for which, in the same breath, we are told he is not to blame; he is punished, and reckoned fit to be punished for an offence, in which, at the same moment, we are told he had no agency. Now, whatever *other* objections may be against this theory, and whatever may be said in its favor, one thing is certain, it is a departure from the Scripture meaning of the word impute. In *all* cases, the Hebrew hashab and the Greek logizomai mean, to reckon, and esteem, and impute things *as they are*, and not according to falsehood: not *to set over*, or to charge on a man, what does not belong to him. This will be seen to be the sense of the word, by examining the places where it occurs. In the Old Testament, the word hashab, rendered by the word logizomai occurs only in the following places: 1 Sam. xviii. 25; Est. viii. 3; ix. 24, 25; Isa. liii. 3, 4; xxxiii. 8; Jer. xlix. 20; l. 45; Lam. ii, 8; 2 Sam. xiv. 13, 14; Jer. xlix. 30; Gen. l. 20; Job xxxv. 2; Eze. xxxviii. 10; Jer. xviii. 8; Psa. x. 2; xxi. 12; cxli. 3, 5; Jer. xi. 19; xlviii. 2;

Amos vi. 5; Jer. xxvi. 3; Micah ii, 3; Neh. i. 11; Jer. xviii. 11; Job xiii. 34; xli. 19, 24; Ps. xxxii. 2; xxxv. 5; Isa. x. 7; Job. xix. 11; xxxiii. 10; Gen. xvi. 6; xxxviii. 15; 1 Sam. i. 13; Ps. lii. 4; Jer. xviii. 8; Zech. vii. 10; Job vi. 40; xix. 16; Isa. xiii. 17; 1 Kings x. 21. Num. xviii. 27, 30; Ps. lxxxviii. 4; Isa. xl. 17; Lam. iv. 2; Isa. xl. 15; Gen. xxxii. 6. The word, properly, means *to think, intend, or purpose—to imagine, invent, or devise—to reckon, or account—to esteem, or impute* what belongs to one, or to reckon it *as* belonging to him. By examining all these passages, it will be found, that whenever *it is applied to God*, it always denotes *to reckon, or esteem, or impute things just as* THEY ARE—and not falsely, or as they are not. Applied to God, it *never* means that he charges on man that which does not belong to him, or that which *ought* not to be charged to him. The word occurs about forty times in the New Testament, and always in a similar sense. A single illustratiou from a well-known and often-quoted passage, may express the sense of this word in the Scriptures. In the epistle to Philemon, ver. 18, Paul says of Onesimus—"If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee aught, put that on mine account" —touto emoi ellogai—impute it, or reckon it to me. This passage is often adduced, as teaching, that that was to be reckoned to a man which did not belong to him; that the word *impute* may denote to charge that on a man which is not his own; and that, therefore, as this was done in this case, it might be proper for God to do this on those who are personally innocent. The argument is, that if it might be done in charging on Paul a *wrong*, or *debt*,

which was not his own, then it might be done by an arbitrary arrangement on the personally innocent posterity of Adam. But the fallaciousness of this reasoning may be seen, from two considerations.—1. Paul ASSUMED the wrong and the debt *before* it was to be charged on him, or imputed to him. This intermediate step of *assumption* is a very material one, and changes the whole face of the affair. When a man *assumes* a debt, and *promises* to pay it, it becomes *his own debt;* it is *due from him;* he binds himself to pay it; and though the debt was not contracted by him at first, yet it is *his* by assumption; and the law, *therefore*, holds him bound to pay it. So in the case of the "wrong" which had been done by Onesimus. It was not true, that Paul had committed it: but he *assumed* the consequences, and undertook to make them good. The reckoning, or imputation in this case, was, therefore, strictly in accordance with the truth. Paul *assumed* a debt, or a wrong, which he had not done personally, and it was to be reckoned to him *as assumed*—that is, JUST AS IT WAS, and not falsely. So, if a man *assumes* the crime of Adam, or *assents* to it, it may be reckoned to him just as it is—that is, *as* assumed, or assented to. The propriety of this view is apparent, from another consideration. 2. Suppose this wrong, or debt, had been charged on Paul by Philemon, *without* Paul's having assumed it. Suppose, that, by an "arbitrary" arrangement, he had held him answerable for the debt, and had prosecuted him for it—is there any doubt how a court or jury would decide the case? Would there not be demanded evidence, that the debt was for a valuable

consideration rendered to him, or had been assumed by him, and that he had bound himself to pay it? No two juries that could be empannelled on the face of the earth, would decide differently on the case. Or suppose that the "wrong" which Onesimus had done to Philemon had been slander, or the seduction of his wife, and that Philemon had *charged* or *imputed* the offence to Paul, without any expression of his assuming it: suppose that Philip had held Paul answerable for the offence, and had published him as a slanderer or seducer—could there be any difference of opinion among men as to this course? Would it be possible to form two judgments in regard to it? And would not the world look with abhorrence on the charge? The simple truth, then, is, that things were *reckoned just as they were;* and that the word reckon, or impute, here means this, and this only. The offence was committed, not by Paul, but by Onesimus. Paul *assumed* it, and it was reckoned *just as it was*, AS ASSUMED. And so in regard to all the arrangements of the divine government.

4. It is a violation in almost express terms of the principles of the divine government, as laid down in the Bible. Ezek. xviii. 2, 3, 4, 19, 20: "What mean ye that ye use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge?" That is, "Why do you charge this as a principle of the divine administration, that the children are punished for the sins of their parents?" That this is the sense is evident, and to reply to this accusation, *i. e.* to *deny* it, is the object of the chapter. "As I live, saith the Lord God,

ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel. Behold all souls are mine: as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine; *the soul that sinneth, it shall die;*" that is, he shall not die, or be punished for the sin of his father, but because he is personally a sinner. He shall not be held to be blameworthy, or be punished for the sin of another, but because he is himself a transgressor, and deserves to die. "Yet ye say, Why? Doth not the son bear the iniquity of the father?" This is the objection of the dissatisfied Jew; charging the government of God with injustice, and cruelty; *and that charge is, that the son bears the iniquity, or is punished for the sin of his father.* To this God replies: "The soul that sinneth IT shall die. THE SON SHALL NOT BEAR THE INIQUITY OF HIS FATHER; NEITHER SHALL THE FATHER BEAR THE INIQUITY OF THE SON. This is the great, and just, and glorious principle of the divine administration; a principle stated expressly in opposition to the charge that the innocent are punished for the crimes of the guilty; and designed forever to free the divine government from that accusation. It would be impossible in stronger language to state the principle. The same principle is stated in Deut. xxiv. 16: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; *every man shall be put to death for his own sin.*" Com. 2 Kings xiv. 5, 6; Eze. xxxiii. 10, 11, 12.

5. It is an abandonment of the old system, which, system was at least *consistent* in its use of language. The theory has retained the *fragments* of a system,

and its *language*, but without retaining the *at least* CONSISTENT theory of the scholastic theology in which it was founded. When the old divines used the word *impute*, they understood its Scripture sense, and its common usage, as denoting *charging on a man that which properly belonged to him.* Hence they invented the theory of the strict and proper *oneness*, or *identity* with Adam, and said that his sin is truly and properly *ours*, and THEREFORE is charged on us. There the theory was consistent, and the language Scriptural—whatever may be said of the theory. When they talked of *guilt*, they meant obligation to *punishment*, not obligation to *suffering*—and to punishment for sins deserved by the fact that the sin of Adam *is* truly and properly ours. When they spoke of *punishment*, they used the word in its common signification as denoting a just suffering of penal evils, for sin of which they were *justly* charged because it was their own.

But in the theory now under consideration, we have the *fragments* only of a system; we have *words* dissevered from their proper signification; and doctrines, the absurdity of which were seen as clearly by the older divines as they can be now. We hear in this system of God's imputing to men sins which in no proper sense belong to them—thus departing wholly from the Scripture use of language; we hear of God's *punishing* them for sin when the sin is not strictly their own, and when they are not "ill-deserving;" we hear of their being bound to punishment, or guilty, when they are not "blameworthy:" we hear of *representation* in a sense contrary to that which is used in language of men, and in all the doctrines of

agencies, without the consent or knowledge of these represented; and all this by an arbitrary arrangement of God, unlike any thing which actually occurs elsewhere on earth. Now whatever may be the defects of the old system, it has manifestly many advantages over this. It has the merit of consistency. It retains the Scripture use of language. It uses words as they are employed in common life. So the profound mind of Edwards saw; and greatly as *I* dislike that system, it has so many *consistencies* over that now under notice, that I should greatly prefer it to that which in our time has supplanted it.

6. The theory is liable to a sixth objection, that it makes *sin* both cause and effect. It teaches that the *sin itself*, with which men are born is a *punishment* for Adam's sin. The punishment according to one view is *before* the crime—that is, it is before ill-desert, or criminality; by another, it is regarded as an *effect*, whose cause had no existence. Men are punished *by* sin, *for* a sin which they did not commit, and which is in no sense strictly theirs. But how can justice make punishment precede transgression or ill-desert? How can it be right to *create* sin in the soul as a *punishment* for the sin of another? How can we conceive a higher absurdity, than that the holy God should *create* sin in the heart of innocence, as a punishment for the crime of another, charged or imputed arbitrarily on the soul personally innocent, or not personally ill-deserving?

7. The theory explains nothing. It throws no light on a very dark and abstruse subject. It greatly encumbers the plain and acknowledged facts in the case

by all the additional embarrassment of a theory which is at variance with the Scripture; with the common use of language, and the common sense of men. It is far less difficnlt to admit the simple facts in the case, with all their difficulties, than it is with the addition of a theory that is more embarrassing than the facts themselves, and that explains nothing. For the question, on each application of this theory of imputation to explain the facts, instantly arises, "How can the theory itself be vindicated? How can it be *just* in God to charge that on men which they never committed, and to hold them responsible for, and to punish them for, an act in which they have incurred no *ill-desert*? And how does this *additional* difficulty release us from embarrassment in regard to the fact?"

8. It is mere theory. The doctrine, it is believed, is not to be found in the Scriptures. We may safely leave it to the common sense of the whole world. Not a man, it is presumed, can find the elements of this theory in the Bible. The theory, without caricature, is, that a sin is *imputed* to us, or charged on us, which is not strictly and properly ours. That this is in virtue, if a *representation* in Adam, who acted for us, without our knowledge and consent. That we are held *guilty* for a sin which in no sense we committed, without being chargeable at all with ill-desert. That we are *punished* for a crime which we did not commit; and which is admitted to be in no proper sense our own. That the *punishment* consists in part in *sin* itself with which we are born, and existing previous to moral agency. And yet that, for this sin, we are not bound to exercise repentance, and for it we

cannot repent. (Bib. Rep. vol. ii. 460.) As an instance of the *effect* of this doctrine in perplexing and troubling the minds of men, I beg leave to read the passage, as well as to show that while it is held that men are *punished*, they are *punished* in such circumstances that they neither *can*, nor are expected *to be sorry* for that on account of which they are punished. "We have been frequently asked by young men, if we have ever repented of Adam's sin, and have uniformly, to their obvious discomfit, answered in the negative. Knowing the sense in which the question was put, it would have confirmed their misconceptions, to have answered otherwise. We have never so appropriated that sin as to recognise it as properly and personally our own, or as the ground of personal remorse. We have always considered this question as unreasonable as it would be to ask us, if we ever felt self-approbation and complacency for the imputed righteousness of Christ."

9. It is a doctrine which will, if preached, greatly embarrass a man's ministry; produce ease in sin; hinder the progress of the gospel; and disgust men of common understanding with Christianity. Let a minister proclaim that his hearers are one with Adam, and then common sense will revolt at it. Let them be told that they are personally ill-deserving for his conduct, committed six thousand years before they were born, and that they acted then, and the infidel will smile. Let them be told that God charges on them a sin which they did *not* commit, and they will say that his charges are confessedly not according to truth, and that it is absurd that they should

be held answerable for a crime which they know they did not commit, and for which they are told in the same breath, they ought not to repent. No man would preach this in a revival of religion; no one to an anxious sinner, when he should ask what he must do to be saved. Our Saviour never taught it to his disciples; nor did Peter or Paul proclaim it, when men trembled under the consciousness of their own crimes, and when they asked what they must do to be saved.

I add, (10) That the doctrine, as so stated, has been long abandoned by a very large portion of the most able, pious, and useful ministers in this country. It is well known that it has not been held for many years, either among the orthodox in New-England, or by a very considerable portion of the ministers of the Presbyterian Church. I may be permitted here to adduce the testimony of a man of deservedly high reputation; a man never suspected of a departure from orthodoxy; and a man whose authority is high, not only in New-England, but in the Presbyterian Church—the Rev. Dr. Woods, of Andover. He says: "*The imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity*, in any sense which those words naturally and properly convey, is a doctrine which we do not believe. In Scripture, the word *impute* signifies uniformly, if I mistake not, charging or reckoning to a man that which is his own attribute or act. Every attempt which has been made to prove that God ever imputes to man any sinful disposition or act, which is not strictly *his own*, has, in my judgment, failed of success." Letters to Unitarians, pp. 44, 45. In stating,

therefore, my dissent from this doctrine, I did not suppose that I was departing from the Bible; from the sentiments of the great mass of orthodox divines; or from the essential doctrines of the Confession of Faith. For the Confession is explicit. It does not say that the first SIN of Adam is charged to his posterity, but that the GUILT of that sin is so charged on them. And understanding the word *guilt* as an obligation to suffer evils which were designed to express the Divine displeasure against the sin, I have not denied it, and do not deny it.

The only other form of doctrine relating to the transaction with Adam, which it is needful to notice, is, that which I have stated under the previous "charge," and which it was my design to teach. It consists in the admission of the simple *facts*, as they occur, and in the simple statement of the *facts* in the Bible, without an attempt to *explain* them by either the theory of *personal oneness* with Adam, or of charging on man that which in no sense properly belongs to him. If then it be asked, whether I hold that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity? I answer, that if by the doctrine it be meant that there was a personal identity between Adam and his posterity, so that his sin became truly and properly theirs, I do not hold it; and in rejecting it, I concur with all, or nearly all, the ministers of the present day. If this were so, then the sin of the posterity of Adam would be *actual*, and not original; it would be *personal*, and not a derived corrupted nature.

Again: If by imputation it be meant that the personal qualities of Adam were transferred, or set over

to his posterity; or transfused into the essence of the soul; I answer, that I do not hold it. The theory is impossible, and the whole church denies any such transfer. Any transfer of personal qualities is utterly impossible, and any such doctrine is absurd.

If it be asked, whether men are ill-deserving and blameworthy for the sin of Adam; that they are so regarded by God, and so treated; I answer, that I do not believe it; and in denying it, I concur with the most eminent and orthodox divines in the land; with the Bible, the Confession of Faith, and with common sense.

If I be asked, then, whether I reject the doctrine of imputation, I answer *no*. No doctrine is more common in the Scriptures; and few words are more frequently used than the word *impute*. But I hold it as a great principle, that is never to be departed from, and which will shape all a man's views of the divine government, THAT ALL GOD'S IMPUTATIONS ARE ACCORDING TO TRUTH, and NONE OF THEM UNJUST OR FALSE. He does not reckon that I stretched forth my hand in Paradise, and plucked and ate the forbidden fruit, for it was not so; and to reckon it so, would be contrary to the historical fact. But *God reckons, or imputes, things just as they are.* Step by step, and point by point, he imputes things just as they occur. He reckoned [1.] that Adam was pure and holy when created; [2.] that he was at the head of the race; and on trial for human nature; [3.] that if he fell, all would fall; [4.] that he actually fell, and brought death into the world and all our wo; [5.] that his fall, according to the wise law, or constitution of things,

which he had ordained, would involve all his posterity in ruin; [6.] that his posterity are, in consequence of his sin, born with a nature corrupt, depraved, and prone to sin; [7.] that their first moral acts, and all their moral acts, in this world or in any other, would be wrong, unless they are renewed; [8.] that man should be subjected to a curse, and the earth be subjected to a curse, and a long train of woes be introduced as a consequence of the sin from which nothing would deliver but an atonement; [9.] that all this was necessary as a proper expression of his hatred of the transgression of Adam; as evincing his displeasure in the most marked and decided manner in which it was possible; and that these are inflictions of a righteous lawgiver, descending on men according to an arrangement which is wise, and which *might* have resulted in the eternal felicity of the great society of which Adam was the head and father. In all this God reckons things just as they are, and as they ought to be reckoned; and *all* his imputations are according to truth. In such a reckoning, or imputation, I assuredly believe. I may add, that I have always intended to reject the doctrine of the Pelagians and Socinians, and wish now to be understood as rejecting them—that men sin only by imitation and example. On this subject it would be easy to quote largely from my book, and the extracts already referred to are satisfactory. Much has been gained by the discussion on this point during the few years past. It is now conceded on all hands, that it is not to be held or taught by *any* class of theologians, either (1.) that men are to *blame*, or are to be esteemed *blame-*

worthy, or *ill-deserving*, for the sin of Adam; and (2.) as a consequence, that they are not to be called on to *repent* for this sin. In all the statements which are to be made on this subject, let these points be conceded and kept constantly in view, and all controversy will cease. All that the new school brethren have been struggling for, is, the doctrine that men are *not* to be represented as *to blame*, or as *ill-deserving*, for a sin committed long before they were born, and that they are not to be called on to repent of it. With all the statements of these brethren respecting the *facts* in the case—the exposure to sin, and death, and calamity, and wo, in consequence of that sin, they agree; and, with this understanding, they can labor and act together in harmony and in love.

My defence, under this charge, is, (1.) That the Confession of Faith no where says, either that the "first SIN of Adam," or any other SIN of Adam, was imputed to his posterity. The framers of this Confession used language accurately and definitely. Had they intended to have conveyed that doctrine, that language would have been used. But *their* language is definite and clear. They say that the "GUILT of his sin was imputed." Though this difference may *appear* to be small, yet it is as wide as is conceivable. To impute a *sin* to a man which he never committed, is one thing; to impute the GUILT of that sin, that is, an obligation or exposedness to judicial suffering on account of it, is another thing. The latter is the doctrine of our Confession, and of the Bible; the former is no where taught in either. Had the *real* language of the Confession on this subject been regarded;

had there been always accurate study of its precise and very definite expressions; no small part of the difficulties which have arisen in the Presbyterian Church, would have been avoided. (2.) I have not taught any thing contrary to what the Confession teaches on this subject. If what is meant then by the phrase, "the guilt of his sin is imputed," or reckoned to his posterity, be, that they are liable, as they come into the world, to evils which are designed to express God's abhorrence of sin; that they are born with a depraved nature; that they will sin as soon as they begin to act as moral agents, whenever that may be, and in whatever world they may be placed; that without renewal they cannot be saved, and that all this is designed to exhibit God's abhorrence of sin, then I have not denied it—but have taught it. That all the sufferings to which the posterity of Adam are subjected, in consequence of his sin, are designed as evils of a judicial nature, intended to set forth his abhorrence of the crime, I have no doubt. When the family of Achan was destroyed for his sin, I have no doubt that it was intended to exhibit the abhorrence which God had of the deed. When the family of the drunkard suffer for the sin of their father, I have no doubt that it is the design of God to express his abhorrence in this way of the offence, and to make this affecting appeal to *all* fathers, to deter them from the crime. When the property of the traitor is confiscated, and his blood attainted, and his family reduced to poverty and disgrace, I have no doubt that it is all done that the law may express its abhorrence of the crime of treason. So far, it is a judicial infliction; not

regarding the sufferers as blameworthy—except the traitor himself—but making use of the "social liabilities," where other means could not be resorted to, to express the deep sense of the crime, and to deter from its commission. As this is the only sense in which a posterity can be said to be "guilty" of the crime of an ancestor, it must be so understood in the Confession of Faith. This doctrine I have never denied. My only objection has ever been to the use of the word "*guilt*" in common discourse, on the ground that it is usually understood to convey the sense of *blameworthiness* or *ill-desert*.

In regard to this charge, the following alterations have been made in the fourth edition of the Notes on the Romans:

P. 121, second col. line 4th from the bottom, instead of "For to say that I am guilty of another in which I had no agency," read, "For to say that I am blameworthy, or ill-deserving, for a sin in which I had no agency."

P. 119. "*The very expression* here is against the supposition that infants are intended. One form of the doctrine of imputation, as held by Edwards, Stapfer, &c., has been, that there was a constituted oneness or personal identity between Adam and his posterity; and that his sin was regarded as truly and properly theirs; and they as personally blameworthy or ill-deserving for it, in the same manner as a man at forty is answerable for his crime committed at twenty. If this doctrine be true, then it is certain that they not only *had* 'sinned' after the similitude of 'Adam's transgression,' but had *committed the very identical* and that they were answerable for it as their

own. But this doctrine is now abandoned by all, or nearly all, who profess to be Calvinists, and as the apostle expressly says that they had *not* sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, it cannot be intended here.

Charge VII.

The seventh charge is that I deny "that mankind are guilty, *i. e.* liable to punishment on account of the sin of Adam."

Proof 1. p. 123. "There is no reason to believe that they are *condemned* to eternal death, or held to be guilty of his sin, without participation of their own, or without personal sin, any more than there is that they are approved by the work of Christ, or held to be personally deserving, without embracing his offer, and receiving him as a Saviour."

Proof 2, p. 127. The word is *in no instance* used to express the idea of *imputing that to one which belongs to another*. It here either means that this was *by a constitution of divine appointment* that they in fact became sinners, or simply declares that they *were* so in fact. There is not the slightest intimation that it was by imputation. The whole scope of the argument is, moreover, against this; for the object of the apostle is to show not that they were charged with the sin of another, that they were in fact *sinners* themselves. If it means that they were condemned for *his* act, without any concurrence of their own will, then the correspondent part will be true, that all are constituted righteous in the same way; and thus the doctrine of universal salvation will be inevitable. But as none are constituted righteous who do not voluntarily avail themselves of the provisions of mercy, so it follows that those who are condemned, are not condemned for the sin of another without their own concurrence, nor unless they personally deserve it.

Sinners.—Transgressors; those who deserve to be punished. It does not mean those who are condemned for the sin of another; but those who are violators of the law of God. All who are condemned are *sinners*. They are not *innocent* persons condemned for the crime of another. Men may be involved in the *consequences* of the sins of others without being to blame. The consequences of the crimes of a murderer, a drunkard, a pirate, may pass over from them, and affect thousands, and whelm them in ruin. But this does not prove that they are blameworthy."

Proof 3, p. 128. "Various attempts have been made to explain

this. The most common has been that Adam was the representative of the race; that he was a covenant head, and that his sin was *imputed* to his posterity, and that they were held liable to punishment for it as if they had committed it themselves. But to this there are great and insuperable objections. *** (3.) It explains nothing. The difficulty still remains. It is certainly *as* difficult to see how, in a just administration, the sins of the guilty should be charged on the innocent, as to contemplate simply the universal fact that the conduct of one man may involve his family in the consequences. (4.) It adds another difficulty to the subject. It not only *explains* nothing, removes no perplexity, but it compels us at once to ask the question, how can this be just? How can it be right to charge the sins of the guilty on those who had no participation in them? How could millions be responsible for the sins of one who acted long before they had an existence, and of whose act they had no consciousness, and in which they had no participation?"

"How can it be right" for a person to advance such doctrines, who has professed to believe the Confession of Faith and Catechisms of the Presbyterian Church? Read the following passages and then answer.

Con. VI. iii. vi. Lar. Cat. 25. 27. Sh. Cat. 18, 19.

After the full examination which I have submitted of the preceding charges, it is not necessary to occupy much time on this. Probably the main *facts* in the case, in relation to the effects of the transgression of Adam on his posterity, would not constitute a point of difference between Dr. Junkin and myself. Our difference here relates to *terms;* and it is idle to waste words in a mere logomachy.

Dr. Junkin holds that we are "liable to punishment" on account of the sin of Adam. It is of importance, therefore, that there should be here a correct explanation of *terms*.

If he means by the phrase that mankind come into the world with a certainty that they will sin when they become moral agents, I have not denied it.

If he means that they are born with a hereditary depravity, or propensity, or liability to sin, resulting from their connexion with Adam, I have not denied it.

If he means that they will suffer; that they will be exposed to many disadvantages; that they will experience pain and death, in consequence of that connexion, and of the same kind as if they had themselves sinned, I have not denied it.

If he means that these sufferings are suitable for the moral governor of the universe to inflict in order to express his abhorrence for sin, and his sense of its ill-desert, I have not denied it. For I have never doubted that the privations and losses; the hereditary tendency to sin; the shame, disgrace, and loss of character and property which ensue to the posterity of a drunkard, a pirate, and a murderer, are designed, on the great principles of the organization of society, as an expression of God's abhorrence of those crimes, and as an incentive to virtue by the apprehension that these calamities will follow. In no other way, for example, could the evil consequences, and the criminality of *suicide* be made to appear than by causing the consequences of the act to pass over and terminate on the reputation and feelings, and property of posterity. The self-murderer, by his own act, removes himself from all punishment on earth, and from all expression in his own person here of God's sense of his crime. But some such expressions are needed in order to deter *others* from the deed. Suffering and shame, therefore, are made to pass over; and impinge

on all who are connected with him. So a suitable sense of the enormity of the crime of Achan could not be expressed except by the sufferings inflicted on his family and even by the destruction of his property. So in order to express the deep abhorrence of a moral governor against the crime of treason, and to show its criminality with an emphasis beyond what the death of the traitor himself could do, the law appoints sufferings and disadvantages in relation to his family. His property is confiscated, his blood attainted, and the honors and titles that would otherwise have descended to his heirs, are withdrawn. It is the only way in which the proper sense of the enormity of the crime can be expressed so as to deter others. In the *facts* in the case, therefore, there can be no controversy. But when it should be insisted that the family of Achan was *guilty* of his crime, and were "*punished*" for it; when, as in order to be consistent, it must be held that "the silver and the garment, and the wedge of gold—and his oxen, and his asses, and his sheep, and his tent, and all that he had," Josh. vii. 24, that were destroyed in consequence of his crime were "guilty" also, and were "*punished*," our objection is to the use of the *language*, and not to the facts in the case. Should it be said that the descendants of a traitor were guilty of his act of treason, and that they were *punished* for it, we might agree in regard to the *facts;* our difference would pertain only to the proper use of language. So in regard to Adam. In the main facts, we agree. But when it is said that *all* the evil consequence of his act, and all the sufferings that have ensued are to be set down as *punish-*

ment, and that all that are effected by them are *guilty* of his sin, we at once revolt at this use of language, and ask how *can* the groaning creation be said to be *punished*—the beasts of the field, and the very earth bringing forth briars and thorns? Is the earth *guilty*, and are the hills and vales *punished*?

The only inquiry, therefore, here is, what is meant by *guilt* and by *punishment*?

I would observe then, that the words *guilt* and *punishment* are by no means to be confounded with the words criminality, or ill-desert. I shall endeavor to show that *guilt* always supposes criminality, and is based on it; but it is not the same. It may be defined to be an obligation to punishment *for personal criminality*. Here is the difference between Dr. Junkin and myself. He supposes that it is an obligation to punishment *without* personal criminality, or ill-desert. I maintain that it always, when correctly used, implies personal ill-desert that is the measure of the punishment due. In other words, he supposes that a man may be said to be *punished* for a crime which is not his own, but which is charged on him by imputation; I maintain that it *always* implies personal ill-desert, and that any other use of the term is a departure from the correct use of language. In support of this, I shall appeal to modern usage, and to the old theological usage, and thus show that there is a real departure in many modern views from the ancient theological *language* of the schools as well as from their *doctrines*.

1. *Guilt*, from *gildan*, to pay, is defined to be "criminality; that state of a moral agent which results

from his actual commission of a crime or offence, knowing it to be a crime, a violation of law. Guilt renders a person a debtor to the law as it binds him to pay a penalty in money or in suffering. Guilt therefore implies both criminality, and liableness to punishment."— *Webster*. The idea here is, that the liableness to punishment results from *the actual commission of a crime or offence*. *Punishment* is defined to be "any pain or suffering inflicted on a person *for a crime or offence*, by the authority to which the offender is subject, either by the constitution of God, or of civil society."— *Webster*. In this definition the necessity of a *crime or offence* is declared in order to make suffering, *punishment*.

2. The same is the use of the terms in common life, and in law. When a jury find a man *guilty*, it is not merely a finding him liable to *suffer*, but it is a finding that he has committed a *crime*, or *offence*, and is *therefore* justly liable to punishment. A jury or court never think of separating the idea of *personal offence, or crime*, from their ideas of *punishment*. The whole system of jurisprudence, as is known to all, is founded on this. The idea, once introduced into the laws and courts, of finding men guilty of offences which they never committed, and exposing them to punishment where there was no criminality, would shock the moral sense of the community, and be regarded as the very definition and summit of tyranny. Blackstone defines *punishment* to be "the right of the temporal legislator to inflict discretionary penalties for *crimes and misdemeanors*," [vol. iv. 7,] and sustains his definition by the whole of his reasoning in this

chapter. Lord Coke, than whom no man better understood the precise meaning of terms, quotes it as a maxim of law, that "no one is punished for the sin of another." Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto. Coke upon Littleton, vol. iii. p. 368. Grotius [de Jure Bel. et Pa. B. ii. ch. xx. § 1,] says, that punishment is an evil of suffering which is inflicted on account of the evil of an action. Malum passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis. It is an ancient maxim, he observes, that "he who does evil shall bear it." Idem, § 2. Qui male fecit malum ferat. Those evils, he says, which were suffered among the Hebrews on account of a contagious disease, or a deformed or mutilated body, or other disparities, "are not properly punishment, although on account of resemblance, and abuse of the term, they are called by that name." § 1. Thus Grotius also quotes Augustine as saying that "all punishment, if it is just, is the punishment of sin." Omnis poena, si justa est, peccati poena est. § 3. And in regard to the word *guilt*, he quotes from Augustine the doctrine that, under the divine government, guilt exists where punishment is not seen to follow. Latet culpa ubi non latet poena. § 3. And again B. ii. ch. xx. § 28, Grotius expressly says, that "no one is to be punished beyond his ill-desert," and appeals to Horace, to Cicero, to Aristides, and to Demosthenes. The doctrine in the *laws*, it is believed, is established beyond the possibility of dispute.

3. The same is the doctrine of the Bible. I appeal here to the *general* aspect and tenor of the Scriptures as sustaining the position that *punishment* is to be regarded as the evil inflicted by a just moral governor

for personal offence. And we may safely challenge any man to bring any place, where the words implying guilt and punishment, are used in any other sense. There is no place where it is affirmed that men are *punished* for the sins of another; and were there, it would be such a departure from the common use of language, and from the obvious principle of common justice, as to neutralize no small part of all the proofs that could be brought for the truth of a divine revelation. I appeal particularly to the doctrine laid down in Eze. xviii. 3, 4, 19, 20, as in accordance with all our views of justice, and as expressly disclaiming the idea of inflicting *punishment* on men for the sins of their ancestors. Thus the Latin *reus* and *reatus* retain the idea of a *debt* which is due, and which a defendant is justly bound to pay; or of guilt or criminality, which *deserves* to be punished, and which is so adjudged in law. Thus, in the New Testament, the word enochos, *guilty*, retains the idea of binding, or obligation, enechomai, to punishment. It occurs ten times. When (Matth. xxvi. 66,) the Jews said "he is guilty of death," they meant to say that he *deserved* to die; that they had found him *criminal* for *blasphemy*, (v. 65;) and that THEREFORE he deserved, according to their law, to be put to death. They did not intend to express simply an obligation to suffer *that which he had not deserved*, but to declare in the strongest terms possible that he *deserved* to die. When our Saviour, in Mark iii. 29, says of him that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, that "he hath never forgiveness, but is *in danger of eternal damnation*, enochos esti aionion kriseos, he did not

mean to say that he was bound to a punishment which he did not personally deserve, but that for a *criminality* in the case, he would be justly liable to that punishment. The same sense occurs in 1 Cor. xi. 27: "Shall be *guilty* of the body and blood of the Lord," *i. e.* their conduct at the Lord's table, in the case specified, would be so blameworthy as to constitute the *crime* of despising his body. See also Matth. v. 21, 22; Mark xiv. 64; Heb. ii. 15; James ii. 10.— In the same sense is the word used by the lxx. who employ the term enochos, *guilty*, for the translation of dom and domim, and in the sense of *deserving* punishment, in Ex. xxii. 3; Lev. xx. 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 27; Num. xxxv. 27; Deut. xix. 10; and in the same sense in Jos. ii. 19; Ex. xxxiv. 7; Num. xiv. 18; xxxv. 31, &c. The Scripture use of the word, therefore, is established.

4. The old Calvinistic writers used the word in the same sense as denoting a liability to punishment for *personal offence*, and not for the *sin of another*. They saw the common sense, and Scripture use, of language; they saw the absurdity of speaking of *guilt*, where there was no *criminality*, and of *punishment*, where there had been no personal offence, and they therefore adopted the theory of our *oneness* or *personal identity* with Adam, making his sin strictly and properly ours, and predicating the doctrine that we are exposed to *punishment* on account of it in that doctrine. Their language was consistent with these views, and though their views were erroneous about such an identity with Adam, yet their *language* is in accordance with common sense and the Bible. The

refinement of modern times seems not to have occurred to them, to deny that the sin is *ours*, that we are *ill-deserving*, and yet to talk of our *guilt* for the crime of another, and *our liableness to punishment*—for a sin which is not ours. My objection, therefore, to the language in question, is, that the mere fragments of a system are retained, without their consistency; and that thus language is torn from its proper and acknowledged meaning. There was the beauty of *consistency* in the architecture of ancient frowning castles, hoary and dark as they were—for the work was in keeping; but here we have pieces of the wainscoting, and balustrades, and frowning towers, which men insist on attaching to modern houses, and with which to grace Corinthian capitals and columns. We have language divested of its proper signification, and in defiance of all the well known usages of men in all times.

That this charge is not unfounded—that the older writers used the words guilt and punishment as based upon criminality always, and as implying an obligation to suffer *for* that, I shall now proceed to prove. For the passages, I am indebted to the Biblical Repertory, and shall take cases which are adduced there for the very opposite purpose. (Vol. ii. p..440.) Turretin (tom. i. p. 654,) says, "Reatus theologice dicitur obligatio ad poenam EX PECCATO. Guilt, among theologians, is defined to be obligation to punishment *on account of sin*." Here the fact that it is from sin, and according to it, is expressly stated, in accordance with all that I have said. Owen says, (On Justification, p. 280,) "Guilt in Scripture is *the respect* OF SIN unto *the sanction of the law* WHEREBY the SINNER be-

comes obnoxious unto punishment. Again: "The guilt of it [sin] is nothing but its respect unto punishment from the sanction of the law." Again: (On Justification, p. 280,) he says, "there can be no *obligation* to punishment, where there is no *desert* of punishment." Again: "The guilt of sin is its desert of punishment. And where is not *this*, there can be no punishment PROPERLY SO CALLED."—On Jus. p. 280.—Christian Spect. vol. iii. p. 307. So Turretin says, "The justice of God does not inflict PUNISHMENT, except on him that DESERVES it." So Ridgely says, (vol. ii. p. 119,) "Guilt is an obligation or liableness to suffer punishment FOR SIN COMMITTED."

That there is some variety of expression among the older theological writers, and some looseness of expression on this subject, I am not disposed to deny. (Con. Bib. Rep. vol. ii. p. 441, &c.) This fluctuation arose, doubtless, from the unsettled views of many of them on the subject of imputation—holding at one time the doctrine of the strict identity with Adam; and at another holding the doctrine of the imputation of his sin without such identity. When they write without reference to a theory, they use the terms guilt and punishment in the obvious sense. Thus Grotius, in his treatise, De Jure, &c., uses the words in their obvious and proper sense. When he had a controversy with Socinus, and a theory to defend, he labored to prove that the words were employed without reference to personal ill-desert. But the above quotations show, abundantly, that the proper and ancient sense of the words was that which is based on the supposition of previous personal criminality.

5. We might safely leave this whole subject to the common sense of men. Who, on hearing the word guilt, does not instantly attach the idea of personal ill-desert, or violation of law? Who, on hearing the word *punishment* does not at once think of *criminality* as laying the just foundation for it? Suffering may be intense; one man may be oppressed by another; a subject may suffer the loss of property, limbs or life, by a government: a martyr may be seen writhing at the stake, or expiring amidst the flames; a patriot may bleed on a battle-field; but unless he has violated law, and is personally ill-deserving, who would speak of his *guilt* or his *punishment*? No one. But if this is the common and popular sense of the words, it is the just sense; nor should they be used otherwise, without great and pressing necessity: If the words are used in a different sense by theological writers—as I admit they often are—then they are turned aside from their proper signification; and when so used, are exposed to all the inconvenience of being misunderstood, or of being the means of conveying an erroneous idea. It is exposed to all the inconvenience of technical language; is a departure from the common use of words; and is unintelligible to the mass of men.

6. That the common use of the terms guilt and punishment is the true use, is apparent from the fact, that in no other way could a penalty be possible or valuable. If a penalty does not denote the pain inflicted by the Lawgiver as an expression of his sense of the evil of sin, and his abhorrence of it, what could be its use, or how could it be threatened? If

not so, on what principle can it be inflicted? How can a just government be sustained, in the eyes of moral agents, if it holds those guilty who are innocent; and punishes those who have no ill-desert? This objection to the language is insuperable. Who can go and preach it? Who can appeal for its truth to the reason and common sense of men? Who can appeal in doing it to the Bible? Whose mind will not revolt at a commission requiring him to proclaim that men, under the Divine administration, are held to be guilty, who are personally innocent; and are punished without any ill-desert? And if it can be proclaimed, who can believe that it will ever commend itself to the consciences of men as a system just and equal? And is there no danger that men will regard the system which proclaims it, as at variance with all their just conceptions of a righteous government, and religion as opposed to the common sense of the world?

My reply, therefore, to this charge is, that on the facts in the case, Dr. J. and myself are agreed. That men suffer most sad evils, in consequence of the apostacy of Adam; that those evils are certain and universal; that they result from the connexion with him; and that they are the appointment of a wise and just moral governor, as an expression of the evil nature and tendency of apostacy, I do not deny. My objection is to an unauthorized theological use of language —to calling that guilt, which is not guilt; and that punishment, which is not punishment. He insists on this as essential to orthodoxy; I doubt its propriety.

The following corrections have been made of the

exceptionable passages here, in the new edition of the "Notes;" (1.) The part from p. 138 has been wholly changed. See the corrections under the 5th charge. (2.) On pages 122, 123, the following has been substituted, instead of the statement, a part of which is quoted in the charge, viz:

Pp. 122, 123. Though men are indubitably affected by the sin of Adam, as *e. g.* by being born with a corrupt disposition; with loss of righteousness; with subjection to pain and wo; and with exposure to eternal death; yet there is reason to believe, that all those who die in infancy, are, through the merits of the Lord Jesus, and by an influence which we cannot explain, changed and prepared for heaven. As nearly half the race die in infancy, therefore, there is reason to think, that in regard to this large portion of the human family, the work of Christ has more than repaired the evils of the fall, and introduced them into heaven, and that his grace has thus abounded unto many. In regard to those who live to the period of moral agency, a scheme has been introduced by which the offers of salvation may be made to them, and by which they may be renewed, and pardoned, and saved. The work of Christ, therefore, may have introduced advantages adapted to meet the evils of the fall; as man comes into the world; and the original applicability of the one be as extensive as the other. In this way the work of Christ was, in its nature, fitted to abound unto the many.

Charge VIII.

The eighth charge is in the following words, denying "That Christ suffered the proper penalty of the law, as the vicarious substitute

of his people, and thus took away legally their sins and purchased pardon."

Proof 1.—All the passages quoted under charges 6 and 7 are referred to here. If the sin of the *first* Adam is not imputed to his seed, and they are not liable to punishment on account of it; then it inevitably follows, that the sin of his seed is not imputed to the second Adam, and he punished on account of it.

Proof 2, p. 89, 90.—"In the plan of salvation, therefore, he has shown a regard to the law, by appointing his Son to be *a substitute* in the place of sinners; not to endure its precise penalty, for his sufferings were not eternal, nor were they attended with remorse of conscience, or by despair, which are the proper *penalty* of the law; but he endured so much as to accomplish the same ends as if those who shall be saved by him, had been doomed to eternal death. That is, he showed that the law could not be violated without introducing sufferings; and that it could not be broken with impunity. He showed that he had so great a regard for it, that he would not pardon *one sinner* without an atonement. And *thus* he secured the proper honor to his character as a lover of his law, a hater of sin, and a just God. He has shown, that if sinners do not avail themselves of the offer of pardon, by Jesus Christ, *they* must experience, in their own souls for ever, the pains which this substitute for sinners endured, in behalf of men, on the cross." Thus, no principle of justice has been abandoned—no claim of his law has been let down—no disposition has been evinced to do *injustice* to the universe, by suffering the guilty to escape. He is, in all this great transaction, a just moral governor, as *just* to his law, to himself, to his Son, to the universe, when he *pardons*, as he is when he sends the incorrigible sinner down to hell. A full compensation, an equivalent has been provided by the sufferings of the Savior, in the sinner's stead, and the sinner may be pardoned."

How opposite this to the doctrines of the Church. See Con. chap. viii. 4, 5; xi. 3. Larg. Cat. 49. Short. Cat. 25.

My views there are accurately expressed, and I submit them to the judgment of my Presbytery.

The charge which is here alleged is a most striking specimen of the loose and inaccurate manner in which these accusations have been framed. It contains *four* counts or specifications, only one of which relates to

the statement in my book; and the three others are *inferences* which Dr. Junkin supposes my doctrine leads to; and which, by a common mode of controversialists, he charges me with holding. To this entire proceeding, of charging me with holding certain *inferences* which he chooses to draw from my doctrine, I complain, and affirm, that in this he has done me and my character material injustice.

The specifications are [1.] That I deny "that Christ suffered the proper penalty of the law." [2.] That I deny that he was "the vicarious substitute of his people." [3.] That I deny that he "took away legally their sins." [4.] That I deny that "he purchased pardon."

I shall offer a few remarks on each of these counts. The first is, that I deny that Christ suffered the proper penalty of the law. In my Notes, (p. 89,) on which this charge is based, I specify *precisely* what I mean by this. I observe there, that according to my view of *penalty*, there are certain things included in the penalty of the law which Christ did not, and could not suffer. I specify particularly two things: [1.] that his sufferings were not *eternal;* [2.] that he did not endure remorse of conscience. These I suppose to have been a part of the proper penalty of the law; and these I then supposed, and still suppose, Christ did not and could not suffer. This seemed to me to be so plain as to be indisputable. If Dr. Junkin maintains that Christ *did* endure the precise penalty of the law, then he must hold one of two things, either that Christ *did* endure in fact *eternal sufferings*, and that his sufferings *were* attended with remorse of con-

science and despair; or he must hold that the eternity of suffering, and remorse of conscience and despair, are no part of the proper penalty of the law. If he holds the first alternative, then he maintains that which is evidently contrary to truth. Christ did not endure eternal sorrows, nor did he endure remorse of conscience. Remorse arises from the consciousness of personal criminality; but Christ was holy, harmless, and undefiled. Nor is it possible to admit for a moment that his mind was harassed and burdened with any conviction of past criminality. If it be held that remorse of conscience and eternity of sufferings are not a part of the penalty of the law, then consequences will follow, all of which I have not time to specify. A few only can be referred to. (1.) A vast amount of suffering has been introduced by transgression which the law did not threaten, and which it did not contemplate, for by far the most acute and dreadful part of the sufferings of sinners arises from remorse of conscience, and the apprehension of eternal punishment. (2.) If the law did not appoint and contemplate it, it is unjust to inflict it. It is appointing and executing that by a *post facto* regulation, which is a departure from all just views of punishment. It is essential to all just ideas of penalty or punishment, that the suffering in which an action shall involve a man shall be specified beforehand, and the subject of the government be apprized of it by a reasonable publication of the penalty. The doctrine, that a magistrate may introduce into his sentence forms or degrees of suffering which the law never contemplated and made known as its penalty, is the very definition of

tyranny, and would jeopard the rights and liberties of all men. (3.) Eternal death, according to this view, is no proper penalty of the law. If so, it will be unjust to inflict it, and if unjust, it will not be inflicted. Unless it be admitted that the *eternity* of punishment was contemplated in the penalty, it would violate all views of justice that it should be inflicted, and the doctrine of universal salvation is inevitable. But if remorse of conscience, and eternal punishment, are the penalty of the law, then it follows that Christ did not endure that strict and proper penalty.

My defence against this part of the charge is,

1. That the Bible does not affirm that Christ endured the proper penalty of the law. It affirms that he was "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world: John i. 29: that he gave himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God, Eph. v. 2: that he is the propitiation for our sins, 1 John ii. 2; iv. 10: that he made his soul an offering for sin, Isa. liii. 10: that God delivered him up for us all, Rom. viii. 32: that by him we have received the atonement, Rom. v. 11: that he has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, Gal. iii. 13—that is, being cursed by hanging on a tree: that he bare our sins in his own body on the tree, 1 Pet. ii. 24, &c., all of which passages prove that he was an atoning sacrifice; that he died in our stead; that he was a vicarious offering, and that his sufferings were efficacious to the removal of the penalty from us. But it is neither affirmed that he endured the exact penalty of the law, nor that it was needful that he should, or possible that he could do it. His sufferings were strictly and

properly a *substitute* for the sufferings of sinners who but for his atonement would have died forever. And all that was needful was that the same good should result in regard to the law, the moral character, and the government of God, which *would* have resulted from the eternal death of the guilty themselves, or, in other words, that *his* sufferings should be an equivalent for theirs.

2. That the Confession of Faith does not declare it. It indeed (Ques. Lar. Cat. 49,) says that he felt and bore the weight of God's wrath; but this must be a figurative expression denoting that he endured sorrows that were the proper expression of the wrath of God against sin—and this I do not deny. Christ was innocent and holy; God was well pleased with his work always, even when he died; Matt. iii. 17; Luke ix. 35; 2 Pet. i. 19; John xiii. 28; and it would be language which the Scriptures do not authorize, and which would be in fact blasphemy, to say that God was *angry* with his holy Son. The framers of our Confession never contemplated such a statement as that; and if not, then their expression cannot mean that Christ endured the proper, and strict, and full penalty of the law.

3. It was impossible, as I have already remarked, that he *should* endure that proper penalty. It was impossible that the eternity of torment should be endured in a limited time; impossible that he should endure remorse of conscience. It is not a fact that he suffered forever; nor is it a fact that he endured remorse of conscience.

4. If it *could* have been; if the Messiah could have

suffered a literal eternity of sufferings, yet it is an abuse of language, and a departure from all the just modes of speech, to affirm that substituted sufferings are the proper penalty of the law. On this point we meet with the same departure from the proper use of language, to which I have already adverted. *Penalty* is defined to be "the suffering in person or property which is annexed by law, or judicial decision to the commission of a crime, offence, or trespass, as a punishment."—*Webster*. In a *penalty* there is implied, therefore, the essential idea that it is for the commission of a crime, and that it is properly a punishment. Yet Christ had neither committed crimes, nor was he punished. This definition is in accordance with the idea of punishment which I have already examined, and is in strict conformity with all the transactions of men. What the law appoints, and what is determined by the magistrate as the proper expression of the evil of crime, is its penalty; and it is always supposed that this is based on the commission of crime. A substitute may pay a debt; may *remove* a penalty, but by no propriety of language can he be said to be punished.

5. If Christ *had* endured the strict penalty of the law, then the law would have no claims on us now. If the debt was fully and literally paid, and *all* the penalty removed, they for whom it was paid have a *right* to a discharge, and are *already* innocent before God. The view, therefore, which affirms that that penalty is truly paid, leads at once to all the evils of Antinomianism. It is that view on which was based the doctrine of *eternal justification*—the very essence

of Antinomianism. If the full penalty of the law has been paid, then it neither has now, nor ever has had, or will have, any claim on those for whom it has been paid; and they must ever have been regarded as justified in the sight of God. When a law or penalty is fully paid, the law has no further claims on men; and if the full penalty had been met by the substitute as really and truly as if the criminal had himself borne it, then he has a *claim* to a discharge, and his release becomes, not in any sense, a matter of grace or favor, but a matter of right. It would not be right that he should *not* be discharged. And this, too, independently of any change in him, or any expressions of repentance, or reformation of life. All that is needful for him in this view is, that he should *persuade himself* that it has been done, and he will urge it as a matter of claim and of right. The influence of these views in former times is well known. The withering and blighting influence of Antinomianism on the churches and the world has been often felt; and that effect is one proof, at least, that the doctrine is not in the Bible. The design of the Bible is to make men holy; and any doctrine that leads to lax notions of holiness, and to indulgence in sin, is *prima facie* evidence that it is contrary to the Scriptures.

6. If this doctrine be true; if it be affirmed that Christ endured the literal, complete, and proper penalty of the law, then it follows that no gain has resulted to the universe from his intervention. All that has been done has been to *transfer* the penalty, involving the same kind and degree of suffering, from the guilty to the innocent. Just as much suffering

has been endured on this supposition as though the elect had endured it in their own persons in the eternal fires of hell. And although it would argue great benevolence in him who consented that it should be transferred to himself, yet it would be evidently contrary to the spirit, and general drift of the Scriptures. The idea is there every where presented, that great advantage or gain has resulted from the sacrifice of Christ; that a vast amount of suffering in the universe has been prevented; that there will be vastly more happiness *in* the universe, taken as a whole, in consequence of his sufferings, than there would otherwise have been; and that his intervention and sacrifice was a glorious event, not only as evincing benevolence, but as actually a device by which indescribable wo might be prevented, and pain and despair greatly diminished. See Rom. v. 20, 21. But if the precise and literal penalty was borne, then none of these beneficial results would follow. The whole work can then be stated in few words—that an infinite amount of sin, and wo, and despair, has been transferred literally from the guilty to the innocent; and that the universes, taken as a whole, has endured just as much pain and despair as if no atonement had been made. It is needless to say that this view of the atonement greatly dims its moral lustre and glory, as a device for *preventing* the existence and extension of wo and despair.

7. This view is inconsistent with the doctrine of substituted sufferings. It teaches indeed the doctrine of a substituted *person;* but the Bible teaches the doctrine of substituted *sufferings;* of sufferings which

are *not* the literal and proper penalty of the law, but which come *in the place* of the penalty, and which are designed to answer the same end. His "blood," that is, his life, his sufferings, is thus represented as the ransom for many. He redeemed us to God *by his blood, i. e.* by his substituted sufferings. He is set forth as the propitiation through faith *in his blood, i. e.* in his sufferings substituted in the place of sinners. He was wounded for our transgression, he was bruised for our iniquities, and with his *stripes* are we healed, that is, his sufferings were substituted in the place of ours, and were designed to answer the same end. "Christ's satisfaction, and the merit of his whole obedience, is as effectual for our pardon, justification, and salvation, as if believers themselves had performed it; and it is imputed to them, in that it was done for their sakes, and suffered in their stead, and the fruit of it by a free donation given to them. But, 1. God is not mistaken, to judge that we obeyed or suffered when we did not. 2. God is no liar to say we did it, when he knoweth we did not. 3. If we were not the *actors* and *sufferers*, it is not possible that we should be made the *natural subjects* of the *accidents* of another's body, by any putation, estimation, or misjudging whatsoever; no, nor by any *donation* neither. It is a contradiction, and therefore an impossibility that the same individual *actions* and *passions* of which Christ's human nature was the agent, and subject so many hundred years ago, and have themselves now no existence, should, *in themselves*, I say *in themselves*, be made yours now, and you be the subject of the same accidents. 4. Therefore they can

be no otherwise given to us, but, 1. By a true estimation of the reason why Christ underwent them, viz. for our sakes as aforesaid. 2. And by a donation of the *effects* or *fruits* of them, viz. pardoning, and justifying, and saving as by them (on the terms chosen by the donor himself, and put into his Testament, or Covenant) as certainly (but not in the same manner) as if we had done and suffered them ourselves," &c. &c.—Baxter on the Life of Faith, chap. viii.

When, therefore, I denied that Christ endured the proper penalty of the law, I meant simply to say, that he did not endure its literal penalty—that he did not endure eternal sufferings, or remorse of conscience, or despair. I did not mean to deny that he was an atoning sacrifice; nor that he died in the place of sinners; nor that his sufferings were strictly a vicarious offering; nor that the law was honored and magnified; nor that his death was an equivalent for all the sinner would himself endure if he was lost. Nor did I mean to deny that his sufferings, though not strictly a *punishment*, were intended as an expression of the hatred which God has to sin. If by penal ills be meant such sufferings inflicted by a moral governor as are a proper expression of his sense of the evil of transgression, I admit and hold that Christ endured such ills. I do not believe that he held him to be guilty, *i. e.* ill-deserving and criminal, for that was impossible; I do not believe that he should be represented as "guilty," for the Bible does not use that term, and the language is abhorrent to the best feelings of the Christian heart; but I do believe that he

should be represented as dying in the place of the guilty; that his sufferings were vicarious and propitiatory; that the results or benefits of his atonement are freely first *given* to believers by God, or made over to them so that on their account they are pardoned and justified, and that they are so reckoned or imputed to them, that without them it was impossible for God to forgive sin; but that now he can do it in perfect consistency with his law, and perfections, and the stability of his moral government. I have no other hope of eternal life than that which is founded on his propitiatory offering in my stead; I have no other announcement to make to men, than that this is the only way in which they can be saved.

The second specification in the charge is, that I deny that Christ "was the vicarious substitute of his people." This is an *inference*—a most unjust one—of Dr. Junkin. In *his* view it seemed to follow that if it was held that Christ did not endure the proper penalty of the law, it would follow that THEREFORE the doctrine of his vicarious sacrifice was denied also. Whether the inference is correct, is not now the question before us. It is whether I have denied that Christ is the vicarious substitute of his people. And here I protest solemnly against the right of Dr. Junkin or any other man to draw an *inference* from my statement, and then charge me with holding the inference, and for that of being guilty of heresy. In all communities, a man has a right to state his views, and to be regarded as holding *only* those views, and not to be charged with holding what others may choose to draw from them by way of inference. It has been

conceded every where, that a man is not to be charged as holding that which to others may seem to follow from his doctrine. Even where such inferences may legitimately be drawn, they are not to be charged as his belief—for he may not see it, or may expressly disavow it; and he is to be held as answerable only for what he expressly affirms. Inferences or results may be drawn to show what his opinions may lead to, and to prove that they are erroneous; but to charge him with holding them is slander. On the principle in which Dr. Junkin has acted in this charge, all that is needful to overwhelm a man with the disgrace of holding any heretical or dangerous opinion, is for some man to draw inferences from what he has stated, to follow out his own reason or fancy into consequences which he thinks follow from the doctrines advanced; to attack any error or false opinion as a *consequence* to what is stated, and then to charge the man with holding that result, or consequence. In this way no man's character would be safe. Justice would be at an end. All kinds and forms of slander would be justified; and every man would be invited to make out his brother to be a heretic or a dangerous man. And it is time that this simple principle of justice should be regarded—that a man shall be held to be responsible only for what he *states* to be his belief. It is time that every Presbytery, and every court of justice, and every community in the land, should rebuke with no ambiguous or uncertain voice the recklessness and injustice, and cruelty involved in the habit of drawing what *inferences* any man pleases from the statements of another, and then charging them on

him as his belief. The authority of the General Assembly has once at least been brought to protect, in this way the reputation of the ministers of the gospel, and to rebuke the spirit involved in this charge which is now brought against me. "Here," say they, "it will be important to remark, that a man cannot be fairly convicted of heresy, for using expressions which may be so interpreted as to involve heretical doctrines, if they also admit of a more favorable construction. Because no one can tell in what sense an ambiguous expression is used but the speaker or writer, and he has a right to explain himself; and in such cases, candor requires that a court should favor the accused, by putting on his words the more favorable, rather than the less favorable construction.

"Another principle is, *that no man can be rightly convicted of heresy by* INFERENCE *or* IMPLICATION; that is, we must not charge an accused person with holding those consequences which may legitimately flow from his assertions." Minutes of the Assembly, vol. v. p. 220. I will just add here, that in any court of justice, an action of slander would lie against the author of this charge. It is a mere inference of his own; it is wholly unfounded; it is fitted most deeply to affect my character and influence as a minister and as a man; and I call upon the Presbytery to throw the shield of justice before me, and to vindicate my character from this deeply injurious charge.

In relation to this specification, I declare that I have never denied that Christ was the vicarious substitute of his people. In the very passage under consideration, I have taught that he *was* their substitute in

express words. "In the plan of salvation," I say, "he has shown a regard to the law by appointing his Son to be *a substitute* in the place of sinners." p. 89. And throughout these "Notes," and in all my writings, I have maintained it with all the talent which God has given me, and with a constancy that neither in fact nor in form has ever wavered. With no slight degree of earnestness do I, therefore, complain of Dr. Junkin for charging me with the denial of a doctrine which, in the very place to which he refers, I expressly maintain.

I would observe further, that the views which I here express, *really* affirm the doctrine of substitution and vicariousness to an extent much greater than can be held by those who maintain that Christ endured the proper penalty of the law. They hold to a substituted *person* only, and to *literal punishment;* I hold to a substituted person, and *substituted sufferings*, retaining the idea of *vicariousness* or *substitution* throughout his entire work.

The third specification under this charge is, that I deny that Christ "took away legally" the "sins" of his people. This is also an *inference* of Dr. Junkin. I reply to *this*, that I have never taught it; nor any thing that can be construed into this accusation. I have always taught that the sins of Christians *are* removed by the work of Christ, legally by justification, and really by sanctification.

The fourth count is, that I deny that Christ "purchased" the "pardon" of his people. This is also an inference; and this I have not denied. I have so repeatedly, in the very book under consideration, stated

that the blood of Christ was the price paid, the ground of acceptance, &c.; that it is matter of amazement that the author of these charges could have found it possible, in his head or his heart, to charge me with this denial. "*Christ died for us.* In our stead; to save us from death. He took our place; and by dying himself on the cross, saved us from dying eternally in hell."—P. 110. "*By his blood.* By his death. The fact that we are PURCHASED by his blood, and sanctified by it, renders us sacred in the eye of God; bestows a value on us proportionate to the worth of the price of our redemption; and is a pledge that he will keep that which has been so dearly bought."—*ib.*

"*Truly* (Note in ch. iii. 24,) it does not mean that it [justification] has been obtained, however, without any price or merit from any one, for the Lord Jesus has PURCHASED *it with his own blood*, and to him it becomes a matter of justice that those who were given to him should be justified."—P. 86. "*Through the redemption, &c.* The word here used occurs but ten times in the New Testament. Its root (lutron) properly denotes the price which is paid for a prisoner war; the ransom, a stipulated purchase money, which being paid, the captive is set free. The word is there employed to denote liberation from bondage, captivity, or evil of any kind, usually keeping up the idea of a price or ransom paid in consequence of which the delivery is effected. It is sometimes used in a large sense, to denote simple deliverance by *any means*, without reference to a price paid, as in Luke xxi. 28; Rom. viii. 23; Eph. i. 14. That this is *not*

the sense here, however, is apparent. For the apostle in the next verse proceeds to specify the *price* which has been paid, or the means by which the redemption has been effected. The word here denotes that *deliverance from sin and from the evil consequences of sin, which has been effected by the offering of Jesus Christ as a propitiation.*"—*Ib.* "When the blood of Christ is spoken of in the New Testament, it means *the offering of his life as a sacrifice*, or his death as an *expiation*. His life was given to make atonement. By faith in his death as a sacrifice for sin; by believing that he took *our* sins; that he died in *our* place; by thus, in some sense, making his offering ours; by approving it, loving it, embracing it, trusting it, our sins become pardoned, and our souls made pure."—P. 88. After these plain, positive, and repeated declarations in regard to my belief that Christ *purchased* the pardon of his people, it is a matter of most difficult solution to understand why Dr. Junkin has accused me of denying it. Can it be that he has not read the book on which he bases these charges? Or can it be that his mind was intent on finding certain things held or denied in the book that would constitute the foundation of serious accusations against a minister of the gospel? Would it be possible for Dr. Junkin, or any other man, to frame expressions that more positively and unequivocally convey the idea that Christ *did* "purchase" the "pardon" of men? And is it to be tolerated in the churches that a man may frame charges *ad libitum* against a brother, and proclaim them to the world in this manner? If this is

done, who is safe? And where is there a man whose character can stand before a proceeding of this kind, or whose reputation is secure?

On the whole, I regard the three last specifications in this charge as deeply injurious to my character and influence; as utterly unfounded; as without the shadow or semblance of proof; and complain to my peers that Dr. Junkin has done me injustice—injustice which should be repaired. I complain of the loose and inaccurate manner in which the charge is couched. I complain of his manner of drawing *inferences*, and then charging me with holding them. I complain of his formally charging me with holding opinions which are fitted to injure my character and usefulness, when I had expressly stated the reverse. I complain of the right of a minister of the gospel to accuse his brother, in a matter so deeply affecting him, in this loose, inaccurate, and unfounded manner.

Charge IX.

The ninth charge is in the following words, viz.

"That the righteousness, *i. e.* the active obedience of Christ to the law, is imputed to his people for their justification; so that they are righteous in the eye of the law, and therefore justified."

Proof 1, p. 28. (3.) The phrase *righteousness of God*, is *equivalent* to *God's plan of justifying men; his scheme of declaring them just in the sight of the law; or of acquitting them from punishment, and admitting them to favor.* In this sense it stands opposed to *man's* plan of justification, *i. e.* by his own works. God's plan is by faith." "The word to *justify*, dikaio, means properly *to be just, to be innocent, to be righteous.* It then means to *declare*, or treat as righteous, as when a man is charged with an offence, and is acquitted. If the crime alleged is not *proved* against him, he is declared by the law *to be innocent.* It then means to *treat as if innocent*, to *regard as innocent;* that is, to pardon, to forgive, and consequently to treat as if the offence

had not occurred. It does not mean that the man *did not* commit the offence, or that the law might not have held him *answerable* for it; but that the offence is forgiven; and it is consistent to receive the offender into favor, and treat him *as if* he had not committed it."

"In regard to this plan, it may be observed. (1.) That is not to declare that men *are* innocent and pure. That would not be true. The truth is just the reverse; and God does not esteem men to be different from what they are. (2.) It is not to *take part* with the sinner, and to mitigate his offences. It admits them to their full extent, and makes *him* feel them also. (3.) It is not that we become partakers of the essential righteousness of God. That is impossible. (4.) It is not that *his* righteousness becomes *ours*. This is not true; and there is no intelligible sense in which that can be understood. But it is God's plan for *pardoning* sin, and for *treating* us as if we had not committed it; that is, adopting us as his children, and admitting us to heaven, on the ground of what the Lord Jesus has done in our stead. This is God's plan. Men seek to save themselves by their own works. God's plan is to save them by the merits of Jesus Christ."

Proof 2, p. 84, 85. "*Even the righteousness of God.* The apostle, having stated that the design of the Gospel was to reveal a new plan of becoming just in the sight of God, proceeds here more fully to explain it. The explanation which he offers, makes it plain that the phrase so often used by him, "*righteousness of God*," does not refer to an attribute of God, but to his plan of making men righteous. Here he says, that it is by faith in Jesus Christ; but surely an *attribute* of God is not produced by faith in Jesus Christ. It means God's mode of regarding men as righteous through their belief in Jesus Christ. "God has promised that they who believe in Christ, shall be pardoned and saved. This is *his* plan in distinction from the plan of those who seek to be justified by works."

"*Being justified*—Being treated as if righteous, that is, being regarded and treated as if they had kept the law. The apostle has shown that they *could not* be so regarded and treated by any merit of their own, or by personal obedience to the law. He now affirms that if they were so treated, it must be by mere favor, and as a matter, not of right, but of gift. This is the essence of the Gospel.

Proof 3, p. 94, 95, as quoted under Charge IV. (7) and p. 96. "God judges things as they are; and sinners who are justified, he judges *not* as if they were pure, or as if they had a claim: but he regards them as *united by faith to the Lord Jesus, and in this relation he judges that should be treated as his friends, though they have been, are, and*

always will be personally undeserving. But if the doctrine of the Scriptures was, that the entire righteousness of Christ was set over to them, was really and truly theirs, and was *transferred* to them in any sense, with what propriety could the apostle say, that God justified the ungodly? If they have all the righteousness of Christ as their own, as really and truly theirs, *as if* they had wrought it out themselves, they are *not* "*ungodly.*" They are eminently pure and holy, and have a claim, not of grace, but of debt, to the very highest rewards of heaven." p. 97. *Unto whom God imputeth righteousness.*—Whom God treats as righteous, or as entitled to his favor in a way different from his conformity to the law. This is found in Psalms xxxii. And the whole scope and design of the Psalm is to show the blessedness of the man who is *forgiven*, and whose sins are not charged on him, but who is freed from the punishment due to his sins. Being thus pardoned, he is treated as a righteous man."

Proof 4, p. 127. *By the obedience of one.*—Of Christ. This stands opposed to the *disobedience* of Adam, and evidently includes the entire work of the Redeemer which has a bearing on the salvation of men. Phil. ii. 8. "He - - - - became *obedient* unto death."

P. 21. "*Of God's righteousness.* Not of the personal holiness of God, but *of God's plan of justifying men*, or of declaring them righteous by faith in his Son. Here God's plan stands opposed to their efforts to make themselves righteous by their own works.

How irreconcileable this is to our standards, is seen.

Con. XI. i. ii. iii. Lar. Cat. 70, 71, 72. Sh. Cat. 33.

On this charge I do not think it necessary to dwell. My general plea is, that the charge is not sustained by the passages which are quoted from my book. The charge is, that I have *denied* that "the active obedience of Christ is imputed to his people for their justification;" and is followed by an *inference* of Dr. Junkin from this, that I also deny that they "are righteous in the sight of the law, and therefore justified." In regard to this I observe, (1.) That the charge is *not* that I denied that the benefits of the work of Christ are imputed to men, or that they were justified on account of what he had done. So explicit were my re-

peated declarations on this subject, that it was not possible to allege that I denied this. (2.) I have *not* denied that the active obedience of Christ is imputed to his people. I have affirmed nothing on the subject. I have not any where in my book referred to the distinction between his active and passive obedience. There does not any where occur an expression in regard to the distinction; and of course there can be no denial of the doctrine. And I confess that I have not thought it necessary, in my preaching or in my writings, to refer distinctly to that distinction which is made in the books of theology. I have uniformly represented the doctrine as near as possible, in the language of the Scriptures; that it was, by his blood, his obedience unto death, his merits, his atoning sacrifice, his substituted sufferings, his work alone, that men could be justified and saved. I have always taught that men have no merits by nature, that they have done nothing, and can do nothing, to deserve eternal life; that they are lost, and helpless, and ruined; and that if ever saved, it must be by the merits of the Lord Jesus Christ alone: And that this *has* been the strain of my preaching, I may appeal boldly to all who have ever heard me, and to all my writings. No man ever heard me utter a sentiment in the pulpit or elsewhere that contravened this great central truth of Christianity; no man can find in any of my writings an expression that is contrary to the doctrine. The charge, therefore, that I have "DENIED that the active obedience of Christ is imputed," &c., is wholly gratuitous and unfounded. It is neither contained in the passages which are quoted by the prosecutor from my

book, nor is it to be found any where in what I have said or written. (3.) I have *not* denied that his people are "righteous in the sight of the law, and therefore justified." This is another of the injurious and unfounded *inferences* which Dr. Junkin has felt himself at liberty to charge me with holding. In the very passages which he has quoted, I have affirmed the very contrary. Thus [p. 85] I expressly say that they are "treated as if righteous, that is, are regarded and treated as if they had kept the law." And thus, [p. 28,] I say, of the plan of justification by faith, that "it is God's plan for pardoning sin, and for treating us as if we had not committed it; that is, adopting us as his children, and admitting us to heaven, on the ground of what the Lord Jesus has done in our stead. Men seek to save themselves by their own works; God's plan is to save them by the merits of Jesus Christ." (4.) My views on the subject of justification are stated often in the Notes, and with such clearness, I supposed, that their meaning could not be mistaken. All that I have now to do is, to submit those views to the Presbytery, as being, so far as appears to me, in strict accordance with the Confession of Faith, and the Bible.

Thus, on p. 85, I say, in the words "*being justified;*" "being treated as if righteous; that is, being regarded and treated as if they had kept the law." I have no other view of justification than that. Again: p. 28. "The phrase, righteousness of God, is equivalent to God's plan of justifying men; his scheme of declaring them just in the sight of the law; or of acquitting them from punishment, and admitting them

to favor. "In this sense, it stands opposed to *man's* plan of justification, *i. e.* by his own works. God's plan is by faith. The *way* in which that is done, is revealed in the gospel. The object contemplated to be done, is to treat men as if they were righteous. Man attempted to accomplish this by obedience to the law. The plan of God was to arrive at it by faith. Here the two schemes differ; and the great design of this epistle is to show that man cannot be justified on his own plan, that is, by works; and that the plan of God is the only way, and a wise and glorious way, of making man just in the eye of the law," &c. Again: p. 29. "But it (the plan of justification by faith) is God's plan of pardoning sin, and for treating us if we had not committed it; that is, adopting us as his children, and admitting us to heaven on the ground of what the Lord Jesus has done in our stead. This is God's plan. Men seek to save themselves by their own works. God's plan is to save them by the merits of Jesus Christ." Also, pp. 90, 97, 95, 213, 29.

In all this, I suppose that the good principle is still maintained, that God reckons *things as they are*, and that *all his imputations are according to truth*, and are not false. Paul, for illustration, was justified by faith in the atoning blood of Christ. God did not reckon, or impute, that *Paul* was put to death on the cross; that *he* was arraigned and mocked; that *his* hands were pierced, and his temples pressed with the crown of thorns, and that *he* was nailed to the tree. So to impute, or reckon, would have been contrary to historical fact. *It was not so*, and could

not be so reckoned, or imputed. But God's imputations were according to truth; and not otherwise. [1.] He reckoned Paul to be a lost and ruined sinner —undone and helpless; and condemned, in the sight of justice and of law. He imputed to him a character which rendered salvation by his own doings impossible; and this was according to truth. [2.] He reckoned or judged his Son to be a sacrifice in the place of Paul. Himself innocent, yet he was willing to die to redeem him. God *regarded* his Son as such a sacrifice, as dying to make atonement; as rising that man might be justified. All his work he regarded or reckoned to have been undertaken and accomplished in the place of sinners. This was to reckon the thing just as it was. [3.] Paul was enabled by the Holy Spirit to repent, and believe the gospel. He so judged of him *as* a penitent, and a believer. And he judged that it would be consistent for him to pardon and save a penitent, on account of what Christ had done in his stead. The law had been magnified and made honorable. Justice had been satisfied. The anger of God had been appeased. His own character would be regarded as pure: his hatred of sin had been evinced; his authority would be maintained, and his mercy manifest, if he should then forgive him. God *judged*, or reckoned, that it could be done consistently, and it was done; and the judgment was in strict accordance with truth. [4.] It was consistent for God to treat Paul *as if* he had not sinned; to treat him, *in fact*, as a pardoned and justified man. The benefits, or results of the work of Christ, were thus made available to his pardon and

acceptance; and were thus reckoned, or imputed to him in the eye of the law, so that he could be consistently treated in this manner. All God's judicial reckonings or imputations are thus according to truth, or as things actually are. He reckons nothing falsely; but just as he sees them to be. Truth and justice are thus maintained; his character is unsullied; and the happiness of man secure.

A change has been made in the "Notes," which removes an ambiguity in the former edition, in a passage which failed to convey my meaning. The change occurs on p. 96, where the following passages have been substituted for those which there occur: viz.

P. 96. "It is not meant that the righteousness of Christ is *transferred* to them, so as to become personally theirs—for moral character cannot be transferred; —nor that it is *infused* into them, making them personally meritorious—for then they could not be spoken of as ungodly; but that Christ died in their stead, to atone for their sins, and is regarded and esteemed by God to have died; and that the results or benefits of his death are so reckoned or imputed to believers, as to make it proper for God to regard and treat them as if they had themselves obeyed the law; that is, as righteous in his sight."

Charge X.

The tenth charge is in the following words, viz:

"Mr. Barnes also teaches, in opposition to the standards, that justification is simply pardon."

Proof 1, pp. 28, 29 (already quoted.) The phrase *righteousness of God* is equivalent to *God's plan of justifying men; his scheme of declaring them just in the sight of the law; or of acquitting them from punishment, and admitting them to favor.*"

2. "In regard to this plan, it may be observed, (4.) It is not that *his* righteousness becomes *ours*. This is not true; and there is no intelligible sense in which that can be understood. But it is God's plan for *pardoning* sin, and for *treating us* as if we had not committed it."

3. P. 110. "*Being now justified.* Pardoned; accepted as his friends."

4. P. 124. "*Unto justification.* The work of Christ is designed to have reference to many offences, so as to produce pardon or justification in regard to them all." The comment on chap. v. 19. "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous," is thus summed up, pp. 127, 128. "The sense of the verse is this: 'As in consequence of the sin of one, the many became sinners, without explaining the mode in which it is done; so the many became righteous in the mode and on the terms which are explained? *Righteous.* Justified. Free from condemnation.'"

5. P. 182. "*It is God that justifieth.* That is, who has pardoned them, and admitted them to his favor, and pronounced them *just* in his sight."

6. P. 217. "The moment a sinner believes, therefore, he is justified; his sins are pardoned; and he is introduced into the favor of God."

The inconsistency of this with standards is evident. Con. XI. i. ii iii. Lar. Cat. 70, 71, 72. Sh. 33. See Scriptures quoted under IX. and Rom. vi. 16—18, 19. 1 Pet. i. 14—22.

In regard to this charge, I have few words to offer. My general reply is, that I have *not* taught what is here charged on me, but the very reverse. So far from teaching that justification is merely pardon, I

have, in the very passages under consideration, taught that God regards and treats the sinner who believes in Christ as if he was righteous, and that solely on account of the merits of Christ, irrespective of any good deeds, or desert of the sinner, whatsoever. The main difference between *pardon* and *justification*, I have supposed, respects the sinner contemplated in respect to his *past* conduct, or to God's *future* dealings with him. Pardon is a free forgiveness of past offences. It simply has reference to those sins *as* forgiven and blotted out. It is an act of remission on the part of God. Justification has respect to the law, and to God's purposes of *future treatment.* It is an act by which the sinner becomes righteous in the sight of the law; or by which God determines to treat him hereafter *as* a righteous man, or as if he had not sinned. It is true that pardon, in the divine arrangement, implies justification as certainly to exist. But it is *because* God has so arranged it; and not because pardon is the same thing as justification. Thus under the English law, in the case of treason, where the blood is corrupted by attainder, the corruption is of such a character that a mere act of pardon cannot fully remove it, but it can be "absolutely salved and restored but by act of Parliament." "And it is a general rule, that having respect to all those whose blood was corrupted at the time of the attainder, the pardon doth not remove the corruption of blood neither upward nor downward." III. Coke upon Littleton, pp. 614, 615. In like manner, in regard to the case of a rebel against heaven, a pardon has reference to past offences, but there is need of the solemn act of

God, resolving that *all* the effects of his sin shall be removed, and that he shall be henceforward treated as if he had fallen; that is, be wholly restored to favor, and adopted as his child. On this charge, I have not taught the doctrine with which I am accused; nor do the passages alleged prove it. In the very passages adduced by the prosecutor on this charge, I have taught that God admits the sinner to favor, and treats him as if he had not sinned, or were righteous.

I am now through with the consideration of these wearisome and troublesome charges. I rejoice that I am drawing near the conclusion of this trial, and that I can commit the cause to my Presbytery. I have gone over the charges at length. A part of the doctrines charged on me I do hold; but have endeavored to show that they are neither contrary to the Bible, nor to the Confession of Faith. A part of them I do *not* hold; the passages which have been adduced from my book to prove them, I have shown do not prove them; and I reject them with as deep abhorrence as my prosecutor can do. A part of them are *inferences* which, the prosecutor has drawn from what he has conceived to be my meaning, and which, in violation, as it seems to me, of all the principles of equity, he has accused me of holding. A large part of the charges pertain to abstract and metaphysical subjects, which do not affect the vitality of Christian doctrine, which are unintelligible, or uninteresting to the great mass of men; and in which men may differ, and yet hold to the great facts of the Christian revelation. None of the points on which I differ from the prosecutor, can be regarded as fundamental; and, on

all of them, difference of opinion has been allowed hitherto in the Presbyterian Church.

In reference to these charges, the Presbytery is now to give their verdict. While I am accused in this manner, I beg that it will be borne in mind, that on the great and vital doctrines of the Christian religion, even my prosecutor has dared to frame no accusation. While I am arraigned on these charges, not affecting the vitality of Christian doctrine, not a charge has been brought, and not a syllable has fallen from his lips, that I am suspected of unsoundness or heresy in regard to the divine origin, and plenary inspiration of the Holy Scriptures; to the unity, spirituality, and perfections of God; to the nature of his moral government, and the claims and equity of his law; to the divinity of Jesus Christ; to the fact that he made an atonement for sinners; that he died and rose from the dead, and ascended to heaven; to the doctrine that man is fallen, lost, corrupted, and totally ruined in himself; that he is entirely depraved, and is condemned by the law; to the necessity of a change of heart, radical and entire, and totally transforming; to the doctrine that this is produced solely by the agency of the Holy Spirit, and that it never is, nor can be accomplished but by him; to the doctrine that man is justified by the merits solely of the Lord Jesus; to the doctrine that God is a sovereign, and bestows his blessings when and where he pleases; that he has a plan that is good and wise, and that men are saved according to his eternal counsels, and his electing love; to the doctrine that Christians should lead a holy life, and should cultivate a spirit of humility, and

love, and purity, and prayer; to the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, and to the great truth that the righteous shall be saved for ever, and the wicked destroyed eternally in hell. Now, on these and the great kindred doctrines of religion, my prosecutor has alleged in me no departure from the faith once delivered to the saints. On minor points, on points of metaphysical difference and speculation, he has arraigned me, has sought to embarrass me, and has spread my name abroad, as charged with heresy, and as unworthy the confidence of the churches of the Redeemer.

Having gone through with an examination of these charges at such length, I now commit the cause to my Presbytery. My happiness, my usefulness, my peace, and my reputation, are in no small degree in your hands. I commit the cause with confidence to my brethren, and to God, not doubting that justice will be done. Deeply affected as all my interests must be in this decision, I have no apprehension as to the result of this investigation; for I have shown, I think, that I hold no doctrines contrary to the Holy Scriptures; that I accord with the great, main, and essential truths stated in the Confession which we all have professed to receive; and that where the prosecutor and myself differ in opinion, it is only in those abstruse and metaphysical points, which in all ages have been considered debatable ground, which do not affect the vitality of Christian doctrine; on which the Presbyterian Church in the United States, always imbued hitherto with a large and catholic spirit, has allowed its ministers and members to differ; and in reference to which they *may* differ, and still be the

warm friends of truth and order; the advocates of revivals of religion; the fellow-laborers in the great work of bearing the gospel around the world.

I have only to add, that I cherish no unkind feelings towards my prosecutor. I charge on him no improper motives. I accuse him of no unchristian or vindictive spirit. I have no reason to doubt that he has, in all this proceeding, been actuated by conscientious motives. I delight to add my humble testimony, in accordance with the feelings of all who have witnessed this trial, to his Christian spirit; and rejoice to close by saying, that my conviction of the piety and the Christian temper of my prosecutor, has been augmenting throughout the entire prosecution. With these remarks, I submit the cause to the Presbytery; and these documents, to be preserved, with the consent of the Presbytery, as a part of their records, as the evidence which I adduce on my part, and as my defence.

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1. The spirit which imbues them is highly devotional. It is a devotion founded on knowledge. It is a zeal guided by discretion.

2. The notes are eminently intellectual. Apparent difficulties are fairly met. They are either explained, or the want of a fully satisfactory explanation admitted. There is none of that slipping by a knot which is too common in many commentaries.

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There may be passages in which we should differ from the writer in some of the minor shades of meaning. There may be sometimes an unguarded expression which has escaped our notice. We have not scrutinized the volumes with the eye of a critic. But we have used them in our private reading. We have used them in our family. And we have invariably read them with profit and delight.

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"From this impressive and instructive parable, we may learn,

"1. That the souls of men do not die with their bodies.

"2. That the souls of men are *conscious* after death; that they do not sleep, as some have supposed, till the morning of the resurrection.

"3 That the righteous are taken to a place of happiness immediately at death, and the wicked consigned to misery.

"4. That wealth does not secure us from death.

> "How vain are riches to secure
> Their haughty owners from the grave.

"The rich, the beautiful the gay, as well as the poor, go down to the grave. All their pomp and apparel; all their honors, their palaces and their gold cannot save them. Death can as easily find his way into the mansions of the rich as into the cottages of the poor, and the rich shall turn to the same corruption, and soon, like the poor, be undistinguished from common dust, and be unknown.

"5. We should not envy the condition of the rich.

> "On slippery rocks I see them stand,
> And fiery billows roll below.

"6. We should strive for a better inheritance, than can be possessed in this life.

> "'Now I esteem their mirth and wine.
> Too dear to purchase with my blood,
> Lord 'tis enough that *thou* art mine,
> My life, my portion, and my God.'"

"7. The sufferings of the wicked in hell will be indiscribably great. Think what is represented by *torment*, by burning flame, by insupportable thirst, by that state when a single drop of water would afford relief. Remember that all this is but a representation of the pains of the damned, and that this will have no relief, day nor night, but will continue from

RECOMMENDATIONS OF BARNES' NOTES.

year to year, and age to age, and without any end, and you have a faint view of the sufferings of those who are in hell.

"8. There is a place of suffering beyond the grave, a hell. If there is not, then this parable has no meaning. It is impossible to make anything of it unless it is designed to teach that.

"9. There will never be any escape from those gloomy regions. There is a gulf fixed—*fixed*, not moveable. Nor can any of the damned beat a pathway across this gulf, to the world of holiness.

"10. We see the amazing folly of those, who suppose there may be an *end* to the sufferings of the wicked, and who on that supposition seem willing to go down to hell to suffer a long time, rather than go at once to heaven. If man were to suffer but a thousand years, or even *one* year, why should he be so foolish as to choose that suffering, rather than go at once to heaven, and be happy at once when he dies?

"11. God gives us warning sufficient to prepare for death. He has sent his word, his servants, his son; he warns us by his Spirit and his providence, by the entreaties of our friends, and by the death of sinners. He offers us heaven, and he threatens hell. If all this will not move sinners, what *would* do it? There is nothing that would.

"12. God will give us nothing farther to warn us. No dead man will come to life, to tell us what he has seen. If he did, we would not believe him. Religion appeals to man, not by ghosts and frightful apparitions. It appeals to their reason, their conscience, their hopes, and their fears.—It sets life and death soberly before men, and if they will not choose the former they must die. If you will not hear the Son of God, and the truth of the Scriptures, there is nothing which you will or can hear; you will never be persuaded, and never will escape the place of torment."

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